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Chapter 1
Literature
“Honour is the greatest good among external
goods.”
Aquinas, 1265 / 1958, Index 156
“The most important factor is individual recognition
— more important than salaries, bonuses or promo-
tions.”
Paul M. Cook, Founder and CEO of Raychem
(Nelson, 1996)
• Irregular accounting procedures resulted in the bankruptcy of Enron, a
large U.S. energy company.
• Société Générale, one of France’s most important commercial banks,
incurred a loss of a AC4.9 billion ($ 6.4 trillion) due to the unauthorized
trading decisions of an employee.
• In 2002 WorldCom filed for bankruptcy after years of fraudulent ac-
counting methods by key staff members were uncovered.
1
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• Barings Bank, the oldest merchant bank in London, collapsed in 1995
after one of the bank’s employees, Nick Leeson, lost £827 million ($1.2
billion) speculating—primarily on futures contracts.
Is there a common theme in all these scandals? These employees all had
high-powered financial incentives to do well, and yet acted contrary to the
interest of their principals. The importance of getting work incentives right
has long been recognized in the economics and management literature. Both
scholars and practitioners recognize that for today’s organizations to attain a
competitive advantage, a skilled work force, cutting edge technological pro-
ficiency, exemplary customer service, and high quality products and services
are needed (O’Reilly and Pfeffer, 2000). Because these demands require
high employee motivation, the critical factor in gaining a distinctive edge
in a globalized, competitive market seems to be on the human side of orga-
nizations (Argyris, 1993; Pfeffer, 1995, 1998; Stajkovic and Luthans, 2003).
Further, research is demonstrating that employees drive success, whether that
be defined as productivity, customer satisfaction, or even profits (Harter et al.,
2002). Therefore, new approaches to human resources are essential for im-
proving competitiveness (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003), especially as the evi-
dence on the effect of monetary incentives on employee motivation and orga-
nizational performance is mixed (the ineffectiveness of monetary incentives
is, for example, shown in Perrin, 2007; Rost and Osterloh, 2009). On the
margin, it is not clear how much CEOs and other workers respond to within-
company incentives.
Despite the agreement about the importance of having a motivated work-
force, a large part of this potential currently lies idle. A study of The Confer-
ence Board (Franco, 2003) shows that two-thirds of employees do not identify
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with the business goals of their employer and are not motivated to contribute
to their attainment. More than half of the employees perceive a disconnect
between themselves and their employer, and one-fourth are willing to con-
tribute just enough to not lose their job. A study by Perrin (2007), one of the
leading management consultancies, shows that the picture is similar in Euro-
pean countries. In Germany, for example, the percentage of highly motivated
employees is 17 percent (12 percentage points lower than the respective num-
ber in the US). Almost every tenth employee has lost all motivation and 28
percent are poorly motivated to perform well.
A number of employee surveys highlights what employees consider to be
important for their work motivation. These studies, therefore, provide in-
sights into what motivating measures are currently underexploited given the
low percentage of highly motivated employees. For Germany, Perrin (2007)
suggests that the most important motivational drive for employees is that
managers show interest for their workforce. Next in line is the decision-
making autonomy, followed by the reputation of the company and opportu-
nities for training and career development. A review of employee surveys re-
veals that “full appreciation for work done” is the only job reward factor that
consistently ranks among the top two motivators for U.S. workers throughout
the post-World War II period (Wiley, 1997). Among ten factors, interesting
work was considered somewhat more important in the 80s, and good wages
were at the top of the list in the 90s, but neither interesting work nor good
wages were among the top four reward factors in more than one decade out
of three. Financial motives occupy fourth place. Likewise, Elsdon (2002)
reports that lack of recognition or appreciation is a major reason why people
leave organizations, second only to lack of career development opportunities.
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The importance of recognition for work motivation and job satisfaction has
already been identified in earlier studies such as Dahrendorf (1959, p. 83)
and Dunnette et al. (1967). Practitioner surveys show that the majority of
managers believe that providing nonfinancial recognition to employees when
they do good work helps to increase their performance (Nelson, 2001).
Despite the agreement that recognition is important, its motivating power is
rarely exploited in companies. Wiley (1997), for example, concludes that
“praise for a job well done is probably the most powerful, yet least costly and
most underused, motivation tool.” The disconnect between the agreement on
the important role of recognition and its underemployment as a human re-
sources instrument is attributed to a lack of empirical support for strategies
to motivate employees to improve performance (see also Pfeffer, 1995, 1998;
Ambrose and Kulik, 1999; Luthans and Stajkovic, 1999; Pfeffer, 2001).
This thesis addresses the identified research gaps in two ways. First, it
provides clear empirical evidence on the impact of rewards on work perfor-
mance. Second, it does so for a type of reward that has not been explic-
itly dealt with in the economics literature so far, namely for institutionalized
recognition in the form of corporate employee awards. Awards directly ad-
dress recognition and praise — those motivational drives that have been iden-
tified as important but so far remain underexploited. In contrast to informal
praise and feedback, which are typically outside the realm of what the com-
pany can strategically influence and plan, awards can be incorporated into a
company’s official human resources strategy.
Despite their neglect in the scientific literature, awards are widely used
in the corporate sector.1 In his book 1001 Ways to Reward Employees, Nel-
1 The prevalence of awards is also noted for other sectors like the cultural sector. English
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son (2005) provides ample evidence for the number and variety of awards in
companies ranging from Employee of the Month titles to Bravo and Thanks
awards.2 To mention just a few examples of corporate awards, consider Fed-
eral Express, which confers a host of awards, both for individual and team ef-
forts. These include the Circle of Excellence Award that is presented monthly
to the best-performing FedEx station, and the Golden Falcon that is awarded
to employees who go beyond the call of duty to serve their customers. Re-
cipients of the Golden Falcon receive a golden uniform pin, a congratulatory
phone call from a senior executive and ten shares of stock. Awards also play
a substantial role in high technology firms. The research laboratories of IBM,
for example, have a multitude of awards for technical achievements (such
as the Outstanding Technical Achievement Award), as well as for other ex-
ceptional efforts (such as the Knowledge Advantage Award or the One Team
Award).
There is major discrepancy between the practitioner literature and the aca-
demic literature with respect to recognition programs. On one hand, the
practitioner literature frequently advocates recognition programs to improve
safety (Pardy, 1999; Krause, 1998; Tait and Walker, 2000), reduce turnover
(Bursch, 1999; Davidson, 1999; Wallsten, 1998), increase job satisfaction
(Davidson, 1999; Wallsten, 1998), improve performance and productivity
(Schneier, 1989), and reduce absenteeism (Boyle, 1995). Furthermore, nu-
(2004, p. 17) takes it to the extreme, stating “the cultural universe has become supersatu-
rated with prizes.”
2 Nelson and Spitzer (2003) lists the various awards offered in big international companies
such as IKEA, McDonald’s or SONY. Awards are also widely used in small and mid-
sized companies. Examples are provided in the Strategic HR Review that regularly devotes
an entire section to successful company award programs (examples are Addison, 2005;
Keating, 2007).
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merous books and manuals have been written detailing how to structure recog-
nition programs (Townsend and Gebhardt, 1997; Glassock and Gram, 1999;
Ventrice, 2003; Podmoroff, 2005). There is also a number of studies on public
sector awards to improve service quality (Löffler, 2001; Hartley and Downe,
2007; Bourgault and Gusella, 2001). On the other hand, there is a paucity of
academic research targeted at recognition programs. This disparity is prob-
ably driven by a lack of a clear definition about what constitutes a corporate
award system from an academic point of view. When practitioners discuss
recognition programs, they refer to a variety of interventions that represent
incentive instruments designed to reward at a low cost. From an academic
point of view, this represents an ambiguous concept with little theoretical ba-
sis, which is why academic research has focused on studying money, praise
and feedback in isolation.
So what exactly are awards? Awards are understood as extrinsic, predomi-
nantly non-material incentives allocated through an institutionalized recogni-
tion program. The formal character clearly distinguishes awards from sponta-
neous feedback and praise. They derive their motivating power from provid-
ing a combination of feedback, status and recognition and — mostly small —
material incentives. Further, they contribute to the work environment by in-
fluencing organizational norms and by highlighting role models of exemplary
performance.
Awards work as incentives via a number of channels that have been shown
to influence human behavior (a more exhaustive and detailed account of the
various motivational channels is presented in chapter 2). Among others,
awards motivate (1) because of the social prestige they generate and recog-
nition they bring within the peer group and from the principal; (2) because
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winning an award makes the recipient feel good about herself even without
others knowing about the award; (3) because awards have signaling value in
that they can signal unobservable characteristics like motivation and commit-
ment to parties inside and outside the company; (4) because of the monetary
compensation associated with winning the awards.
Awards have work both as ex ante incentives and through ex post motiva-
tional effects. Awards establish role models and create loyalty between the
recipients and the award giver. Further, award announcements as well as the
publication of the behavior of award winners distribute information on the
kinds of behaviors and performance that the company expects and values in
its employees. Depending on the specific award analyzed, the various award
channels mentioned above are salient in differing degrees. While the gen-
eral term ‘award’ implies that the different existing honors and prizes pertain
to the same group of incentives, specific awards differ vastly from one an-
other in terms of what component is most salient. Some awards are clearly
competition prizes, while others more closely resemble feedback or praise.
Some awards are valuable in monetary terms, while others come with neither
monetary nor other material benefits.
This thesis refrains from distinguishing between different types of awards
and treats all types of awards as a unified category of non-monetary incen-
tives. This is justified, despite the mentioned differences, as all awards share
certain essential features that warrant the analysis of awards as one phe-
nomenon. Among others, these features are that awards are always visible, be
it via a public ceremony or because the award itself can be publicly displayed.
Further, awards are associated with some form of social recognition, which
can come either from peers or from the award-giving institution. Awards are
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handed out according to a set of broad and vague criteria. Typically, the var-
ious performance dimensions and how these are weighed to determine the
winner are not clearly specified. Consider, for example, an award for excep-
tional customer service. It is typically not made explicit which specific be-
haviors (e.g., working overtime, being friendly, solving customer complaints)
count towards winning the award and how much weight each of the relevant
behaviors receives when the management decides on the award winner. One
reason for vague award criteria may be that they prevent employees from fo-
cusing on the activities specified as relevant for winning the award instead of
considering which behavior would be best in the situation at hand. Vague cri-
teria also allow the management to adjust the set of relevant performance di-
mensions and weights to the actual business situations. This leads to another
feature of awards, namely the subjective element in determining the winner.
While awards are typically handed out in a manner that makes the reasons for
choosing the particular recipient(s) transparent, nonrecipients cannot claim
an award by trying to establish that their performance was better. A fur-
ther characteristic of awards is the tournament character and the fact that all
awards serve as incentives, be it direct or indirect. Awards are direct incen-
tives when it is announced ex ante that they will be granted for certain kinds
of performance, such as the customer service award granted for the best cus-
tomer service in the current year. Awards are indirect incentives when they
stimulate non-winners to engage in tasks similar to the ones rewarded, by
establishing that this kind of behavior is deemed desirable, and when they
foster motivation by improving the work environment or by changing norms.
In addition, awards may strengthen organizational commitment, which in turn
provides incentives to work better and harder (the unique features of awards
are further explored in Chapter 3).
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As was mentioned above, there exists little academic research on awards.
Hansen and Weisbrod (1972) and Frey (2005, 2006, 2007) provide general
accounts of awards. Concerning the corporate sector, Markham et al. (2002)
show in a quasi-experimental setting that the introduction of a public recog-
nition program lowered absenteeism by 52 percent. Gavrila et al. (2005)
describe the optimal solution for the management of awards over time, by
considering that their incentive effect depends on the number of awards pre-
sented. Besley and Ghatak (2008) analyze a principal-agent setting with non-
monetary incentives, such as job titles or awards. The decisive feature of
these rewards is that they have zero costs, so that it is incentive compatible
for the principal to award them even if his output is not verifiable for the
agent. In such a situation, the principal cannot credibly commit ex ante to
paying out an output-dependent material reward, because he would always
claim ex post that final output is low. Malmendier and Tate (2008) also show
how the receipt of a title like CEO of the Year affects subsequent performance.
However, their paper is concerned with extra-organizational awards that are
exogenous to the principal-agent relationship. These kinds of awards differ
in essential ways from intra-organizational awards because they are handed
out for a different set of reasons, by a person or institution that is not the prin-
cipal, and come with a different set of benefits for the recipient. Therefore,
their findings cannot be generalized to intra-organizational awards.
There are further economic discussions of awards. These, however, do
not address the behavioral effect of awards but rather use specific prizes to
study other issues like the correctness of expert opinion (e.g., Glejser and
Heyndels, 2001; Ginsburgh, 2003; Ginsburgh and van Ours, 2003 on music
and arts prizes, Coupé, 2003 on best paper prizes in economics, and Hamer-
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mesh and Schmidt, 2003 on the determinants of Econometric Society Fellows
elections). Redelmeier and Singh (2001) use Oscars and Rablen and Os-
wald (2008) use Nobel prizes to study the impact of status on physiological
outcomes such as health and longevity. Nelson et al. (2001) estimate the
economic impact of winning an Oscar on business performance. Many his-
torical accounts describe prizes and support the intuition that they are impor-
tant motivators, but lack a systematic theoretical or empirical account of their
role Examples are Holden (1993) and Levy (1987) on the Academy Awards,
Risk (1972) on the Order of the Bath or Galloway (2002) on the Order of St
Michael and St George.
This thesis provides an extensive discussion of awards and demonstrates
their effect on employee performance. Chapter 2 lays the theoretical founda-
tion for why awards may motivate by providing an over-view of classical eco-
nomic as well as more recent behavioral and psychological arguments. When
awards have some material value they can be understood as performance in-
centives in a principal-agent setting or as a prize in a tournament. Moreover,
agents may exert extra effort to receive the award when the award signals to
relevant outsiders that the agent is highly motivated, talented, or successful
in the company. Further, the announcement of the criteria for a new award
or the publication of an award winner’s activities can provide other employ-
ees with information on the kinds of behavior and performance the company
expects and values in its employees. Chapter 3 discusses awards and their
relationship with other incentive instruments, specifically monetary compen-
sation schemes, and presents some insights into practitioners’ perceptions of
awards as incentives. To gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics of
awards as incentives, they are compared in their extreme form of purely social
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recognition without any material consequence with pure monetary compen-
sation devoid of any social component. Chapters 4 to 6 provide the empiri-
cal evidence showing that awards have a systematic and significant effect on
employee performance. A field experiment in collaboration with an interna-
tional NGO is presented in chapter 4. It shows that productivity in a data
entry job, measured as the number of completed data fields per minute, is ap-
proximately 10 percent higher in workgroups where the two best employees
can get an award in addition to the fixed wage that is identical for all work-
groups. Awards also have a significant impact on performance after they are
handed out. Chapter 5 reports the results of an econometric study using data
on awards and employee performance from the call center of a large interna-
tional bank. It can be shown that the performance of award winners is signif-
icantly higher than that of nonrecipients one month after an award. Chapter
6 sheds some light into what award features drive this effect by reporting
the results of a vignette study with researchers at a research laboratory. The
findings suggest that the publicity associated with winning an award is a ma-
jor motivation force that drives people to aspire to win an award. Chapter
7 concludes by critically examining the results and limitations of the studies
presented, discussing the implications for human resources and suggesting
avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2
Why Do Awards Affect Behavior? — A
Survey of the Literature
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the subsequent empirical sec-
tions, which demonstrate the impact of awards on employee performance in
organizations. The literature in economics, organizational psychology, man-
agement, sociology and evolutionary anthropology is presented regarding if
and why awards may induce effort. As there is no literature that directly ad-
dresses awards, those aspects of the literature are chosen for discussion that
are relevant for an analysis of awards. First, standard economic approaches
are presented that explain why awards induce effort. Awards are discussed
in terms of the tournament created, their value as signals of unobservable
personal characteristics as well as their function in communicating desirable
and successful behaviors within the organization. The chapter proceeds with
approaches that discuss awards in terms of preferences beyond material self-
interest such as status, self-esteem, and image considerations. The conclud-
ing section briefly discusses culture, business environment and procedures as
factors that influence the effectiveness of awards.
The same subject is often discussed with a different terminology in differ-
ent disciplines. For the most part, the language has been adapted to fit into
the framework typically used in economics. One exception is the psycho-
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logical concept work motivation that is treated as an outcome variable per se
in psychology, whereas economists are typically only interested in its behav-
ioral consequences. Motivation, coming from the Latin word movere mean-
ing ‘to move’, has been defined in various ways. Pinder (1998) describes
work motivation as the set of internal and external forces that initiate work-
related behavior, and determine its form, direction, intensity, and duration.
This definition views motivation, i.e. the drive to act, as being influenced by
environmental forces, such as the organizational reward system and the na-
ture of the work being performed, as well as forces inherent in the person,
such as individual needs and motives. In comparison, economics has focused
on the effects of the organizational reward system by making the simplifying
assumption that all internal forces can be summarized as the desire for ma-
terial gain. More recent contributions in economics acknowledge the role of
other needs and motives in the workplace like the desire for status, prestige
and intrinsic motivation. As there is a direct relationship between motivation
and behavior, the determinants of motivation identified by psychologists can
be discussed alongside the behavioral forces identified to drive behavior in
economics.
2.1 Standard Approaches
In this section, I outline how several standard theories - a principal-agent
model, a tournament, a signaling framework and an information-sharing frame-
work are relevant to awards. If awards are tied to some immediate or future
monetary or material advantage, much of the economic standard literature
on principal-agent relationships and tournaments can be applied directly to
the case of awards. The same holds when one assumes that employees value
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awards per se. Mechanisms for why this may be the case are explored below
in section 2.2. Tournaments can be viewed as one mechanism to induce effort
in a principal-agent setting. Because the tournament literature is so large and
has established itself as a field of inquiry, it is dealt with in a separate section.
The general framework of principal-agent theory and the tournament litera-
ture share a focus on the incentive effect of rewards, i.e. their impact on per-
formance while employees work towards receiving them. The same holds for
the signaling literature. The signaling framework can explain why employees
aspire to win awards when awards have some value as signals. Awards can,
for example, signal motivation and ability to outsiders, which may lead to
attractive job offers or improve the agent’s social network. Further, awards
affect behavior when they reveal information on the kinds of activities and
the level of performance the company wants from its employees. Such in-
formation is relevant in settings with complex tasks where this information
is not readily available otherwise and if employees expect that performance
in line with company goals results in pay raises or promotions. As a con-
ceptual note, the theories described here do not have the same relationship to
awards as one another. Rather, they help to explain and highlight different
aspects of awards. Principal-agent and signaling models refer to the problem
of unobservability of agent’s effort and describe ways to get around it. Tour-
naments are similar to awards in their structure as some good is rationed and
it is assumed that participation in a tournament raises the equilibrium effort
of all players and not just the winners. However, there is no “problem” per se.
The information value of awards refers to a lack of clarity about norms be-
tween the principal and agent. Hence it is an issue within the principal-agent
problem about the unobservability of the principal’s goals.
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2.1.1 Principal-agent theory
Principal-agent theory goes back to Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and is the generic framework within which economic
theory typically discusses incentive provision in the workplace. The central
dilemma investigated by principal-agent theorists is a two-party interaction
in which one party, the principal, wants to induce another party, the agent, to
take some action that is costly to the agent. The principal may be unable to
directly observe the action of the agent, but instead observes some output, X ,
that is determined, at least in part, by the actions of the agent. The principal’s
problem is to design an incentive payment from the principal to the agent that
induces the agent to take the best action from the viewpoint of the principal.
The simplest example of a principal-agent problem is that of a manager and
a worker. The manager wants the worker to exert as much effort as possible
in order to produce as much output as possible, while the worker rationally
wants to make a choice that maximizes his own utility given the effort and in-
centive payment scheme (further information on the basic set-up is provided
in Varian, 1992).1
The basic premises of the theory are that the relationship between the prin-
cipal and the agent is defined solely by the contract and that the agents react
to the stimuli the employer presents them with. Further, better performance
requires greater effort or is in some other way associated with disutility on
1 The basic premises of this theory go back to Taylor (1911), according to whom the natural
state of a worker in an organization is one of inactivity and laziness and only the prospect of
personal financial gain can coax the individual out of this. Taylor assumes that whenever
people are forced to work in groups or for fixed pay, they will be undermotivated and
reluctant to exert effort. His suggested solution is to only select the very best workers, to
ensure that they are treated and work as individuals and to pay them only for what they
produce.
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the part of workers. In order to provide incentives, these models predict the
existence of reward systems that structure compensation so that a worker’s
expected utility increases with observed productivity. An optimal incentive
scheme in settings of incomplete or asymmetric information changes the rules
of the game such that the self-interested rational choices of the agent coincide
with what the principal desires. Mechanisms that have been discussed in the
literature are piece rates and commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages,
and performance control.2
In psychology, the Organizational Behavior Modification paradigm (Luthans
and Kreitner, 1975, 1985) also emphasizes that employee behavior is a func-
tion of contingent consequences (Bandura, 1969; Komaki, 1996; Pfeffer, 1995).
The paradigm is grounded in reinforcement theory, where the core idea is that
decisions concerning present or future behaviors are largely influenced by the
consequences, i.e. rewards, of past behavior (see Steers et al., 2004 and the
references therein). Past actions that led to positive outcomes tend to be re-
peated, whereas past actions that led to negative outcomes tend to diminish
3 Current reinforcement models are prevalent in organizational psychology
as explanations for understanding work motivation and job performance (Ko-
maki, 2003). The most commonly studied organizational reinforcers in this
literature are money in the form of performance pay, feedback, social recog-
nition, and their combinations (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997, 2001, 2003).
2 The goal of pay-for-performance is to compensate staff according to their individual and
specific performance in order to motivate them to further efforts. The concept follows the
idea of piece rate. The company Safelite Glass is a prominent example. After the change
from fixed pay rates per hour to piece rates, measured according to assembled glass units
per worker and day, productivity rose by 36 percent while salary cost only rose by 9 percent
(Lazear, 2000b).
3 Thorndike (1911) referred to this as the law of effect.
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Principal-agent and reinforcement theory are well supported empirically.
However, there remain a number of puzzles that these theories cannot ex-
plain, such as the fact that most pay systems are largely independent of per-
formance, i.e. egalitarian and seniority based. Moreover, the empirical find-
ings on the effect of pay-based incentives are mixed (see Pfeffer, 1997, pp.
111f, Kohn, 1993 and Frey, 1997). Within the principal-agent and organi-
zational behavior frameworks, awards can be understood as one form of a
performance-contingent reward similar to piece rates or profit sharing and as
one possible combination of the recognition, feedback and money.
2.1.2 Tournaments
Awards can also be understood as prizes in a tournament. The analysis of
tournaments has been introduced in the economic literature by Lazear and
Rosen (1981).4 According to McLaughlin (1988), tournaments can elicit ef-
fort when the monitoring of input is costly by offering a “carrot” to the win-
ner or a “stick” to the loser. The principal features of tournaments apply to
any compensation scheme which bases pay on a relative performance, as is
typically the case for awards if the number of potential winners is limited.
Relevant for designing awards are analyses of how specific design feature of
the contest influence effort provision. Clark and Riis (1998), for example,
analyze the optimal number of prize winners and whether a simultaneous
or sequential distribution mechanism is preferable given that agents may be
heterogeneous with respect to their ability. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005)
study how the number of contestants and winners influence performance in
the presence of sabotage and show that it is beneficial to equalize the number
4 For a recent overview see Konrad (2007)
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of winners and losers.
Despite the obvious similarities between the way award systems are set
up and what is studied in the tournament literature, there are some limita-
tions of the generalizability of the tournament literature to awards that make
a separate analysis of awards worthwhile. First, the tournament literature
typically considers standard preferences, i.e. material self-interest, and the
material value of awards is often close to zero. Second, awards are not nec-
essarily distributed as a competition. Many awards are granted according to
an absolute scale, i.e. to everyone exceeding a specific target level of perfor-
mance. Third, practitioners see important differences in the way that between
award systems and tournament systems are typically implemented in compa-
nies. Tournaments in companies (e.g. for vacations or gifts) are typically
based on precise performance measures like sales figures, whereas awards
are handed out for soft factors and activities that preclude precise measure-
ment. Also, managers by and large consider frustration by nonrecipients or
low-ability employees to be less of a problem in the case of awards mainly
because the material stakes involved in award incentives are typically low (a
more detailed account of the results of the manager interviews are presented
in chapter 3)
2.1.3 Signals
Awards derive part of their motivating power from their value as signals of
unobservable characteristics to uninformed parties both within and outside of
the organization.
Economics has an extensive literature on signaling that belongs to the broader
field of information economics, specifically on asymmetric information. Asym-
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metric information often results in market equilibria that fail to be Pareto opti-
mal.5 Spence (1973, 1974) proposed signals as one mechanism to overcome
the induced market failure. The basic idea is that the presence of signals
allows informed individuals to signal information about their unobservable
type through observable action, an action that individuals of the other type
do not want to imitate. One example for a signal of ability may be a costless
test that reliably reveals the type of the worker. Another prominent exam-
ple is education, which has signal value if the cost of education is lower for
high-productivitiy types and if this results in high-productivity workers get-
ting more education in equilibrium than low-productivity workers. Signals
are only informative in a separating equilibrium because this allows the high-
ability individuals to “prove” their type.
Awards may motivate when they signal an agent’s performance to out-
siders, when outsiders cannot observe the agent’s performance directly, but
have access to information on awards as a coarse measure of the agent’s per-
formance (see Ariely et al., 2009 or Andreoni and Petrie, 2004 for a similar
argument on why the provision of plaques can increase donations). Simi-
larly, awards can be understood as signals of unobservable individual charac-
teristics, like dedication and employee motivation to uninformed parties both
5 Basic set-ups of asymmetric information are described, for instance, in Mas-Colell et al.
(1995). One example is a setting in which firms cannot directly observe worker productiv-
ity. As firms cannot distinguish between high- and low-productivity workers, they offer a
uniform wage to all employees, which corresponds to the average productivity in the mar-
ket. In the presence of a high number of low-productivity workers, the average productivity
and hence the average wage is below the reservation wage of high-productivity workers, so
that these leave the market. But once the best workers are driven out of the market, the av-
erage productivity of the workforce falls, thereby further lowering the wage that firms are
willing to pay. As both firms and high-ability workers have incentives to enable companies
to distinguish among workers, mechanisms are developed and used in the marketplace that
achieve this objective.
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within and outside the company.6 For example, motivation and certain abili-
ties may only become apparent during the course of employment. Therefore,
the employee can, for example, use an award for outstanding performance
or high motivation to credibly signal his ability and dedication to outside
employers, information that otherwise could not be credibly communicated.
At the same time, awards may also have signaling value of and bring pres-
tige with respect to other “targets”, such as the local community, family and
friends or other social networks (English, 2004, p. 91). In fact, awards have
been explicitly shown to be signals of expertise (Heppner and Steve, 1977).7
The signaling literature is relevant for understanding the motivating power
of awards because employees are willing to exert effort to obtain an award
6 One might argue that companies have no interest in installing award systems that increase
the outside options of their employees and likely result in demands for higher wages.
Hence, one would expect that companies only install awards that can be used as sig-
nals within the company, but not outside. This argument is parallel to the one that firms
should not invest in the general human capital of their employees because this augments
the worker’s productivity in the same way in multiple firms so that she reaps the whole
rent of the investment. Firms should only invest in firm-specific human capital that makes
the worker more productive in her current firm, but not elsewhere (Becker, 1962; Par-
sons, 1972; Hashimoto, 1981). However, it has been shown that companies in fact do in-
vest in the general human capital of their employees. Arguments brought forward for this
phenomenon rest on market imperfections that render the benefit of the investment larger
within the company than what the employee can market outside the company. Examples
of such market imperfections are asymmetric information about the value of the human
capital investment (Katz and Ziderman, 1990) and the existence of job market institutions
that compress wages (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999). As for awards this means that
companies may be willing to install awards with signal value for the employee as long as
the value of the award system to the company is larger than the costs associated with the
outside advantages it brings to the employee. Possible channels are imperfect information,
i.e. that award winners are typically only announced within the company so that this infor-
mation does not become immediately available to outsiders or that outside parties infer the
value of the award in terms of employee productivity less than perfectly.
7 Similarly, it has been argued that individuals contribute to charities because contributions
signal wealth (Glazer and Konrad, 1996) and that people care about status because status
is considered to be a signal of non-observable abilities (Rege, 2008).
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to reap the benefits in terms of outside job offers, wage increases, access to
networks or prestige.
2.1.4 Beliefs and information between the principal and the agent
Economics has long analyzed the role of information and beliefs on behav-
ior. In contrast to the last section, where the employee had private information
important for the employer, this section discusses the role of awards in chang-
ing the beliefs and available information of the employee, both of which may
alter her behavior.
Information and beliefs are typically studied in settings of choice under
uncertainty and state-dependent utility, i.e. when preferences among out-
comes depend on the state of nature under which the outcome occurs. This
framework is relevant for the study of awards, as the announcement of a new
award and the publication of the winning individuals’ activities inform em-
ployees, for instance, about the kinds of activities the company values. This
information is relevant for the decisions of the employee because behavior in
accordance with company goals may result in pay rises or promotions. Fur-
ther, information on award-winning behaviors allows other employees to up-
date their beliefs on the effort necessary to win an award. Similarly, awards
provide feedback on the employer’s belief about the agent, which enables
the agent to update her beliefs about upcoming wage raises and promotions.8
The aforementioned channels provide rationales for why employees strive for
approval from their employer and may do so by pursuing company awards
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007).
8 Organizational psychologists consider feedback to be an essential element of formal and in-
formal recognition programs (Luthans and Stajkovic, 2000; Stajkovic and Luthans, 2003).
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The information value of awards can also be substantiated with social cog-
nitive theory and goal-setting theory in psychology. Social cognitive theory
was proposed by Bandura (1986) and builds on social learning theory (Rot-
ter, 1954; Bandura, 1976). It presents an advancement of reinforcement and
learning theories by focusing on the specific human capabilities to learn by
observation and to plan in advance. Specifically, information on the behav-
iors of winners allows nonrecipients to copy these behaviors, anticipating that
this may also result in an award for them. Further, awards provide feedback
concerning own performance and enhances role clarity about the task per-
formed (Bandura, 1986 and Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). In line with signaling
theory, Bandura (1986, p. 235) argues that social rewards, such as awards,
derive their motivating power from their value as predictors for future ma-
terial rewards rather than from the social reward itself. Goal-setting theory
emerged in the late 1960s as researchers began to discover that the simple act
of specifying targets for behavior enhanced task performance (Locke, 1968,
1996; Steers and Porter, 1974). Research in this area led to the development
of a formal theory of goal setting (Locke and Latham, 1990a), which rests on
the basic premise that an employee’s conscious intentions (goals) are primary
determinants of task-related motivation because goals direct thoughts and ac-
tions (Locke, 1968). Multiple reviews and meta-analyses of the goal-setting
literature have provided substantial support for goal-setting theory and have
shown that goal specificity, goal difficulty, and goal commitment each serve
to enhance task performance (Locke and Latham, 1990a,b; Wofford et al.,
1992). Hence, awards have a positive impact on effort when they help to
establish clear and specific performance goals for the employees.
Beyond what can be explained in terms of narrow material self-interest,
information on colleagues’ actions that awards provide may influence behav-
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ior because such information may shift an individual’s understanding of what
is considered appropriate behavior (see, for instance, Bazerman et al., 1992;
Loewenstein et al., 1989; Berkowitz, 1972, on social comparison). That is, if
people care about how their contributions compare to some “standard”, then
providing information on others’ behavior may be important. Awards may
also have an impact on corporate culture and affect what individuals consider
to be behavioral norms. This may influence behavior if individuals have a
preference for conditional cooperation or conformity (also see the discussion
of social norms below). Thereby, awards may have an expressive function
similar to what is discussed in the context of law (Cooter and Bohnet, 2003
and McAdams, 1997, p. 397ff).
The preceding sections provided an overview of standard economic and
psychological approaches for understanding how awards induce higher effort
in the workplace. First, principal-agent theory helps to explain awards as a
part of variable compensation, which is necessary to align the interests of the
principal and the agent. Second, an analogy to the tournament literature was
drawn because many awards can be understood as prizes in a tournament.
Third, the signaling literature was presented, because awards may motivate
due to their capacity to signal unobservable characteristics of the employee,
such as ability, motivation, and intra-organizational status, to uninformed but
interested third parties. Fourth, awards may also motivate due to their im-
pact on the beliefs and information of the employee when awards are used to
communicate to the agent which kinds of activity and effort level the com-
pany values.
While they do not exclude non-monetary motives per se, the frameworks
presented above have traditionally been discussed in terms of material self-
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interest. As for awards this implies that they motivate as signals when they
lead to attractive new job offers or wage increases; they motivate as tourna-
ment prizes insofar as they bring immediate or future monetary benefits; they
motivate due to the information they provide on the activities and effort level
the company desires if complying with these wishes results in pay raises or
promotions. The following sections present economic approaches that go be-
yond material self-interest, explaining how non-material awards may affect
performance.
2.2 Motivators Beyond Material Self-interest
The material self-interest approach has had great success in many areas of
economics and beyond (Becker, 1976; Stigler, 1984; Frey, 2000, 2004; Lazear,
2000a). At the same time, as was mentioned above, standard theory is not
generally incompatible with non-material motives. It merely assumes that
work provides disutility to the worker and better performance requires greater
effort. It therefore predicts that reward systems align the interests of em-
ployee and employer by ensuring that a worker’s expected utility increases
with observed productivity. In principle, standard theory is agnostic about
what the offered rewards may be as long as they raise the employee’s util-
ity. Hence, many different forms of reward are compatible with the theory,
including praise from superiors and co-workers, feelings of self-esteem that
come from superior achievement and recognition, and current and future cash
rewards related to performance. That humans are motivated by factors other
than material self-interest has been explicitly addressed in early works in eco-
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nomics.9 However, economists, “while recognizing that non-monetary re-
wards for performance can be important, tend to focus on monetary rewards
because individuals are willing to substitute non-monetary for monetary re-
wards and because money represents a generalized claim on resources and
is therefore in general preferred over an equal dollar-value payment in kind”
(Baker et al., 1988). Therefore, the economics literature has mostly neglected
non-monetary motivators and focused on material incentives (Ellingsen and
Johannesson, 2007; Frey and Benz, 2008), and the study of the psychological
mechanisms relevant in decision making was lost (Lewin, 1996).
Other reasons for their neglect are the conviction that social motives do not
systematically shape decisions and behavior in economically relevant areas
such as employment or market situations; that even if they do, such behav-
iors lead to worse outcomes than those in line with material self-interest are
pay-off dominated and therefore disappear over time; and that simple models
abstracting from social motives present better explanations of observable —
even social — phenomena. Specifically, there was a reluctance to include
such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such
a broad range of behavior that there are few, if any, restrictions on equilibrium
behavior. Hence, such models have little or no predictive power (Postlewaite,
1998).
However, by focusing only on material self-interest economics has failed
to account for a number of robust, systematic and economically relevant em-
pirical phenomena. There is now a substantial body of evidence documenting
9 Smith (2002 / 1759, p. 116), for instance, writes that “Nature, when she formed man for
society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend
his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favorable, and pain in their unfavorable
regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its
own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.”
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deviations from the standard model in the form of altruism, fairness con-
cerns or spitefulness in economically relevant settings (Fehr and Falk, 2002;
Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007, provide overviews), and more generally
non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision
making (DellaVigna, Forthcoming).
Recent years have seen a number of attempts to augment the standard util-
ity framework with non-pecuniary motivations to reconcile economic theory
with a wider array of empirically observable behavior. First, approaches are
presented that account for the fact that individuals care about how they fare
relative to others and about what others think about them (status, social ap-
proval, attention). This is followed by approaches that focus on concerns
about self-image and identity. The section concludes with a discussion of
intrinsic motivation.
2.2.1 Status
Weber defines status as “an effective claim to social esteem in terms of neg-
ative or positive privileges” (Weber, 1978/1922, p. 305). A more recent defi-
nition is provided by Ridgeway and Walker (1995, p. 281) who define status
structures as “rank-ordered relationships among actors that describe the in-
teractional inequalities formed from actors’ implicit valuations of themselves
and one another according to some shared standard of value.” The latter def-
inition corresponds to how status is typically modeled by economists, where
status is understood as a rank ordering of individuals. Hence, by definition,
the increase in rank of one person is associated with the decrease in rank of
others. This implies that status is a scarce resource and status competition a
zero-sum game.
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It is generally acknowledged in economics that people care about social
status. Early accounts of the importance of status concerns as sources for
behavior can, for instance, be found in Smith (2002 / 1759, p. 61) (“It is the
vanity, not the ease or the pleasure which interests us.”) and Veblen (1953
/ 1899, p. 136) (“At this quasi-peaceable stage the law of status is the dom-
inant feature in the scheme of life”). More recent well-known accounts of
status concerns and their implication for macroeconomic variables such as
savings, wages and growth are provided in Frank (1985) and Fershtman and
Weiss (1998b). Ball et al. (2001) show in a laboratory experiment that an
exogenous and random distribution of status has an impact on subsequent
market outcomes and individual earnings, as higher status individuals earn
significantly more than their lower status counterparts. Despite this general
acknowledgement of status as a motivator, there is some discussion about the
proper modeling strategy. Letting status be an argument in the utility function
is what Postlewaite (1998) calls the “direct” approach. It has found its most
compelling support in an evolutionary argument developed in Fershtman and
Weiss (1998a).10 There is also experimental evidence that people value sta-
10 Evolutionary anthropologists have long recognized that status behavior has its roots in a
general primate tendency toward social hierarchy, which allows competition among group
members (for food, mates, sleeping sites) to be performed efficiently with as little injury
or risk of injury as possible (e.g., Barkow, 1975, de Waal, 1989 and Chapais, 1991). More
recently, Henrich and Gil-White (2201) show that both the desire for status as well as acts
of deference can be explained evolutionarily, and Bisin and Verdier (1998) show that there
are stable equilibria in which part of the population have a preference for status. Endocrine
studies support the evolutionary aspect of status by demonstrating the existence of a genetic
component to reactions to alterations of status. Increases in status caused, for instance, by a
victory in a competition, are shown to be associated with a heightened level of testosterone,
which in turn increases competitive behavior (Booth et al., 1989; Mazur and Booth, 1998).
Zizzo (2002) provides evidence for a positive correlation between relative position and the
neurotransmitter serotonin in non-human primates. A number of studies have demonstrated
a positive impact of high status on physiological outcomes such as health and longevity
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tus independently of any material consequence; that they are even willing to
incur costs to obtain it (Huberman et al., 2004). The proponents of an alter-
native “instrumental” approach, where status indirectly affects individuals’
consumption level, criticize the direct approach for lacking robustness as its
results are sensitive to the exact specification of the utility function (Postle-
waite, 1998).
Relevant for awards is the anthropological evidence that suggests that,
in contrast to non-human primates, status among humans is largely symbolic,
can rest on multiple criteria, and can, to some extent, be selected by the group
(Barkow, 1989, Chapter 8). The possibility of shaping status behavior is also
emphasized by the sociological literature and has important implication for
the instrumental use of status considerations as incentives.
The preceding considerations and evidence suggest that awards motivate if
they are perceived as symbols of status. Then, awards work as incentives be-
cause employees are willing to exert additional effort to win them and thereby
enhance their status. Awards, once received, may also lead to a sustainable
increase in effort upon receipt, if the induced change in social standing af-
fects the costs and/or benefits of performance. Further, awards may influence
the dimensions according to which status is granted within the organization,
and so awards may shape norms within the organization and as a result cor-
porate culture. At the same time, awards motivate due to their capacity to
serve as sustainable reminders of a person’s high status for herself and oth-
ers. Additionally, awards inform outsiders that may not know about the intra-
organizational status of the individual. It is, for instance, argued that medals
(Marmot, 2004; Rablen and Oswald, 2008; Redelmeier and Singh, 2001). Hopcroft (2005)
shows that in the contemporary U.S. higher status males have more offspring than lower
status males.
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and trophies that make status rewards more durable encourage higher levels
of a given action (Jaeger, 2004).
After having established that awards motivate due to their effect on the
recipient’s status, the following section provides a variety of more specific
implications of the status literature for corporate awards. Specifically, this
section presents those studies on impact of status concerns in the workplace
that have direct implications for understanding awards beyond what has al-
ready been discussed above. Auriol and Renault (2008) argue in their theo-
retical model that status and income are complements, suggesting that awards
may work well for individuals with a relatively high salary. Moreover, they
demonstrate that status incentives in the form of promotions are more effec-
tive in inducing effort than pay-for-performance systems in long-term work
relationships. The model of Ederer and Patacconi (2008) provides the theo-
retical basis for the superiority of evaluation schemes like award systems that
reward winners without explicitly identifying losers. Moldovanu et al. (2007)
and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2005) show theoretically that discrete incentive
instruments or coarse status categories with as little as one individual in the
top class may be preferable to continuous, objective incentives when individ-
uals care about how they perform relative to others. Smeets (2004) analyzes a
setting with several tasks, i.e. a private task with variable pay and a task with
a collective good character. She shows that in such a setting, status incen-
tives can encourage employees to identify with the organization and thereby
ensure contributions to the public good. The model resembles award sys-
tems in companies closely as company awards are typically handed out for
behaviors that cannot be contractually stipulated and depend on contributions
to public goods like organizing workshops or helping colleagues. Fershtman
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et al. (Forthcoming) show that companies should ensure that their workforce
is heterogeneous with respect to the importance that the individuals attribute
to status as well as to their reference group. The intuition is that in a mixed
workforce the negative externalities of high status on lower status agents are
mitigated if these lower status agents do not care about status or have a ref-
erence group outside the company. Loch et al. (2000) point out that status
competition based on merit can push group members to work hard. However,
if status can also be achieved through political maneuvering, it can lead to
lower overall performance. In another paper (Loch et al., 2001), the authors
explore the managerial consequences of status competition in organizations.
Managers can ensure that employees’ efforts to increase their status are chan-
neled towards production rather than sabotage or politicking by by manipulat-
ing the criteria along which status is awarded. Recognition by a hierarchical
supervisor is considered as one way to lend weight to a status criterion. Loch
et al. (2001) also mention the creation of non-monetary symbols of status,
like awards, as one possible way of reaping the benefits of seeking status
without incurring high financial costs. In doing so, the management needs
to credibly commit to the values and goals of the award system; such sym-
bols cannot be created arbitrarily. Specifically, the symbols should be kept
scarce because status is relative. Additionally, management should not ig-
nore the fact that the size of bonus payments also creates a status hierarchy.
A different aspect is modeled in Besley and Ghatak (2008) who analyze a
principal-agent setting with social incentives, such as job titles or awards that
have zero marginal costs. Managerial costs of zero imply that it is incentive
compatible for the principal to award them even if the agent’s output is only
observable for the principal. Hence, one would expect awards to be used for
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activities in which it is hard for the agent to assess and document his or her
contribution to the principal’s profit.
Despite this large theoretical literature, there is very little empirical work
documenting the impact of status concerns in the workplace. Only Greenberg
(1988) and Greenberg and Ornstein (1983) show exogenously varied social
standing affects productivity. The authors vary status by randomly assigning
subjects to higher- and lower-status offices and titles.
2.2.2 Image motivation, social approval, respect, prestige, regard
In recent years, economics has seen a growing literature on image motivation
and the need for social approval, respect, prestige and regard.11 Distinctive
about this body of literature is the focus on self-regarding motives such as
pride and shame (in contrast to the social preference approaches that capture
other-regarding motives such as altruism or reciprocity). The analyses typ-
ically do not assume a rank ordering of subjects and zero-sum interactions,
as the status literature discussed above does.12 Most relevant for this thesis
are those approaches that study the impact of social approval motives on pro-
social behavior, contributions to public goods, and the adherence to norms,
as these are exactly the kinds of behaviors that employers often try to elicit
with awards. This section presents a selection of papers from this body of
literature with direct implications for awards.
11 A general analysis of esteem and its exchange are provided in Brennan and Pettit (2004).
12 However, in terms of terminology as well as models, the distinction between prestige,
recognition and approval on the one hand and status on the other is far from clear-cut. For
the purpose of this analysis, all approaches that explicitly talk about status and assume
zero-sum preferences over rankings are attributed to the status section, whereas the other
approaches are presented here.
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The important role of social approval for behavior was already recognized
by Smith (2002 / 1759) in the Theory of Moral Sentiments where he wrote:
“We are pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the natural ob-
jects of approbation, [. . . ] and we are mortified to reflect that we have justly
merited the blame of those we live with.” Likewise, Harsanyi (1969) was
convinced that social approval is important: “People’s behaviour can largely
be explained in terms of two dominant interests: economic gain and social
acceptance.” Psychology has long acknowledged and widely discussed the
existence and consequences of an inherent need for recognition. Specifically,
these approaches belong to the literature on need theories.
Similar to the economic concept of preferences, needs are defined as de-
ficiencies that energize or trigger behaviors to reduce or satisfy those needs.
Most prominent is the hierarchy of needs by Maslow (1943), who proposes a
hierarchy of five basic need categories, the two highest of which are esteem,
which includes self-esteem through personal achievement as well as social
esteem through recognition and respect from others and self-actualization,
which represents the need for self-fulfillment — a sense that the person’s
potential has been realized. Prominent extensions of this initial formulation
are Alderfer (1969), who reduces the number of need categories to three,
and the theory of socially acquired needs (McClelland, 1985, 1987; McClel-
land and Winter, 1969). The most prominent need theory focusing on job at-
tributes was introduced in Herzberg et al. (1959) and Herzberg (1966, 1968).
In his motivation-hygiene theory, Herzberg argues that work motivation is
composed of two largely unrelated dimensions: (1) job-related factors which
can prevent dissatisfaction but do not promote employees’ growth and devel-
opment (hygiene factors), such as working conditions and security; and (2)
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factors associated with job satisfaction (motivators) like achievement, recog-
nition, the work itself, and advancement. The need for recognition has also
been acknowledged in the management literature. Magnus (1981) argues that
public demonstrations of appreciation may be better means to increase pro-
ductivity than salary raises.
That such concerns are behaviorally relevant has also been documented
empirically. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) lay out a body of evidence
that taken together shows that employees value and respond positively to
signs of respect, such as symbolic awards, attention, and trust. Further, there
is much circumstantial and questionnaire evidence supporting the view that
people care about (dis)approval (e.g., Lindbeck, 1995, 1997). As was men-
tioned before, recognition was identified to be a top motivator for U.S. work-
ers (Wiley, 1997) and the lack of recognition a major reason why people leave
organizations (Elsdon, 2002). In organizational behavior, there is a consider-
able literature that shows that if social recognition is applied on a contingent
basis, it is a powerful incentive motivator for performance improvement (Sta-
jkovic and Luthans, 1997, 2001, 2003). Specifically, Peterson and Luthans
(2006) show that financial and non-financial incentives have an equally sig-
nificant impact on employee turnover and Stajkovic and Luthans (2003) show
that social recognition in the form of praise has a significant positive impact
on performance.
The economic literature provides experimental evidence on the role of im-
age motivation understood as the desire to be liked and well-regarded by oth-
ers. Ariely et al. (2009), for example, show that image-concerns are an impor-
tant driver of pro-social behavior. Specifically, they show that — without any
private incentives — subjects put forth significantly higher effort for a task
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associated with positive image in a public than in a private setting. That rev-
elation of a subject’s identity as well as the size of her contribution increases
contributions to a public good is confirmed by Andreoni and Petrie (2004)
and Rege and Telle (2004). In line with a desire for social approval, the latter
study additionally shows that framing the public good game in a language that
makes social and internalized norms for cooperation salient is also associated
with larger contributions. Masclet et al. (2003) demonstrate experimentally
that an option to show disapproval raises contributions even when there are
no material consequences connected with it. Murnighan et al. (2001) find
that the fairness of offers in dictator games is signiÞcantly decreased when
the precision with which offerers can split the cake is decreased. The lower
precision allows offerers to construe the outcomes as largely outside their
control. Therefore agents no longer feel the need to sacrifice material income
to avoid social disapproval. Harbaugh (1998) documents the role of prestige
motives for charitable giving in the field. Closely related to the subject of
this thesis is the field experiment of Markham et al. (2002) who show that
the introduction of a public recognition program reduces absenteeism by 52
percent in the last quarter of their study. A large body of empirical evidence
documents the importance of approval motives for charitable giving and vol-
untary cooperation — important kinds of activities in any organization.
Hence, awards serve as incentives when they are acknowledged as sym-
bols of respect and approval, and when they contribute to a positive image
towards others. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) even state that, if workers
care about approval, employers can pay them with a combination of monetary
rewards and respect rather than with money alone.
Awards can also influence norms and the sources of esteem. This argu-
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ment is parallel to the one above on awards’ influence on the sources of sta-
tus. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), for instance, argue that a company
can highlight desirable worker traits and thereby shape the organizational
culture. When a company, for example, gives prizes for cooperation it is uti-
lizing its power to define the sources of esteem. Insofar as awards help to
shape corporate norms, concerns for social approval ensure that these persist
even if they are disadvantageous for the individual.13 Therefore, any instru-
ment that shapes organizational norms is valuable for companies. Norms can,
for instance, serve to mitigate multi-tasking problems caused by distorting fi-
nancial incentives (Bruggen and Moers, 2007). In this context, awards have
an information function as they reveal both the kinds of behaviors the com-
pany values and also the behaviors of other employees — the award winners.
Thereby, they signal what one “should” do and potentially create a norm.
Awards may also have an impact on aspects of corporate culture other
than norms. Awards motivate when they are interpreted as signals of kind in-
tentions, attention and regard. That intentions matter has been demonstrated
by a large literature on reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, provide a recent
overview). It has been shown that nonfinancial incentives are viewed by em-
ployees as an attempt to create a positive climate. Employees reciprocate this
with prosocial citizenship behaviors and engagement, which raises the perfor-
mance of the organization (Goodman, 2000). Further, employees care about
whether their employer is genuinely altruistic towards them and attention is
a more credible signal of altruism than high wages (Dur, 2008). Similarly,
13 According to Akerlof (1980) the binding force of norms lies in the social sanction imposed
by loss of reputation from breaking the custom. Hence, people wish not to deviate from
social norms insofar as they care about approval and/or the potential sanctions imposed on
them (see e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Messick, 1999).
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gifts-in-kind are more salient signals of kind intentions in the workplace than
wage increases (Kube et al., 2008). Therefore, signals of attentions and sym-
bolic rewards cause greater reciprocal reactions and hence, larger increases
in effort than monetary rewards.
2.2.3 Self-image and identity
Closely related to the last section is the recent literature on self-image con-
cerns. Smith (2002 / 1759, Part III, Chap. I) describes this motive for acting
in a moral or unselfish way in terms of individuals assessing their own con-
duct through the eyes of an “impartial spectator”, an “ideal mate within the
breast.” He also expressed the close connection between concerns for a good
self-image and social approval. “[. . . ] social approval is therefore closely re-
lated to self-approval [. . . ] when actors also want to be worthy of praise, they
engage in moral behavior even when unobserved” (Smith, 2002 / 1759, p.
166). In more contemporary terms, psychologists and sociologists describe
people’s behavior as being influenced by a strong need to maintain confor-
mity between one’s behavior and certain values, long-term goals or identi-
ties. According to Batson (1998), “the ability to pat oneself on the back and
feeling good about being a kind, caring person, can be a powerful incentive
to help.”
As for empirical relevance, much of the evidence cited in the last sec-
tion is also compatible with self-image concerns. Additionally, Kahneman
and Knetsch (1992) find that subjects’ stated willingness to pay for differ-
ent public goods is well predicted by independent assessments of the asso-
ciated “moral satisfaction”. In psychology, it is generally agreed that self-
confidence or a person’s belief of how capable he or she is to accomplish his
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or her goals (e.g., Bandura (1977, Chap. 1) on self-efficacy) directly influ-
ences behavior. There is also evidence that even in anonymous situations,
people follow internalized norms because they otherwise suffer from guilt,
shame or fear (Coleman, 1990). Dana et al. (2006) show that people are
willing to sacrifice money to retain a positive image even with respect to an
anonymous counterpart in a dictator game setting.
Hence, individuals care about a positive self-image. Therefore, awards
can induce effort 1) when they have an impact on self-image; 2) when they
influence what behavior is associated with a good image; and 3) when they
provide performance-related feedback and individuals care about how they
perform relative to others. The second point corresponds to the capacity of
awards to shape which behaviors earn status. People may also comply with
norms not only to avoid disapproval from others, but to avoid cognitive dis-
sonance (Festinger, 1957) or an unfavorable assessment of themselves when
they have internalized the norms or support them. Covaleski et al. (1998, p.
313), for example, show that employees internalize both company goals and
individual goals. Akerlof (1980) highlights these two channels when argu-
ing that people adhere to norms because they care about their reputations in
their respective communities, and, for believers in the “community’s code of
honor”, when they care about the agreement of their actions with that code.
In companies these codes can be understood as part of the corporate culture.
Again, awards can serve the function of making the goals of both the com-
pany and the individual salient.
Apart from the general discussion of the role of self-image concerns for
behavior, there are smaller, more specialized discussions of self-confidence
and identity. Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006a,b) present a se-
Chapter 2 Why Do Awards Affect Behavior? 39
ries of models around self-image concerns. All rest on the premise that indi-
viduals have imperfect knowledge about themselves, i.e. their character and
ability, and the nature of the situation or task, such as the costs and benefits as-
sociated with executing a project. In such a setting, individuals use their own
actions and the actions of others as signals for these variables, and this knowl-
edge in turn influences their performance. Underlying this self-signaling is
the fact that actions are more memorable than exact motivations.14 Bénabou
and Tirole (2004, 2006a) focus on self-signaling, i.e. the inferences that in-
dividuals draw from their own actions about personal characteristics such as
their willpower and identity. In such a setting, awards may motivate by mak-
ing specific actions of the individual more salient and by serving as durable
reminders of the award-winning successes (see Jeffrey and Shaffer, 2007 for
a discussion of this and other benefits of tangible rewards). It is, however,
not clear ex ante whether this increases or decreases the desired performance.
On the one hand, self-confidence may be improved, which motivates indi-
viduals and leads them to approach more challenging projects. On the other
hand, the durability of awards as a reminder of one’s “good deeds” may re-
duce the need for further contributions. Hence, the overall effect of awards
on prosocial activities is ambiguous at the level of the individual. At the level
of the company, the decision to implement awards also depends on whether
self-image and approval motives lead to an over- or underprovision of public
goods in the absence of the award scheme.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006b) focus on the inferences people make
from the actions of others on the nature of their motivation (intrinsic or ex-
14 Similar arguments can be found in Bodner and Prelec, 2003. In psychology, the idea that
individuals take their actions as diagnostic of their preferences originated with Bem (1972),
but it also relates to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1958).
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trinsic), their ability, and the difficulty of the task. The premise is that the
principal has more information than the agent about these variables and that
knowledge on these variables affects an agent’s performance because she only
undertakes an activity if she expects to succeed. In such a setting, extrinsic
incentives may cause a decrease in praiseworthy behavior if it signals to the
agent that the task is not intrinsically rewarding. At the same time, high-
powered incentives may convey bad news about the difficulty of the task or
the ability of the agent.15 Awards, in contrast, less likely signal to the agent
that she is of low ability. Rather, they serve as credible and sustainable sig-
nals of competence — increasing motivation and performance, as the need
for competence is a powerful motivator (White, 1959).16
Related is the argument that subjective evaluations in the form of discre-
tionary bonuses serve as feedback for performance, which in turn inform the
agent about her ability, affecting self-confidence and motivation (Suvorov and
van de Ven, 2006). Hence, awards motivate by signaling an agent’s ability to
herself. In this role, awards should work best when workers are in their learn-
ing phase, produce a complex good, or contribute to a project that involves
many individual tasks so that experience and overview enables the manager
to form a better judgment of an employee’s performance. An implication
of this literature is that a monetary component to the feedback is necessary
to make the information credible, as the principal would otherwise have an
incentive to offer the reward even after bad performance in order not to de-
15 The next section further investigates negative effects of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic
motivation.
16 The link between self-esteem and behavior is further discussed in Bénabou and Tirole
(2002) where it is argued that persons confident in their abilities are typically highly moti-
vated and undertake more challenging tasks.
Chapter 2 Why Do Awards Affect Behavior? 41
motivate the agent. This may be one explanation for why awards are so often
accompanied with monetary bonuses in the corporate sector despite the fact
that managers and employees say that the payment is not central to the award
(the findings of the manager interviews are presented in chapter 3). Another
implication is that, while motivation increases with the size of the bonus in
general, even small, insignificant rewards can have a substantial impact on
the agent’s subsequent motivation when the principal’s stake in the project is
small.17 Mostly the direct material consequences of activities that are typi-
cally rewarded with awards, such as substituting for colleagues or organizing
workshops, are low for the principal. This may explain the observation that
award bonuses are typically relatively small.
Cowen and Glazer (2007) explain the observation that people fear and
try to avoid evaluations because they have a preference for a favorable self-
image, and they are risk-averse with respect to their self-image. Therefore,
they fear bad evaluations more than they experience joy from good ones. Sim-
ilarly, Köszegi (2006) shows that individuals may avoid actions that are in-
formative about their self-image, when they are satisfied with current beliefs
about themselves. This also explains an aversion to performance bonuses be-
cause these are typically informative about own ability as well as the distri-
bution of abilities in the workforce. Similar to what was concluded by Ederer
and Patacconi (2008) on status concerns, it may hence be preferable to reward
good performers without identifying bad ones, as is true for award systems.
Specifically, there is only one or a small number of winners in typical award
schemes, so that even non-recipients do not suffer a big loss in self-image be-
17 The intuition is that if the principal derives higher benefits from a success, a bonus of a
given size becomes relatively less costly, and the principle has to increase the size of the
bonus to keep it credible in equilibrium.
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cause they can still believe that their ability is almost as high as the one of the
winners. This implies that the company does not have to compensate work-
ers for the risk of receiving negative information about themselves, and the
workforce is better motivated as all employees — rightly or wrongly — can
feel good about themselves. The trade-off for the company, however, is that
individuals may be overconfident in their abilities, which may have negative
effects on performance.18
The second approach in the literature on self-image focuses on the behav-
ioral consequences of identity. Awards may motivate via identity concerns
because they have the potential to influence the identity of award winners by
sustainably changing preferences, i.e. increasing the benefit of exerting ef-
fort for the company or reducing effort costs. The concept of identity, i.e. an
individual’s sense of self as an individual and as part of a group, has been in-
troduced into economics by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), extended in Akerlof
and Kranton (2002) and applied to the work setting in Akerlof and Kranton
(2005, 2008).19 They assume that an individual’s utility depends on con-
sumption as well as on identity, which is composed of the status of the social
group one identifies with and the degree to which one’s actions conform to
what is considered to be appropriate behavior (ideal type) in that particular
18 Related is the argument that a prize with a low chance of winning and many highly qualified
applicants who do not win, does not deter applicants because not winning the prize then
does not necessarily imply bad news about the employee’s performance or ability. Indeed, a
prize committee that rejects some highly qualified applicants may find that it can encourage
more effort, but to do so, its prize selection must show some imperfection or noise in
selecting the best competitors (Hollaender, 1990).
19 A prominent account of identity in social psychology is Tajfel and Turner (1979). The
concept of identity is also widely discussed in sociology. Weber (1978, pp. 958f), for
instance, emphasizes the identification of the officeholder with the office itself. “An office
is a vocation;” and “entrance into an office [. . . ] is considered an acceptance of a specific
duty of fealty to the purpose of the office.”
Chapter 2 Why Do Awards Affect Behavior? 43
group. Individuals are, to some extent, free in choosing the category/group
they identify with as well as their actions.20 Central for the discussion of
awards is that the number and kinds of social categories can be influenced as
well as the associated social prescriptions. This has important implications
for an analysis of awards. First, companies can create social categories with
awards, such as “the high-performer” or “the helpful person” via the estab-
lishment of different kinds of awards. Second, they can establish ideal types
associated with each category by publicizing and honoring the award winning
behaviors. Third, companies face a trade-off in creating these ideal types: the
more categories are created, the more likely employees identify with at least
one of them and, hence, act accordingly. However, the more categories there
are, the less likely are individuals to identify with those categories that the
company values most. This may explain why organizations typically order
their awards in a hierarchy. The hierarchy is communicated both directly and
via differences in the amounts of the monetary bonuses and degrees of pub-
licity or honor. Fourth, companies also face a trade-off with respect to the
performance ideal promoted: The higher the performance ideal, the higher
the effort of the top achievers. At the same time, however, a greater number
of people may resign and opt out of the “high-achiever” social category.
Because identity reduces the need for monetary rewards, it can be viewed
as a new type of firm capital, motivational capital, that may be worthwhile
investing in (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). In fact, if workers identify with the
company they work hard even in the absence of contingent rewards because
they have a loss in utility if they do not follow the rules of their superiors and
do not act in the interests of the organization. Directly relevant for awards is
20 Similarly, in Bénabou and Tirole (2006a) individuals can invest in identity-building.
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that they suggest that rituals and other organizational features can change the
way people see themselves. In particular, initiation rites can lead individuals
to take on a different self-image because the individual must explain to herself
why she has (willingly) accepted such treatment (see Aronson, 1984, Chap. 4,
pp. 113–179 or Festinger, 1957, on cognitive dissonance). Award ceremonies
can serve as such initiation rites.
In the context of self-image concerns, another channel via which awards
may affect behavior is their impact on what agents perceive to be their in-
group. Research in psychology and sociology shows that even arbitrary sig-
nals can induce individuals to identify with a group, leading to in-group fa-
voritism and loyalty and out-group discrimination (see Tajfel, 1978 on the
minimal group paradigm).21 There is overwhelming evidence suggesting that
people cooperate more with members of their in-group than with individuals
who are not part of it (e.g., Kollock, 1998; Goette et al., 2006; Bernhard et al.,
2006). Hence, awards benefit the company if they create the feelings that all
employees form a single in-group, counteracting the otherwise spontaneously
emerging subgroups that often hinder cooperation and information flow. A
group feeling can, for instance, be induced with an award ceremony at which
the entire workforce is present.
2.2.4 Intrinsic motivation
This section discusses the impact of incentives on intrinsic motivation, estab-
lishing that awards affect behavior via their impact on intrinsic motivation.
Some of the issues that have been addressed above also have implications for
21 The importance of organizational identification for understanding work behavior has long
been recognized by industrial psychologists (Patchen, 1970; Dutton et al., 1994; Lee,
1971). Also see Tajfel and Turner (1979) on the role of group identities.
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intrinsic motivation. Akerlof and Kranton (2008), for instance, suggests that
behavior driven by concerns for identity can be classified as intrinsically mo-
tivated behavior. Therefore, this section addresses the effect of incentives on
intrinsic motivation beyond what has already been captured in the analyses of
self-image and social recognition above. Due to the large number of studies
and theories on intrinsic motivation and the potential negative impact of ex-
trinsic incentives, an illuminating, yet incomplete, selection of theoretical and
empirical accounts is presented below. Specific weight is given to accounts
of the negative impact of monetary incentives on intrinsic motivation. Hence,
this section differs somewhat from the other sections because less work is
done on generalizing existing findings to awards. Rather, the knowledge on
intrinsic motivation and the crowding out effect is merely presented. These
facts then serve as the basis for discussing how the crowding effect may dif-
fer between extrinsic incentives in the form of performance pay and awards
in chapter 3.1.3.
Building on earlier works in psychology (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 1971) and
early empirical documentations (e.g., Titmuss, 1970), Frey (1993a, 1994,
1997) introduced the concept of intrinsic motivation and its crowding out by
extrinsic incentives into economics. Since then the effect, its validity, and its
causes have been lively debated in both psychology and economics (Eisen-
berger and Cameron, 1996; Deci et al., 1999; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Kunz and
Pfaff, 2002; Weibel et al., 2007). There are several explanations of the crowd-
ing out phenomenon that have implications for awards and specifically, why
they may have different consequences for intrinsic motivation than monetary
rewards.
Deci and Ryan (1985) and Frey (1997) argue that there is a direct link
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between monetary rewards and performance. Cognitive Evaluation Theory
(Deci and Ryan, 1971, 1985) suggests that there are two motivational subsys-
tems: extrinsic and intrinsic. Intrinsically motivated persons have an “inter-
nal locus of causality”. That is, intrinsically motivated individuals attribute
the cause of their behavior to internal needs and perform behaviors for in-
trinsic rewards and satisfaction. Aspects of the situation (e.g., the reward or
the feedback system) may influence the individual as to what she considers
to be the true causes her behavior. Extrinsic incentives may then induce the
individual to attribute her behavior to the reward rather than some intrinsic
need. Hence, perceived causation shifts from internal to external, which re-
sults in a decrease in intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1980). At the same
time, extrinsic rewards can increase intrinsic motivation when they enhance
the feelings of personal competence and self-efficacy (Arnold, 1985). In the
self-signaling framework discussed above (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006b),
individuals have imperfect knowledge about their character traits and they use
past actions to construct a self-image. This implies that individuals take the
effect of current actions on future inferences about themselves into account.
As compared to a situation with perfect self-knowledge, Individuals may be-
have differently, when the behavior affects information that is relevant for the
construction of one’s self-image. Crowding-out then occurs because the pres-
ence of rewards or punishments spoils the reputational (or self-reputational)
value of good deeds, creating doubt as to the extent to which they were per-
formed for the incentive rather than for intrinsic reasons, e.g., altruism. An-
ticipating this ambiguity, individuals reduce the associated behavior, which is
in line with what psychologists refer to as the “overjustification effect” (e.g.,
Lepper et al., 1973). Ariely et al. (2009) provide evidence for the relevance of
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self-signaling motives by showing that pro-social behavior decreases when it
is public knowledge that there are additional monetary incentives attached to
the activity. The authors argue that this is the case as the extrinsic incentives
interact with image motivation by diluting the signaling value of pro-social
behavior. The presence of an order or an external reward deprives intrinsically
motivated persons of the chance to display their own interest and involvement
in an activity (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
High-powered extrinsic incentives may also lower motivation when they
signal to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. The idea is that
people care about social appraisal to varying degrees, and the importance
of the appraisal depends on the praiseworthiness of the relevant other. The
praiseworthiness of the other party is inferred from her actions. Performance
pay schemes suggest to the agent that the principal is not trusting them to
work hard even in the absence of monetary inducements. Because agents
value approval from a trusting principal more than approval from a principal
who does not trust them, approval motives for effort are reduced (Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2008). Similarly, additional monetary payments may signal
to the agent that the task is boring or difficult, which in turn lowers effort
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003).
There is also a large discussion about how extrinsic incentives affect so-
cial norms and morale. The presence of monetary, individual incentives may,
for instance, override individuals’ concerns for contributing to a cooperative
task (Rob and Zemsky, 2002). The negative impact of regulation systems on
worker morale and therefore behavior is also addressed in Frey (1993b). Frey
et al. (1996); Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that compensation for
local disamenities does not increase the level for support of a nuclear waste
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repository among Swiss communities and argue that the payment crowds out
public spirit. Fehr and Gächter (2002) show experimentally that sellers pro-
vide lower quality when they face a fine for doing so than when they do
not. A similar detrimental effect is documented in Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000a), where parents were more likely to pick up their children late from a
day care center when facing a fine than when not.22 Hence, the installment
of monetary incentives may replace other incentives, such as the adherence
to social norms and morale. This is in line with the argumentation that mone-
tary payments change the mental frame of a situation from a voluntary social
interaction to one of market exchange. This framing effect is explicitly tested
and confirmed in Fehr and Gächter (2002); Cooter and Bohnet (2003); Irlen-
busch and Sliwka (2007). In fact, moral behavior is often considered to be
moral for the very reason that it is undertaken even when the individual incurs
costs for doing so. Since moral behavior is typically associated with social
approval, paying for it implies that it can no longer be considered as moral,
which reduces approval incentives. Hence, rewarding people monetarily for
obeying social norms may weaken norm enforcement and, therefore, lead to
a gradual erosion of norm-guided behavior (Fehr and Falk, 2002).
Frey (1993a) and Fehr and Gächter (2002) further suggest that the de-
crease in performance may be driven by inequity aversion or reciprocity. This
channel is considered to be particularly relevant when the incentive system is
under direct control of the principal, whose payoff is affected by the actions
of the agents. Hence, awards may also motivate if they lead to agent reci-
procity when, for example, the award is perceived as a signal of kindness.
22 Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) show that while performance increases with the monetary
amount offered, participants who were offered a small payoff performed worse than those
who were offered no compensation at all.
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Chapter 3.1.3 comes back to the discussion of intrinsic motivation and the
potential negative effects of monetary compensation, investigating if and to
what extent awards differ in this respect.
2.3 Factors That Influence Award Effectiveness
The preceding sections laid out a body of theoretical and empirical evidence
that can explain the motivating power of awards beyond the approaches tra-
ditionally employed in economics. Specifically, it was shown that employees
aspire to win awards when awards enhance their status, cause social recog-
nition and prestige, and have a positive impact on self-image and identity.
Further, awards may influence performance if the recognition that follows or
the change in status or self-image alters the relevant costs and benefits of ex-
erting effort. In addition, awards may influence the intrinsic motivation to
undertake certain activities. This section analyzes three factors that influence
the size of the effect of awards on performance: culture, business environ-
ment and strategy, and procedures.
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2.3.1 Culture and country-specific context
“What is rewarding to different people varies greatly
depending on their background, expectations, values,
and needs. The value of money, response to public
recognition, the desire for peer and professional re-
spect, and the need for challenging assignments all
vary according to lifestyle and culture.”
Jamieson and O’Mara (1991, pp. 109–110)
The theories discussed so far mostly abstract from a number of relevant
context factors of the employment relationship. Specifically, they abstract
from the institutional framework, which has been shown to affect the needs of
individuals and their preferences about performance incentives (Rehu et al.,
2004).23 It seems obvious that economic factors such as income level, in-
flation, and living conditions as well as country-specific institutional factors
determine the effectiveness of incentives (Deresky, 2000, p. 411).24
Work also provides individuals with additional psychological benefits,
such as achievement, honor, and social connectedness whose importance
varies between countries. According to the Meaning of Work International
Research Team (1985, p. 113), Japanese employees should find pure mone-
tary rewards, such as raises and bonuses, more motivating than German and
US employees because Japanese see work as a means to provide income,
23 An exception is McClelland’s theory of socially acquired needs discussed in section 2.2.2.
24 One example of a relevant formal institutional framework are public health care benefits.
The German law requires every employee and employer to share the costs of compre-
hensive mandatory health care and retirement plans, whereas there is no comprehensive
coverage in the U.S. For that reason, US employees can be expected to value such benefits
more highly than German employees because they are likely to have a higher expressed
need in this area.
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whereas Americans and Germans place more value on the social factors per-
taining to work. In particular, Americans consider work as a place where one
makes interesting contacts and where status and prestige can be obtained. For
Germans work is related to prestige and status as well. However, they do not
view working as a service to the society in the same sense as do Americans
(Rehu et al., 2004).
Therefore, awards should work best in the U.S., should motivate to a
somewhat lesser extent in Germany and may not be a motivator at all in Asian
countries such as Japan and China. The same prediction follows from Hof-
stede (1991, p. 151-170) who suggests that due to their lower uncertainty
avoidance’, US employees should place higher importance on rewards such
as stock options while Japanese employees would prefer cash income. At the
same time, their higher degree of individuality should make US employees
more receptive to rewards that focus on individual recognition, e.g., Employee
of the Month rewards and positive feedback from a supervisor (Hofstede,
1991, p. 215).
Moran (1990) finds that Irish have a lower need for achievement than their
American counterparts. Manso-Pinto et al. (1993) shows that Chilean man-
agers differ from managers from other countries in their ranking of job at-
tributes because they rank advancement, pride in one’s company, pay and
working conditions as more important than what has been found for man-
agers from Britain, Hungary, Japan, and the United States. Pennings (1993)
documents that these differences in attitudes and values are reflected in em-
pirically observable differences in compensation schemes. In long-term ex-
ecutive compensation in the US, for instance, the amount of money “at risk”
as well as the size of bonus payout is much higher than in the other countries
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studied.
These statements highlight the context-dependence of incentives. Culture
as well as the economic and institutional context need to be considered when
making predictions for the effectiveness of awards as incentives. Despite
the increasing number of cross-cultural studies, there is still little systematic
research in this area. Research on culture is characterized by convenience
samples and simple approaches that ask “do the groups differ?” with no uni-
fying theory guiding this work. The studies presented allow some predictions
about the effectiveness of awards in this selective set of countries. However,
it is still unclear how differences in culture affect, for instance, the percep-
tions of and needs for specific incentives and individual reactions to work
design (Ambrose and Kulik, 1999) and also the need for achievement (Mc-
Clelland, 1987). This prohibits any inference from the countries studied to
other settings.
2.3.2 Business context and organizational structure
Awards can and should not be studied in isolation. First, they are part of the
company’s incentive and compensation scheme. Second, the company is em-
bedded in a business context that includes an industry structure and a com-
petitive environment. Concerning the first point, Lazear and Shaw (2007)
highlight the complementarity of human resources practices in the sense that
doing more of one practice increases the returns of doing more of the oth-
ers. Specifically, they argue that when a new practice is introduced, it often
requires supporting practices to be successful. For example, teams are more
productive when workers are better trained, are given team-based incentive
pay, or are selected carefully for skills that are complementary. If the firm
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does not introduce all practices, the teams may fail to produce higher out-
put. Ichniowski et al. (1997) demonstrate empirically that steel factories that
introduce a set of human resources measures are more successful than com-
panies that only introduce isolated practices (Delery and Doty, 1996, come to
the same conclusion). Weibel et al. (2008) highlight that for synergies to take
place management needs to consider if and how to combine non-material re-
wards like praise and performance-dependent, extrinsic incentives. Stajkovic
and Luthans (2003) conclude in a survey of 72 behavioral management stud-
ies that social recognition in the form of praise, performance feedback and
money each have a significant positive impact on performance. Moreover,
the effect on task performance is strongest (synergistic) when all three are
used in combination.25
This suggests that the effectiveness of an award depends on the specific
combination of material benefits, social recognition and feedback that it of-
fers as well as on the presence or absence of other incentives in the company.
Awards motivate, for instance, via their impact on organizational norms. If a
particular award focuses on knowledge sharing, it can only effectively foster
cooperation when other incentives do not counteract it. Hence, when intro-
ducing a new award, management needs to carefully assess the other incen-
tives present and, if necessary, eliminate some or introduce others alongside
the new award.
There is a large literature in organizational psychology and management
that links the effect of human resource practices with the strategy of the com-
pany and its business environment (see Guest, 1999, for a review of the the-
oretical and empirical literature). A number of studies show that those firms
25 In the organizational behavior literature the hypothesis that certain bundles of human re-
source practices are superior is known as the configurational approach.
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that have a fit between business strategy, structure, the company’s external
environment and human resource policy and practice have superior perfor-
mance (Huselid, 1995; Delery and Doty, 1996; Youndt et al., 1996). Hence,
the aim and scope of the award system need to be in accord with the strategy
and structure of the company for the award system to be effective in promot-
ing organizational performance.26
2.3.3 Procedure
Procedures are another factor hindering or enhancing the effect of awards
on performance. The importance of procedures for motivation has been ad-
dressed in organizational psychology as well as in economics. An early ac-
count is equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965), which rests on the assumption
that people are motivated as long as they perceive the situation to be just. Two
important forms of justice have been identified as important: distributive and
procedural (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Thibaut and Laurens, 1978). Distribu-
tive justice relates to the fairness of a given outcome and procedural justice
relates to the fairness of the processes that led to that outcome (Tyler, 1989,
1998). A third form is sometimes discussed and relates to whether the person
is treated with concern and consideration during the exchange (overviews of
the literature on interactional justice are presented in Greenberg, 1990, 2000).
The predictions of these theories have been validated in both the laboratory
and the field (Ambrose and Kulik, 1999). In economics, procedural utility
26 However, there is also evidence that some practices are superior to others irrespective of the
context (“best-practice hypothesis”). Pfeffer (1995), for example, lists 16 human resources
practices whose positive effects are established. Empirical support is provided in (Huselid,
1995; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Arthur, 1994; Ichniowski et al., 1997).
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has been introduced by Frey et al. (2004).27 In a recent review, Tyler and
Blader (2000) demonstrates that people are more willing to accept decisions
when they feel that those decisions are made through decision-making pro-
cedures they view as fair. Studies of procedural justice further suggest that
people evaluate fairness primarily through criteria like whether there are op-
portunities to participate, the authorities are neutral, people trust the motives
of the authorities, and people are treated with dignity and respect.
This literature has several important insights for awards. The general pro-
cedures that govern the award system need to be transparent and fair. This
pertains to decisions on the kinds of activities that can earn an award and
the range of employees for which the respective award is open. Further, as
awards derive their motivating power to a large extent from recognition and
honor, management’s attitude as indicated by their statements and behavior
influence the value of awards. If employees feel that management does not re-
ally care about the activities honored or only uses the award system as a cheap
incentive device, they will not work. Also, the procedures via which award
winners are determined and honored need to be fair and transparent. In par-
ticular, the evaluation criteria that lead to a nomination and the determination
of the winners should be the same for all employees. Further, the decision-
maker should be able to adequately evaluate the performance. Otherwise, the
award loses its motivating power because it is considered arbitrary.
An important characteristic of most incentive contracts is the use of sub-
jectivity in evaluating and rewarding employees (Murphy and Cleveland, 1995;
Prendergast, 1999). The same is true for awards that involve a subjective el-
ement in determining the winners. Hence, the literature that discusses the
27 Benz and Stutzer (2003) provide evidence on procedural utility in work relationships.
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effect of ex post, subjective performance evaluations is directly relevant for
understanding the motivating power of awards. The literature on ex post re-
wards has mainly studied subjective monetary bonuses and concluded that
these motivate, because they complement perceived weaknesses in quantita-
tive performance measures and provide employees with an insurance against
the downside risks associated with their variable pay as managers can con-
sider more determinants than quantitative output when they determine the
bonus (Gibbs et al., 2004). Specifically, subjective bonuses are used to mit-
igate formula bonus distortions caused by incompleteness, short-term focus,
and susceptibility to manipulation. Further, subjective bonuses reduce the
risk associated with deterministic, formulaic bonuses by filtering out factors
that the individual cannot control. The use of subjectivity also allows evalua-
tors to exploit any additional relevant information that arises during the mea-
surement period to the benefit of both the firm and the employee. The firm
can benefit through improved incentive alignment, and the employee can ben-
efit through reduced risk. In effect, subjectivity allows for the recalibration
of incentives during or after the period, which can be especially important
if there are costs to changing or renegotiating formal bonus contracts (Baker
et al., 1988).
At the same time, ex post rewards may be preferable in overcoming multi-
tasking problems because the principal can take into account the agents’ per-
formance in all the tasks even if it is impossible to write explicit contract on
most tasks (Fehr and Falk, 2002). Among others, Baker et al. (1994) and
Baiman and Rajan (1995) show theoretically that in certain circumstances
the combined use of objective performance measures (explicit contracts) and
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subjective performance measures (implicit contracts)28 is optimal. Most the
positive aspects of subjectively determined financial bonuses also apply to
awards. In fact, as will be discussed below in chapter 3, it may be one of
the attractive features of awards that they complement an employee’s salary
and substitute for performance pay in situations in which the latter backfires.
However, awards cannot compensate or insure employees for large financial
risks associated with their variable salary components due to their typically
low monetary value.
In practice, there are certain implementation problems that compromise
the theoretically established advantages of subjective performance evalua-
tions. Among other problems, performance appraisals are often a required,
but unrewarded managerial task. It is rational for managers to spend no more
than the minimal acceptable time and effort needed when evaluating subordi-
nates performance. Moreover, managers bear a disproportionally large share
of the nonpecuniary costs associated with performance appraisals because
they often have personal relationships with their direct subordinates, making
employee complaints and direct conflict with poorly performing employees
particularly distasteful. Therefore, managers prefer uniform (centrality bias)
and high ratings (leniency bias) to a careful differentiation of employees by
performance.29 The biases cause a suboptimal incentive provision and are
28 On implicit contract also see the literature on psychological contracts that represents the
mutual beliefs, perceptions, and informal obligations between an employer and an em-
ployee (Rousseau, 1998, pp. 218f, Frey, 2006, p. 378).
29 For an overview of these and other biases see Murphy and Cleveland (1995). Murphy
(1992) empirically demonstrates biases in subjective performance evaluation and their con-
sequences for incentive provision. He further shows that systems that force managers to
deviate from uniform and lenient ratings have important downsides because they induce
sabotage and provide little incentives for teamwork and cooperation. Further, it is unlikely
that the forced distribution corresponds to the actual distribution of performances in the
58 Why Do Awards Affect Behavior? Chapter 2
not easily remedied (Murphy, 1992).
Awards combine some advantages of subjective rating systems. They are
less prone to the described biases because they only require the manager to
identify one or few employees as top-performing. This requires less effort on
the side of the manager and also has less potential for conflict with subordi-
nates. However, some of the dangers associated with subjective evaluations
in general remain like collusion between manager and employees. Also, an
effective incentive provision via subjective evaluations requires the supervi-
sors to make fair and unbiased judgments that subordinates accept while not
trying to influence the supervisor inappropriately (Gibbs et al., 2004).
This section has presented three mechanisms that have an impact on the
degree to which awards influence behavior. First, the cultural background of
the employees and country-specific institutional factors are important deter-
minants for the attractiveness of awards as incentives. Second, the business
context and the organizational structure of the company need to be considered
when designing an award system as incentive systems promote organizational
performance best when they fit with the overall business strategy. Third, the
procedures involved in determining the award winners play an important role
for the motivating power of awards. Only when employees feel that they are
treated with respect and when the procedure for granting awards is perceived
to be fair and transparent will awards be esteemed.30
workgroup, which leads to demotivation.
30 Of course there are other factors influencing the effectiveness of awards. Another impor-
tant factor is the nature of the task to be fostered with the award. Awards may, for example,
create procedural utility (Frey et al., 2004) and hence, irrespective of the outcome, pleasure
for people engaged in simple, repetitive tasks because the tournament for the award adds
an element of fun.31 On the other hand, awards may work especially well for very com-
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After having presented various approaches that provide insight into why
awards may have an impact on employee behavior, the next section proceeds
with a comparison of awards to other, particularly monetary, incentives.
plex tasks as employees in these tasks have a greater need for role clarification and goal
specification (Bandura, 1986; Kluger and DeNisi, 1996; Locke and Latham, 1990a).
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Chapter 3
Awards Versus Other Incentives
“In many cases, properly run recognition programs
can boost awareness of the organization, build em-
ployee pride, raise morale and, ultimately, increase
productivity. As some of our respondents observed,
higher salary is not the best answer. While a larger
paycheck is always appreciated, everyone’s pride is
boosted by a public demonstration of appreciation.”
Magnus (1981)
Before moving on to the empirical evidence regarding the impact of awards
on performance, this section provides a conceptual analysis. Awards are con-
trasted with other incentive instruments such as praise, feedback, promotions
and performance pay to gain a deeper understanding of the unique features of
these different motivators and their comparative advantages. The issues dis-
cussed in this section go beyond what will be tested empirically in chapters 4,
5, and 6 and are still open for future empirical research. This section does not
attempt to present an exhaustive discussion of all incentive instruments and
their characteristics. Rather, a number of interesting features of awards are
raised and it is discussed how these features distinguish awards from other
incentive instruments. As there is basically no literature on awards, this sec-
tion is somewhat tentative and proceeds without many references to existing
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research. The findings reported in the previous chapter on tournaments, per-
formance pay and social incentives serve as the foundation for the analysis.
Insights from the interviews with nine human resources managers that
were conducted are added to shed light into how practitioners perceive the
role and effect of awards. The expert interviews1 were conducted between
2006 and 2007. As is the case in Bewley (1999) and Agell and Lundborg
(1995), the sample of managers is neither representative nor random. How-
ever, all of the managers interviewed were either directly in charge of the
compensation policy of the company or high enough in the hierarchy to be
able to discuss the relevance and meaning of awards as incentives.2
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, awards are contrasted with purely
monetary rewards to derive a rich characterization of awards and a better un-
derstanding of how awards relate to performance-pay, which is currently the
most widely used and discussed means of incentivizing work effort. Second,
shorter contrasts of awards with three other benchmarks — praise and feed-
back, promotions and gifts in-kind — are presented to gain a deeper under-
standing of the distinctive features of awards. Third, implications for human
resources policy are exxamined.
1 For further information on the method is provided in Kvale (1996), Merton and Kendall
(1979), and Bewley (1999).
2 The companies in the sample cover a broad range of industries to ensure a differentiated
set of opinions. The sample consists of a multinational food producing company, a big
Swiss construction and real estate firm, an international Swiss-based industrial group, a
Swiss credit card service company, three internationally active banks of different sizes, a
European financial services company, and the research lab of an international high-tech
company. The number of employees accountable to each of the managers ranges from 500
to 6,000.
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3.1 Comparing Awards and Monetary Compensation
This section provides a detailed and in-depth comparison of awards with
monetary compensation. This highlights the unique features of awards and
provides insights into the comparative advantages of the two incentive instru-
ments. Pay-for-performance was chosen as an example because it is currently
the most widely discussed motivator in theory as well as practice, and its
prevalence is increasing throughout all sectors from corporations to govern-
mental agencies (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006; Rost and Osterloh, 2009). Money
is implicitly assumed to be the most attractive kind of incentive due to its fun-
gibility (e.g., Baker et al., 1988; Waldfogel, 1993). This assumption is, how-
ever, not well grounded in empirical evidence because the knowledge about
the comparative effectiveness of money and awards as incentives is severely
limited. This section draws on existing research on monetary compensation
and considers whether similar effects can be expected for awards.
To highlight the differences between awards and monetary compensation,
the section discusses money and awards in their pure forms, monetary com-
pensation deprived of any social recognition, and awards with no direct or
indirect material benefits. Of course, these pure forms do not exist in reality.
Rather, there is considerable interdependence between awards and monetary
compensation, a fact which complicates the discussion of either instrument
in isolation. Income, for example, depends directly on performance, because
of variable salary components, and indirectly, because successful employees
have higher chances of promotions, pay raises or beneficial outside offers. At
the same time, income may also rise due to the receipt of an award. Awards in
turn increase income directly and indirectly. They directly increase income
when they come with a monetary bonus. They indirectly increase income
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when they help to build up a reputation and make the individual’s abilities
known to a broader set of persons both within and outside the company. This
in turn may improve her professional network and result in job offers. Social
recognition, on the other hand, may be generated by good performance, by
a high salary, and by awards. Sometimes receiving a bonus for good per-
formance may also provide social recognition similar to receiving an award.
This is, for instance, implicit in the expression “to be awarded money.”3 Fur-
ther, it has been argued that the sizes of bonus payments are well known
among colleagues even though they are not officially disclosed and that they
present a source of intra-organizational prestige (e.g., Bewley, 1999, p. 27).
The preceding two points make clear that the differences between mone-
tary compensation and awards are far from simple and clear-cut. However,
a comparison of the two instruments in their pure forms is valuable because
management needs to decide where to place any new incentive on the contin-
uum between pure social recognition and pure monetary payments.4 Knowl-
edge on the advantages and dangers of the two extreme types is therefore
valuable.
3 Psychologists even argue that the primary motivating factor that any effective compensa-
tion program provides is the psychological effect on the individual and that this also holds
for monetary bonuses, where “it is not the material value of the reward, but the boost
in self-esteem that public recognition with monetary compensation afford” (Dawson and
Dawson, 1991).
4 One needs to differentiate between four different kinds of monetary compensation: 1)
fixed salary, 2) variable, contractually specified monetary bonuses based on company per-
formance, and 3) variable, contractually specified monetary bonuses based on individual
performance, 4) variable, discrete monetary bonuses. The focus in this section is on 3) and
4) as these are comparable to awards in their aim of promoting certain activities.
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3.1.1 Differences in the applicability of awards and monetary
compensation
This section discusses external constraints on the applicability of the two in-
struments that have to be taken into account when deciding on a new incen-
tive.
Extent of control over the instruments
The scope for implementing pay-for-performance and other monetary incen-
tive schemes may be restricted due to external factors such as laws, regula-
tions and union contracts prohibiting certain kinds of monetary incentives and
pay differentiation. No such laws and regulations exist for corporate awards
and there are also no legal remedies available for individuals who feel treated
unfairly or discriminated against by their employer with respect to awards.
To eliminate the danger of legal complaints or negative impacts due to envy,
bonuses are awarded on the basis of clearly specifiable quantitative perfor-
mance measures. In fact, they are often perceived as a fixed part of wages
by the employees, as they are often awarded on a contingent basis and with
little discretion (see Bandura, 1986). According to the managers interviewed,
monetary compensation, including performance bonuses, does not have any
incentive effect at all: it is necessary; but it does not motivate. In fact, compa-
nies in industries in which bonuses are common are almost obligated to use
them, and the staff considers them a standard part of their salary because the
variable monetary rewards also follow contractually specified rules.5 Em-
5 Related is the finding in the practitioner literature that monetary rewards do not sustainably
motivate as aspiration levels increase with each salary increase and as economic incentives
become rights rather than rewards. According to Peter Drucker, who is widely considered
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ployees mostly expect the bonus to be at least as high as in the preceding
year. When the bonus is lower, they are disappointed and their motivation
is reduced. If the bonus is approximately the same amount as the previous
year’s bonus, expectations are met and there is little impact on behavior. Mo-
tivation is thought to increase only when the bonus unexpectedly exceeds the
previous one by a substantial amount. However, the managers agree that this
is rarely the case.
Thus, awards can be used spontaneously, while monetary bonuses cannot.
This is relevant here because spontaneity is considered to an important factor
for reward systems to sustainably motivate employees.6 Awards are typically
not fully expected because not everyone gets them and because of the man-
agement’s discretion in determining the winners. The managers perceive that
awards motivate to a large extent exactly because they are out of the ordinary
and highly symbolic. One manager emphasized in the interview that awards
are about spontaneity and surprise, whereas bonuses are calculable. There-
fore, awards are sustainable motivators.
Hence, awards may serve as important complements of monetary payment
schemes as they can be used more flexibly and are subject to fewer restric-
tions.
to be the father of “modern management”, “Merit raises are always introduced as rewards
for exceptional performance. In no time at all they become a right. To deny a merit raise
or to grant only a small one becomes punishment. The increasing demand for material
rewards is rapidly destroying their usefulness as incentives as managerial tools” (Nelson,
1996).
6 This is in line with research that suggests that rewards only motivate when they are not fully
anticipated. Schultz (2006), for example, summarizes the neurophysiological literature on
rewards and concludes that only rewards that are not fully predicted contribute to learning.
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Ideological Restrictions
Apart from legal and institutional constraints, culture, ideology and norms
are decisive factors for the applicability of incentive instruments. There are
certain sectors and situations in which money or awards may be deemed un-
acceptable. While the scientific literature does not directly address this issue
in the workplace, other situations are investigated that demonstrate that peo-
ple have certain ideas about when money and when social incentives should
be used. One example is gift giving for which a number of studies have shown
that money is considered to be inappropriate (e.g., Webley et al., 1983; Offer,
1997). In the corporate sector, monetary payments are generally accepted as a
means of exchange. Nevertheless, monetary payments are less acceptable for
some tasks (e.g., Wiersma, 1992, shows that people are unwilling to exchange
voluntary, personal activities, for money). At the same time, the reverse also
holds, and there are situations in which monetary compensation represents
the appropriate means of compensation, such as compensating employees for
hours of overtime or for other activities directly relevant for company profits.
Such implicit or explicit remuneration norms are not fixed, but may change
over time. Consider academia, which has for a long time been taken to be a
“Republic of Science” with its own values and rules that are different from
market mechanisms (Polanyi, 1962; Merton, 1973). Recently, the ideologi-
cal system in academia has been changing and pay-for-performance programs
have been increasingly used and accepted. An extreme example is the Vienna
University of Economics and Business Administration, which pays AC1000
for a paper published in an ‘A journal’ and AC3000 for a paper published in an
‘A+ journal’.7 Moreover, awards can also affect compensation norms (also
7 See http://bach.wu-wien.ac.at/bachapp/cgi-bin/fides/fides.aspx?journal=true.
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see section 2.2 on the behavioral relevance of norms and the potential effect
of awards on norms).
Hence, managers need to be aware of such norms and informal rules about
what is considered an appropriate kind of incentive in a certain situation when
designing rewards. Factors that have a bearing on this such as culture or the
nature of the rewarded task have been discussed in 2.3.
Financial feasibility
Pay-for-performance and award schemes differ in the timing and kinds of
cost involved in their implementation and operation. Variable pay has direct
monetary costs that occur regularly according to a fixed schedule. Further, it
requires a good performance monitoring system according to which perfor-
mance and thereby the payments are determined. The set-up costs for such a
monitoring system may vary depending on the nature of the task. The costs
associated with an award system are typically less clear-cut and transparent.
The award itself often costs little in terms of the material used. Some costs
arise from the award ceremony and from the selection and screening process
necessary when determining the winners. These costs are not negligible. The
Van Cliburn International Piano Competition, a renowned music competition,
for example, which presents a cash award of $20,000 to its first-prize winner,
costs more than $3 million to run (English, 2004, pp. 112ff). In a corporate
setting, the costs are probably lower because performance is monitored more
or less independently of the award, and supervisors can typically judge who
deserves awards.
There are also differences in the financial benefits from employing awards
or money as incentives. Because monetary benefits are considered to be more
Chapter 3 Comparing Awards With Other Incentives 69
powerful extrinsic incentives, it is likely a bonus of a typical size causes a
larger increase in the activity targeted than a typical award. Awards, by com-
parison, may bring additional benefits to the company that may be hard to
quantify in dollars or only become effective in the long run. Examples are
the development of a group identity, a change in the organizational climate
and the establishment of role models.
Due to the differences in the nature and timing of the associated costs
and benefits, external factors such as the availability of financial means or
the feasibility and costs of a monitoring system play decisive roles in de-
ciding between awards and performance pay as incentives. If an organiza-
tion, for example, wants to install a new incentive and has limited funds but
free human resource manpower, awards may be more attractive than pay-for-
performance schemes. On the other hand, if it is important that certain activ-
ities are quickly increased and financial benefits and expenditures are highly
predictable, variable pay such as piece rates, may be preferable to awards.
Performance measurement
As was mentioned above, monetary compensation has to be specified con-
tractually ex ante, i.e. before the performance of the employee.8 Typically,
the base salary is fixed in the employment contract, and the rules according to
which bonuses are determined are specified. Hence, performance bonuses are
suitable incentives when goals can be clearly specified ex ante and when the
corresponding performance is easy to identify and to measure. Performance
8 Theoretically, monetary bonuses may also be determined subjectively ex post. However,
monetary payments are typically subject to a strict set of rules, and employees may even
sue employers when they disagree with the stipulated amount. Therefore, most bonuses are
determined according to a clear and transparent set of quantifiable performance measures.
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bonuses frequently backfire when the goals are vague, when performance can
only be measured with considerable error or in a limited set of dimensions of
a complex job. In these cases, financial incentives cannot be conditioned
adequately on performance. If an employee feels that the exact amount of a
monetary reward does not correspond to her achievement, she is disappointed
and her motivation may falter. Further, effort may be distorted, such as when
employees only focus on the specified performance dimensions and neglect
other important aspects of the task (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991 or
Kaarboe and Olsen, 2006 on multi-tasking).
Typically, the economics and management literature has focused on sim-
ple and clearly specifiable tasks, despite the prevalence of complex jobs with
vague tasks.9 The few authors who have addressed incentives for complex
jobs either advocate the use of fixed wages, i.e. the abandonment of explicit
extrinsic incentives and the reliance on intrinsic motivation (e.g., Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991; Frey and Osterloh, 2005) or they call for a subjective
overall performance evaluation (see section 2.3.3, specifically Baker et al.,
1988, Hayes and Schaefer, 2000, and Murphy and Oyer, 2003). However, it
is typically not specified how this should be done. Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1994) argue for a combination of different incentive systems to counterbal-
ance potentially distorting effects of one system alone. Awards are extrinsic,
but non-monetary motivators and lie between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tors. They are often exactly suited to the situations described before because
they are typically handed out according to a set of vague criteria, thus giv-
ing managers leeway to globally assess performance ex post and to take into
account inputs such as work ethics.
9 This has been criticized, for instance, by Prendergast (1999).
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Awards do not require an exact evaluation of performance. An approx-
imate knowledge of overall performance suffices because the award itself
provides general recognition rather than recognition counted in exact sums
of dollars or euros. Hence, awards may be substitutes for performance pay
when the tasks are of a vague and complex nature and hard to measure. Alter-
natively, awards may be important complements to performance pay in these
situations in case the combined use of the two instruments does not lead to the
same kinds of distortions that would be caused by performance pay alone.10
The same holds when there is uncertainty ex ante with respect to which be-
haviors suit the company best. Then, the company deliberately wants to stip-
ulate vague performance criteria, such as “good customer service”, and leave
open which specific kinds of behavior qualify. In the interviews, managers
stated that awards are used when management wants to keep performance
criteria deliberately vague. In all but one company, which uses awards as
tournament prizes based on sales figures, awards are handed out according to
a set of broad criteria so that management retains leeway in evaluating per-
formance ex post. Related is the finding that all managers agree that salaries,
including performance bonuses, compensate for “normal” performance and
that awards rather than monetary forms of compensation should be used to
reward extraordinary performances and activities. Such activities tend to be
those that cannot be contractually fixed. That some substitution is possible
10 Along similar lines, Bruggen and Moers (2007) also hypothesize that non-monetary in-
centives play a crucial role in multi-tasking settings. Their experimental results show that,
while financial incentives promote higher levels of effort, congruent social incentives, i.e.
social and ethical norms promote a less distorted effort allocation. However, in their set-
up, the principal cannot influence the social incentives that guide behavior. Awards can
be understood as social incentives. However, in contrast to norms, they can be used as
instruments that influence behavior both directly, because awards are desired by individual
employees, and indirectly, via their impact on norms in the workplace.
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between status/honor and monetary compensation has already been observed
by Smith (1937 / 1776, p. 100) stating that “honor makes a great part of the
reward in all honorable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things
considered, they are generally under compensated.” At the same time, Auriol
and Renault (2008) counter that while recognition is a key feature of work
incentives even when output is easily measurable, it would be misleading to
view recognition as a cheap substitute for money. A common theme in or-
ganization theory is that there are some costs associated with the differential
treatment of people performing similar tasks. Recognition has a cost because
it is valued in relative terms; for every award winner there are a number of
losers. Another constraint that an employer faces when deciding on an allo-
cation of social status is that the allocation should be perceived as legitimate
because it will be without effect or even counterproductive otherwise.
3.1.2 Effectiveness of awards and monetary compensation as in-
centive instruments
This section compares five ways in which the two instruments, money and
awards, differ in their effectiveness in incentivizing effort.
Marginal effect
Recent empirical research on happiness (a reasonably good empirical proxy
for utility) has shown that the marginal utility of money is, indeed, decreasing
exactly in the way postulated by standard economic theory. An increase in
income raises the happiness of poor people considerably, while the effect on
people with higher income is relatively small (see Frey and Stutzer, 2002a,b;
Layard, 2005; Deaton, 2007). There is no evidence on how the marginal ben-
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efit of awards changes with the number of awards received. However, there
are some models on status incentives (e.g., Auriol and Renault, 2008) that
assume decreasing marginal benefits and a positive cross-elasticity between
income and status (psychological need theories also point in the same direc-
tion see section 2.2.2). It seems plausible to make the same assumptions for
awards. When deciding between money and awards it is therefore impor-
tant to know whether the marginal utility of money or awards is decreasing
more quickly. The current state of research does not provide an answer to this
question.
Another effect to be considered is the induced change in utility over time.
According to the adaptation explanation of the “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin,
1974, 2005),11 an increase in income first raises utility, but the effect on utility
wears off over time. After a year, between two thirds and three quarters of
the utility increase have evaporated (Frey and Stutzer, 2006). Over time,
increases in the per capita income of a country therefore go along with a
(nearly) constant happiness level. Again, there is no evidence for awards.
However, one may once more draw on the status literature, which has shown
that people are much slower to adapt to higher status than to higher income
(Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006). Therefore, an increase in status leads to
a more sustained increase in utility than an increase in income. Because
awards and status are related, one might therefore infer that awards also lead
to a more sustained increase in utility than an increase in income.
11 The Easterlin Paradox describes the empirical observation that while individuals in richer
countries are happier than those in poorer countries and wealthy individuals are happy than
poor individuals in the same country, average happiness in a country does not increase
with rises in the country’s income level over time. Apart from the adaptation hypothesis
discussed above, a second popular explanation for the paradox is that relative rather than
absolute income determines happiness.
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Value to the recipient
Money is valuable to all individuals, because it is the most fungible of all
goods, an insight that has long been central to economic thinking.12 The
value of monetary incentives to recipients is unambiguous and changes in the
value of money are determined by the current rate of inflation. Hence, it is
exogenous to both the award-giving institution and the recipients. The trans-
fer of money to the recipient is therefore always a clear and credible signal of
appreciation and recognition because money is a scarce resource. This is sup-
ported in interviews as the managers agree that awards are often associated
with a monetary bonus, not because the bonus per se is important for moti-
vation, but because it credibly signals the importance of the activity to the
company and because money is the dimension in which the company profits
from their employees’ efforts. The desirability of awards, in comparison, is
endogenous and depends on a number of different factors such as its scarcity
and the prestige of the organization or person bestowing the award.
Awards mainly consist of a “piece of ribbon” or a paper certificate of no
significant material value. There is, therefore, no apparent constraint when
it comes to handing out awards. This can easily result in award inflation,
as has indeed happened in some countries (examples being the Soviet Union
and the German Democratic Republic) where so many orders, medals, and
decorations were handed out that they lost much of their value. As the value
of an award critically depends on its scarcity, and because the scarcity of
awards is not exogenously fixed, the giver must resort to some credible self-
binding mechanism to maintain its value. One such mechanism is to combine
the award with money. This is an effective constraint as funds are limited. A
12 See, e.g., Baker et al. (1988), or Waldfogel (1993) on the comparison with gifts.
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second mechanism is a formal restriction on the number of awards handed
out. Such a restriction can take various forms. One can restrict the number
of awards by having a fixed number in circulation. This procedure holds, for
example, for some state orders in Great Britain such as the Most Noble Order
of the Garter or the Most Ancient and Noble Order of the Thistle, which are
limited to 25 and 16 bearers, respectively. However, such restrictions are only
rarely used in companies.13
Another possibility is to hand out awards only at fixed intervals and only
to a fixed number of persons. That is the case for Employee of the Month ti-
tles, which by definition are handed out on a monthly basis to one individual
a time. Restricting the number of possible recipients does not always work
because the award-giving institution has a short-term incentive to increase
the number of award recipients at the expense of the award’s reputation and
value in the future.14 Outside the corporate sector, this has, for instance, hap-
pened in the case of the French Légion d’honneur. The number of recipients
is allegedly limited (1,250 Commanders and 10,000 Officers), but has been
awarded to many more people (3,626 Commanders and 22,401 Officers; see
Frey, 2005). In the corporate sector, restrictions in the number of awards are
often implicit and known by custom.
The value, and hence effectiveness of awards also depends on the prestige
of the organization, which can partly be influenced by the recipient. An em-
ployee’s effort contributes to company success, which in turn influences the
13 An exception is IBM Research, which has two categories of awards each with a fixed num-
ber of recipients: the IBM Academy with 500 members worldwide and the IBM Fellowship
program with 40 members worldwide.
14 The managers added that the monetary component of awards should be kept small, so that
the award does not become comparable to performance pay, which tends to create envy
among colleagues or feelings of entitlement.
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reputation and prestige of the organization and hence, the value of the award.
This channel provides an incentive for award winners to put in additional ef-
fort even after the award is presented because she can increase the value of
the received honor with her performance.
Apart from the factors mentioned, procedures are more important for the
value of awards than for monetary rewards that retain their consumption value
irrespective of how the bonus was calculated. Specifically, employees need to
trust the supervisors that only the most deserving employees receive awards.
Only then do awards have value as compensation and as a signal of outstand-
ing performance, which is a prerequisite for the discussed positive impact on
status, recognition and self-image (see chapter 2).
The value of awards versus monetary compensation to the recipient also
depends on other, individual-specific, factors such as the hierarchical posi-
tion of the employee in the company. One can argue that awards are more
effective for employees in lower positions in the firm as they have a greater
need for recognition in the form of awards. Persons high in the company hi-
erarchy often receive recognition by outsiders in the form of job offers from
headhunters, invitations to give talks, or occupational prestige associated with
their job in general. They may also reap all social recognition for successful
projects. Additionally, highly ranked prestige hierarchies outside the firm,
such as professional associations or the media, provide awards to employees
in important positions (e.g., the title Manager of the Month by the business
press). As the need for social recognition by higher-level employees is met
in these different ways, they exhibit a smaller interest in awards from the
company itself.
The preceding arguments may seem to contradict the argument that awards
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should work particularly well for those individuals with a low marginal utility
from monetary payments. Low marginal utility of income applies for instance
to employees in higher hierarchical positions of the organization as they earn
higher salaries. However, the low marginal utility from monetary compen-
sation for persons in higher positions in the organization is not sufficient to
infer that awards will work better for them. Rather, the preceding discussion
suggests that the marginal utility of monetary payments and of social recog-
nition may be positively correlated within organizations. Hence, both money
and awards work better for individuals low in the company hierarchy.
3.1.3 Publicity
In section 2.1.3 it has been established that signals of motivation and ability
are highly valued in many settings. Monetary compensation, in contrast, is
not typically publicized. Receiving a large year-end bonus for outstanding
sales performance, for example, helps little, if at all, in signaling motivation
and ability to outsiders. As was discussed, awards serve the signaling func-
tion well. An award is typically given at a public ceremony, and it is clearly
articulated why the recipient won the award. Hence, a clear signal is given
to insiders. The signaling value of an award is increased because it extents
to outsider as it is generally acceptable to display award certificates in one’s
home or office and to list awards on one’s C.V.15 Also, the award-winning
behaviors are typically mentioned on the certificate, which increases the in-
15 As was discussed in the literature section, the company will only implement awards with
a large signal value to outsiders if the overall benefit of the award systems outweighs the
risks associated with employees demanding a higher wage or even leaving the company
because of outside job offers. One manager interviewed explicitly addressed the downsides
of publicity by arguing that awards may improve an employee’s outside option.
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formation contained in the signal to outsiders.
Award winners are publicized in all of the companies surveyed via a cere-
mony, a presentation of the recipients on the local area network, or an article
in the company newsletter. This publication of the winners and the reasons for
their selection constitutes an important difference between awards and other
kinds of incentives. The visibility of the winners allows awards to generate
social recognition exceeding that generated by bonuses, which are typically
private, or praise, which is only observed by the colleagues present. This is
confirmed by the managers who emphasized that awards are better than other
motivators in bringing esteem and honor to the winners via, for instance,
public congratulations or a certificate. According to them, recognition by fel-
low employees is the most powerful motivational drive and awards directly
address this need. According to all managers, visible symbols such as a cer-
tificate or a trophy are an important feature of awards that distinguish them
from praise as well as from monetary payments. The publicity also extends
the circle of people from which the recipient may receive recognition to in-
clude colleagues the recipient does not know personally. Further, publicity
also fosters the creation of role models within the company. By putting a
successful employee into the spotlight, the company can highlight successful
and valuable kinds of behavior.
Of course, awards also motivate when they are not public, because they
provide performance feedback and recognition by the superior. However, the
net effect of such awards should be smaller than the one of public awards,
as long as there is no reason to assume that the potentially negative effect of
publicity on non-recipients due to envy or disappointment is substantial.
Monetary compensation or performance bonuses, on the other hand, are
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not published, nor is information about them made available upon request in
all the companies surveyed. Money may be more effective in inducing perfor-
mance increases with respect to a targeted activity, but it exhibits fewer posi-
tive side effects in the form of information dissemination and social recogni-
tion. Hence, the desirability of publicity is another critical factor in deciding
between awards and monetary compensation.
Intrinsic motivation
In section 2.2.4 it was explained why monetary compensation may, under
certain circumstances, reduce effort and performance. Detrimental effects of
performance pay are, for instance, likely when performance measurement is
difficult or tasks are vague. This section argues that there are major differ-
ences between performance pay and awards with respect to their impact on
intrinsic motivation and that awards are less likely than performance pay to
decrease intrinsic motivation. On the contrary, they may even foster it.
The monitoring necessary to make performance pay schemes effective is
one cause for their negative impact on intrinsic motivation, as employees
may perceive it as controlling. Awards, on the other hand, can do without
strict performance measurements, as they only require a broad assessment of
performance and are therefore less likely to be perceived as controlling. In
contrast, because the intrinsic motivation and dedication of the winner are
often emphasized in the award speech, intrinsic motivation may even be fos-
tered.16 Further, weak individual material incentives are shown to create an
16 This is in line with Cognitive Evaluation Theory that suggests that feedback from an exter-
nal source is expected to lower intrinsic motivation if individuals perceive it as controlling,
which is likely for performance pay requiring exact measurements, but not if they perceive
it as competence feedback, which is likely for awards (Deci and Ryan, 1980).
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impression of disrespect and should only be used when they are sufficiently
strong. Symbolic rewards, such as stars or other materially worthless dis-
tinctions may be preferable and can be used to indicate which behaviors are
deemed to be desirable (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). One manager in
the study emphasized that social incentives should be used to reward activi-
ties that require a high degree of intrinsic motivation because those activities
would be viewed as less enjoyable if they were associated with purely mon-
etary rewards. However, it is, of course, true that well administered pay-for-
performance programs may avoid the crowding out of intrinsic motivation,17
just as badly administered award systems may do.
Awards and money also differ with respect to their impact on a person’s
self-image, which was discussed in section 2.2.3. Recall that this literature
rests on the premise that individuals have imperfect knowledge about their
motivation or their ability and infer this information from their behavior or
external interventions. When individuals are given money for contributing to
corporate public goods or for helping their colleagues, they may infer from
this that they did so mainly to earn money and not because they were inter-
ested in it or genuinely cared about helping their colleagues. In the presence
of external incentives, the activity may therefore be reduced because engag-
ing in it does not result in an unambiguous, positive signal of one’s genuine
altruistic motivations. Award winners are determined subjectively according
to a set of vague criteria. Hence, awards may be less harmful to the signaling
value of pro-social activities as monetary incentives because there is no clear,
completely predictable relationship between behavior and awards. Further,
17 Wiley (1997, p. 272) describes evidence that monetary rewards increase intrinsic motiva-
tion when employees consider good wages to be solid feedback concerning their work as
well as a reward for their ability and competence.
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receiving an award may boost self-confidence, which in turn increases mo-
tivation and effort (see section 2.2.3 on the relationship between self-image
and performance).
Hence, awards can serve as substitutes for monetary incentives when the
latter have detrimental effects on performance. Monetary payments tend to
lower effort, when they crowd out the intrinsic motivation to engage in a task
or negatively affect an agent’s self-image.18
Creation of loyalty to the giver
As was discussed above (see section 2.2.3 on identity), awards and the asso-
ciated ceremonies have the potential to shape employees’ identities as well as
create in-groups, both of which may result in loyalty towards the company.
At the same time, public recognition of the recipient by the organization may
create an emotional as well as a strategic bond due to the warm feelings of
thankfulness for the honor received19 and the connection between the recipi-
ent and the award-giving institution that is established with the public accep-
tance of an award. In fact, the recipient would devalue her own award if she
spoke badly of the giver. A bond of loyalty is therefore established between
the giver and the recipient. While the strength of this bond varies depend-
ing on the specific award and the specific recipient, it is most likely stronger
18 That some substitution is possible between status/honor and monetary compensation has
already been observed by Smith (1937 / 1776, p. 100) stating that “honor makes a great part
of the reward in all honorable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered,
they are generally under compensated.”
19 The managers stated that awards cause a stronger emotional reaction than other motiva-
tors. Monetary compensation was considered to be devoid of any emotional element (“one
simply is not emotionally touched when receiving one’s salary”). Praise, by comparison,
is thought to cause an emotional reaction.
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for awards than for monetary payments. In fact, monetary compensation typi-
cally does not induce any loyalty and can even be used as justification to work
for a principal or an organization that one publicly denounces — “I only did
it because of the money.” Experimental research suggests that monetary pay-
ments induce a self-sufficient orientation in which people prefer to be free
of dependency and dependents, i.e. they feel less obliged towards the institu-
tion responsible for the payment (Vohs et al., 2006, p. 1154). The gesture of
payment relegates the relationship to the purely economic sphere, in which
characteristics such as loyalty play no role (see also Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000a). Hence, considerations of loyalty also have an impact on the decision
between awards and money as incentives.
In the interviews, seven of the nine managers said that awards induce loy-
alty because the recognition induces feelings of connectedness to and sol-
idarity with the company. One manager limited his statement to the more
important awards. Overall, there was general agreement that awards do af-
fect organizational commitment, a weaker form of loyalty. One manager
emphasized that awards and monetary compensation lead to differences in
orientation of the employees. Awards cause loyalty and identification and put
values and value-oriented behaviors into the focus of attention. Performance-
pay schemes, on the other hand, induce employees to be oriented towards
increasing their monetary payoff. Employees typically compare their bonus
with those of colleagues and also with employees at comparable companies
and become disgruntled if their bonuses are smaller. Whether behavior is in
line with ethical standards or the values of the organization is not the center of
attention. However, it is unlikely that differences in award schemes between
companies cause envy and dissatisfaction because awards are more difficult
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to compare and because people typically do not compare their company with
other companies in terms of the award systems installed.
3.2 Contrasting Awards with Praise, Promotions, and
Non-monetary Gifts
Of course monetary forms of compensation are not the only interesting bench-
mark to compare awards with. This section therefore contrasts awards with
three further human resources instruments according to a selective but infor-
mative set of factors. Praise and feedback, promotions and gifts in-kind are
considered because these are the most widely used human resources instru-
ments apart from monetary rewards.20
3.2.1 Praise
Relative to praise21 and feedback, the procedures associated with awards are
more formal. Typically, there is also a limit to the number of awards handed
out in total or per period and the associated monetary bonus additionally fore-
stalls an inflationary use of awards. Moreover, awards are signed or even
handed over by a higher-level manager, often even the CEO. Her high op-
portunity costs also ensure the credibility of the recognition expressed with
the award. These and other features lend awards an official character that
differentiates them from more informal interventions such as praise and feed-
back and make an individual award more valuable than a praise or a positive
20 Fringe benefits are not discussed explicitly because they are highly regulated and form part
of the employment contract. Thus, they are not used as discrete rewards for exceptional
performance, which is the focus here.
21 Praise refers to a supervisor verbally telling an employee that he or she did a good job.
84 Comparing Awards With Other Incentives Chapter 3
feedback.
At the same time, there are no immediate material costs associated with
informal praise or feedback from one’s immediate supervisor. Much of the ef-
fect of these incentives therefore hinges on the personal relationship between
the manager and the employee. Specifically, the effect of praise and feedback
depends on the ability of the supervisor to provide feedback, the employees’
trust in the sincerity of the praise, and on the employees’ assessment of the
supervisor’s subjective criteria for deciding whom to praise. Hence, the ef-
fect of these informal incentives on performance depends to a large extent on
the individual supervisor and is hard to systematically administer for human
resources managers.
The official procedures render awards much less person-specific. An award
scheme applies to more employees than there are members of a single work-
group managed by an individual supervisor, which alleviates problems asso-
ciated with procedural justice. Awards and praise should, however, not be
considered as substitutes because the nature of recognition differs. While
feedback and praise provide instantaneous recognition for a job well done
and are of a personal nature, awards recognize longer-term dedication and
achievement and are more formal, i.e. they present recognition by the com-
pany. In addition, awards can partly compensate for the lack of recognition
in workgroups in which the direct supervisor has problems to communicate
recognition.
3.2.2 Promotions
While award systems and promotions share an element of competition, the
aims of the two incentive systems are different. Promotions have organiza-
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tional consequences as they change the hierarchical position and job content
of selected employees. Awards, on the other hand, are typically unrelated
to promotion decisions, as was confirmed in the interviews with human re-
source managers. For this reason, the criteria for selecting award winners
and for choosing employees for promotion differ in essential aspects. Pro-
motion decisions are typically based on performance in core business areas.
Awards, in contrast, target a larger variety of behaviors. They often promote
soft activities or organizational citizenship behaviors, such as volunteering
to substitute for sick colleagues or helping new employees get settled. Such
behaviors are typically not feasible for making promotion decisions because
they reveal motivation but provide little information about skill, which are
important for promotions. Since awards are often granted for activities where
the standard deviation of performance is high, and given that awards typically
have a larger number of recipients than there are opportunities for promo-
tions, awards are attainable for a larger number of employees. Hence, there
is less of a danger that individuals resign or even resort to sabotage because
they feel excluded from an incentive scheme they value (this effect has been
extensively discussed in the literature on tournaments, see section 2.1.2 on
an overview of this literature). Specifically, awards may be attainable for
employees who are not eligible for promotions or high performance bonuses.
Award systems are also more differentiated than promotion systems. There
are, for example, awards for cooperation, innovation and skill enhancements.
This selection already shows that awards can be and are created as the need
arises. Promotion systems on the other hand are fixed, mostly depending on
the organizational structure, with little discretionary room for management
to change the number of hierarchies other than via the creation of arbitrary
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titles, which is unlikely to motivate anyone.
The preceding discussion shows that awards work and that they may serve
as complements to promotions. While promotions have to be based on per-
formance in core business activities and have to take the fit between the pro-
moted individual and the new job into account, awards can focus on many
different criteria.
3.2.3 Non-monetary gifts (gifts in-kind)
Another interesting contrast is between awards and gifts in-kind as rewards
for special achievements. Awards via the trophy and in-kind gifts share many
features, including their value as sustainable reminders of good performance.
In comparison to monetary bonuses, awards and gifts in-kind likely cause
greater reciprocal reactions (see section 2.2). Awards, however, are more
durable than gifts, which are typically used or consumed. Further, awards
are more fungible in the sense that the associated social recognition and
bonus are more likely coincide with the needs of the recipients than a specific
gift. Moreover, awards are better signals to professional outsiders as they
can be mentioned in the C.V. and as the certificate provides information on
the award-winning behaviors. Of course, gifts-in-kind also have advantages.
Among others, they more easily transfer the intra-organizational recognition
to the home setting, as family and friends typically take more note of a new
TV than a certificate in the office. If chosen correctly, individuals may value
the gift beyond the monetary equivalent (in addition to the recognition and
status provided with the presentation). This applies to goods that are highly
valued but not bought, because the individual would not be able to justify the
purchase of such a luxury good to himself or the family (a discussion of this
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justification effect is presented in Jeffrey, 2007). As awards and gifts-in-kind
each have advantages, circumstances determine which of the two should be
used in a specific situation.
3.3 Implications for HR–Policy
The comparison of awards with other incentives highlighted some specific
features of awards. Moreover, the section presented a number of contextual
factors, such as the norms concerning appropriate forms of compensation, the
legal and institutional environment and the type of activity to be rewarded,
which influence the preferability of the different instruments. This section
draws on the findings discussed above to derive specific implications for hu-
man resources management.
3.3.1 Awards are a distinct kind of incentive
To begin, an important difference between awards and other incentives are
that awards are motivators along different dimensions. This means that they
address a number of different needs at the same time, for instance, the need
for social approval, for a positive self-image and for a signal for ability. One
consequence is that awards appeal to employees with very heterogeneous
needs, offering a bonus to those for whom material needs are most salient,
feedback to those that have a need to know how they perform relative to others
and relative to their own performance standard. Of course, other motivators
also address more than a single need. However, the bundle character is more
pronounced and explicit in the case of awards. Informal positive feedback,
for example, may also raise status if others learn about the praise. Neverthe-
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less, the impact on status is typically only an unintended side effect. Awards
may also exhibit unique properties exactly because of their bundle character,
i.e. effects that go beyond what has been demonstrated for the individual mo-
tivators that comprise an award (evidence on synergistic effects of incentives
was discussed in section 2.3.2). So far, no study has investigated the syn-
ergistic properties of the specific combinations present in awards. Second,
awards reward performance that cannot be contracted such as having a goof
work ethic. Further, awards can be used to incentivize activities that cannot
be targeted with other incentives, like promotions for work output. Third, the
performance evaluation associated with awards is more formal than the one
for praise and instantaneous feedback, and it relies on ex-post assessments
according to vague criteria that are typically different from those of perfor-
mance pay schemes. Therefore, the performance evaluation for awards may
be perceived as less controlling than the one associated with variable mon-
etary compensation so that awards are less likely to crowd out the intrinsic
motivation. Fourth, awards provide formal recognition to employees that may
not be eligible for other formal rewards such as high bonuses or promotions.
Fifth, awards are more durable than gifts and are superior in terms of their
signaling value due to the certificate and publicity. Overall, depending on the
task at hand and the availability of other rewards, awards can either comple-
ment or substitute for other incentive types. The established differences can
serve as criteria for human resources managers on deciding which kind of
incentives to implement in a certain situation.
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3.3.2 When to use money and when to use awards
The deeper comparison between awards and monetary forms of compen-
sation revealed some substantial differences in the applicability and effec-
tiveness of the two instruments that have consequences for human resources
strategy. The main strengths of money as an incentive are its fungibility (con-
sumption value), and the fact that it more easily serves as a credible signal of
appreciation. Its main weaknesses are the often limited applicability due to
political, social, and economic restrictions, and the problems entailed in the
necessary performance measurement. The main strengths of awards are their
wide applicability (due to their discretionary nature), their effectiveness in
terms of their signaling capacity, motivational crowding-in, and the creation
of loyalty. The main weakness of awards is the difficulty of the award-givers
to commit themselves to keeping the number of awards scarce and therefore
valuable. Further, the discretionary nature of awards implies that they are
only taken seriously if there is considerable trust in the selection procedure.
Although money may, in principle, bring recognition and status, awards are
more effective in doing so due to the greater role of publicity.
It follows that money is a valuable instrument to promote effort if the price
system is politically and socially accepted, if the performance desired is well
specified, if incomes are low (and the marginal utility of money high), if there
is little need for signaling, and if output does not depend greatly on intrinsic
motivation. Awards are the preferred instrument in the opposite cases.
It might seem obvious that the advantages of each instrument could be
maximized and the disadvantages minimized by combining money and awards
in a suitable way. This is done in many cases. The IBM Innovation Award,
for example, comes with a considerable sum of money. Indeed, connecting a
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prize with a substantial monetary bonus might well be a good strategy for a
newly established prize in order to signal the seriousness of the intention to
honor good performance and to make it prominent (prizes with higher mon-
etary amounts may receive more attention by employees). The danger of
combining money and awards is that both instruments lose their advantages,
yet the disadvantages remain. Many prizes do not even publicize the amount
of money that goes with them, or they publicly downplay the role of the com-
pensation. As soon as the monetary component becomes too salient, awards
may, like performance pay, lead to motivational crowding-out, destroy self-
signaling, and lead to envy and sabotage.
As was discussed above, money and awards do not exist in the “pure”
forms discussed in this section. Rather, even awards without money attached
may have indirect monetary consequences by raising future income, and re-
ceiving money may, under some conditions, bring social recognition. There-
fore, managers typically do not have to make an “either-or” decision, but can
choose a combination of the two instruments that suits their specific situation
best. Relevant factors to be considered have been identified above. This is
in line with the finding in the interviews that all managers agree that awards
cannot substitute for adequate financial remuneration. Hence, awards and
monetary compensation, overall, are viewed as complementing each other.
In general, the managers argued that one should not ask about the partic-
ular type of reward to be used for certain kinds of behaviors. Rather the
choice of the incentive system needs to be aligned with the overall strategy of
the company. In the view of one manager, non-monetary incentives such as
praise and awards tend to focus on values and relationships, whereas purely
monetary bonuses typically focus on measurable performance outcomes. If
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a company wants to move from an incentive system based on monetary re-
wards to a system of praise and awards, management needs to establish a new
set of evaluation criteria. Further, awards will only motivate if management
provides an example, for instance when managers exhibit behavior guided
by those values and rules that are used for evaluating the employees. Other-
wise, employees will consider a move from monetary incentives to praise as
a mere cost-saving measure, especially if managers continue to be compen-
sated with bonuses. One manager stressed that one cannot discuss the impact
of a particular award in isolation; rather awards always need to be embedded
in an entire reward system. Some awards should be associated with substan-
tial monetary bonuses, others with a smaller bonus, and still others with no
monetary payout at all. It is important that there is a broad variety and a small
number of awards so that there is still an element of surprise for the winner.
This thesis provides a first systematic assessment of awards. The chap-
ters presenting empirical studies demonstrate that awards have a significant
ex ante incentive effect as well as a sizeable ex post effect on performance.
Of course, many of issues raised in this section cannot be verified with an
analysis of these “main effects”. Hence, a careful empirical investigation of
the comparative effectiveness of awards and other incentives remains open
for future research.
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Chapter 4
The Incentive Effect of Awards — A Field
Experiment
4.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the results of a field experiment that assesses the incen-
tive effect of non-material awards (i.e. rewards with no impact on current
or future economic well-being) on performance in a real-life work situation.
Hence, it provides empirical relevance of the relevance of awards that is so
far missing in the literature.
The following section describes the experimental design. Section 4.3 presents
and discusses the experimental results and section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Experimental Design
The field experiment was conducted in collaboration with the Swiss office
of the international NGO The Hunger Project (THP). This NGO, headquar-
tered in New York, operates worldwide and aims to fight hunger and extreme
poverty. The NGO helps communities in different countries to create their
own schools and health centers, as well as by providing food security, literacy
trainings, and banking. Further, the NGO offers programs to educate com-
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munity members for political leadership roles, programs to help to empower
indigenous communities, and programs to strengthen democracy. In addition
to raising funds from private individuals and corporations, THP Switzerland
began asking Swiss communities for financial support in 2006. Due to the
highly federal nature of the Swiss political system, individual communities
have their own developmental budgets. Because THP’s initial appeals for
funds sent to a small number of communities were very successful, the orga-
nization decided to send appeals to all of the about 1600 German speaking
Swiss communities. For this mailing, the organization planned to set up a
database that included the names and addresses of the communities as well
as the names of the current community presidents and administrators to per-
sonalize the appeals. Additionally, contact information such as the phone
number and e-mail address of the community office were also to be included.
This situation presented a unique opportunity to run a field experiment. We
hired students for this job via announcements on different university bulletin
boards. The job announcement did not reveal the identity of the employer; it
only described a one-time data entry job of two hours for which CHF 45 (ap-
proximately $37, a standard wage for student workers in Switzerland) could
be earned. We did not reveal the identity of the employer to ensure that the
students did not think that job involved voluntary work, which might have
attracted students with particularly strong social preferences. Interested stu-
dents could sign up online and were then contacted by our recruiters who
assigned them to workgroups of up to twelve students ensuring an approx-
imately equal distribution of gender and subject of study across groups. In
total, 150 students participated in the study; they were assigned to one of
16 workgroups with an average number of 9.4 participants per group (group
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sizes varied between 7 and 12).1 67 students participated in the control ses-
sions without awards (7 sessions) and 83 students participated in the award
sessions (9 sessions). The experiment was conducted consecutively, employ-
ing one group of students at a time in a university lecture hall equipped with
laptops and internet connections.2 Upon arrival, students were asked to take
a seat in front of one of the work stations. The workstations were arranged
in a u-shape from allowing for sufficient space between the participants to
ensure that students felt unobserved while working. The students were then
informed about THP and about their task. The THP database could be ac-
cessed online with an individual password that was handed out to the stu-
dents when entering the room. Online, each student was presented a set of
60 communities. To generate a sufficient number of communities for all the
students, most of the 1600 Swiss communities were included in two or more
sets. The community sets were generated in a way that ensured equal diffi-
culty of the different sets. The difficulty of finding the relevant information
mostly depends on the size of the community, as web presence and detail
of information online typically increases with the number of inhabitants in a
community. Therefore, communities were sorted into categories by size and
each student received the same number of communities of each category. The
task of the students consisted in searching contact information on the internet
1 In unreported regressions, we find that group size is not related to performance.
2 When introducing THP to the students, we informed them that the Swiss division of THP
was small and run by the administrator from her home office. Therefore, a room was
requested from the university for the data entry project, which the university provided free
of charge. This was done to ensure that students did not wonder about why the job took
place in a university building.
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and entering it in the database.3 We informed the students that the names of
the president and the administrator were sometimes hard to find but vital for
the NGO, as personalized letters are more likely to result in a donation. In the
analysis, this allows us to check if the students merely collected the easy-to-
find information or acted in the interest of the organization by trying harder to
find out the names of the president and administrator. The information on the
organization as well as on the task to be performed was given to the students
according to a fixed protocol by the same research assistant in all groups.
In the award treatment, the chairwomen of the NGO told the subjects at the
beginning of the work session that THP wanted to reward the two students
who put in most effort in terms of quantity and quality of entries and that the
database software would indicate these two names at the end of the session.4
She also told them that she would personally come at the end of the session
to congratulate and thank the winners. The students were further shown the
award, a congratulatory note (see Appendix A.1), to ensure that students fully
understood that the award was of no material value. In line with other com-
pany award systems, the exact criteria according to which the winners would
be chosen were specifically left vague. The database software was designed
such that it assigned points for each community. The number of points de-
pended on the number of fields completed and was higher for more difficult
fields, such as the names of the president and the community administrator.
3 All students were informed that they could find the basic information, i.e. the address of
the community, via the web portal www.ch.ch and that they had to look for the names of
the president and administrator and — if not already available on www.ch.ch — also for
the phone number and e-mail address via the homepage of the respective communities.
4 The wording was specifically chosen such that unlike the participants in the control ses-
sions, subjects in the award groups did not get the impression that their performance was
closely monitored.
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While we were present throughout each session to help students in case there
were questions, students were left alone to work for the 2 hours. About 5
minutes before the end of their worktime, we asked the students to fill out a
short questionnaire that we portrayed as feedback for THP on how THP han-
dled the employment of the students. The questionnaire included questions
about previous database experience, skill in touch typing, perceived difficulty
of the task, and level of engagement in volunteer work. During the award
sessions, the chairman of THP then handed out the awards. Afterwards, stu-
dents were paid the CHF 45 in cash. The experiment took place in a three
week period in spring 2008 with two or three work groups per day (morning,
midday and afternoon). We ensured that award and control treatments took
place with equal frequency in each of these time slots.
4.3 Results
Because sessions differed somewhat in length,5 we analyzed subjects’ perfor-
mance in terms of productivity, i.e, output per minute of worktime. Worktime
represents the actual length of a session and is calculated as the span of time
between the first opening of a community data-screen and the last saving of
an entry in any given session. As output measures we use the number of
communities that the subjects worked on per minute and next, the number of
points per minute that the subjects achieved. The first measure reflects the
5 The differences in session lengths are caused by the fact that, in some sessions, students
took longer to enter the room, to take their seats and to ask questions. While session lengths
are not statistically significantly different between award and control sessions, individual
sessions differ to up to 10 minutes and on average the award sessions are a little shorter. Us-
ing productivity rather than total output corrects for these differences. Our results reported
below are robust when total output is used as the dependent variable.
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main goal of the task, namely to enter the addresses of as many communi-
ties as possible as this enables the organization to send out the appeals. The
second measure takes into account that the different items to be entered are
of different importance to the NGO and require different amounts of time
and effort. Specifically, the names of the community president and clerk are
hard to find online but are valuable to the organization, as personalized let-
ters more likely result in a donation. To generate a performance measure
that takes these aspects into account, THP developed a rating scheme before
the experiment took place. Specifically, THP attributed a certain number of
points to each of the fields to be entered. The performance index is then
constructed by adding up the points for all fields that the subject worked on
during the job. In total, students could earn 20 points for each community
entered: 1 point each for entering the zip code and the name of community or
city, 2 points each for entering the address or P.O. Box, the telephone number,
and the e-mail address of the community office, 3 points for finding the cor-
rect name for the community office (e.g., community office or city bureau),
4 points for the name of the community president and 5 points for the name
of the community clerk. Overall, the two performance measures presented
reflect the two dimensions of the task: 1) the quantity of work done and 2)
the quality in terms of whether students prioritized their work in line with
the stated objectives of the organization. Table 4.1 displays the descriptive
statistics and shows that students in the award treatment are more productive
than those in the control treatment. On average, the performance in the award
sessions is 12 percent higher in terms of the number of communities entered
and 9 percent higher in terms of the number of points achieved.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Average number Average number
of communities of points
Session per minute per minute
No award 1 0.216 3.944
2 0.237 4.412
3 0.219 3.992
4 0.222 4.365
5 0.204 3.967
6 0.273 4.781
7 0.222 4.064
Ø 0.226 4.194
Award 8 0.253 4.479
9 0.232 4.393
10 0.249 4.698
11 0.287 5.261
12 0.232 4.184
13 0.233 4.233
14 0.300 4.452
15 0.256 4.895
16 0.256 4.594
Ø 0.253 4.572
Note: The productivity measures refer to the average output per minute
of actual worktime in each session.
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Table 4.2 presents the regression results for three different model specifi-
cations. Models 1 presents the simple regression of the dependent variable on
the treatment variable and a constant. Model 2 additionally controls for abil-
ity, i.e. skill in using the touch typing, and work experience with databases.
Model 3 further controls for perceived task difficulty. The additional controls
were taken from the questionnaire that was to be completed at the end of each
session. As some subjects left responses blank, the number of observations
decreases from model 1 to 3.
The regression results show that both types of productivity are signifi-
cantly higher in the award sessions and that this effort enhancing effect is
robust to alternative model specifications. This result is corroborated by a
non-parametric analysis (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.02 and p = 0.04 respec-
tively, one-sided). The effect size of the award is substantial. Experiments
on gift-exchange report output elasticities with respect to wage increases be-
tween 0.16 and 0.38 (Fehr et al. (2008)). Hence, the observed increase in
performance of about 10 percent is equivalent to what could be induced by
increasing hourly wage between 26 and 62 percent. These substantial cor-
responding wage increases seem quite plausible in light of recent findings
that subjects seem to react less strongly to wage increases in the field than
in the lab. Dur (2008) argues that this disparity is caused by the fact that in
lab experiments, wage is the only means of exchange, while managers in the
field also have socioeconomic tools, such as symbolic gifts, at their disposal
to build up exchange relationships with their workers. Specifically, the latter
may work better than money as signals of kind intentions, thereby causing
strong reciprocal reactions from the workers.
Of the other control variables, only skill in using the touch system and
concentration become statistically significant in some of the regressions each
with the expected sign. None of the other variables we examined in the ques-
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tionnaire have a statistically significant impact on performance or the award
coefficient. For example, subjects’ pro-social motivation that was measured
by the frequency with which subjects are engaged in volunteer work and the
frequency and amount of donations to charities has no influence on subjects’
performance and on how they react to the award. We also do not find a gender
effect.
Importantly, the increase in performance comes at no cost in quality. We
checked the correctness of every information entered into the database. Look-
ing at the share of fields (address, e-mail, phone number, etc.) that were
entered correctly for any given community, we find that on average 88 per-
cent and 87 percent of the information of a community is entered correctly in
the control and the award treatment, respectively. Both quality levels are re-
markably high and do not differ between the treatments (Mann-Whitney test,
p = 0.310, two-sided). The same holds for other possible quality measures,
such as, e.g., the number of mistakes or the number of communities entered
100 percent correctly. In principle, the higher number of points achieved in
the award sessions could either result from a higher number of communities
worked on or from a higher quantity of completed fields that produce more
points. We find that the former is the case. Therefore, the observed increase
in productivity in the award sessions is a quantity effect that does not come
at the expense of quality. At the same time, there was also little room for
an increase in quality due to the award, as quality levels are also high in the
control sessions.
We further inquired into the nature of the performance increase. Provided
that awards motivate due to the tournament character of the award, the vari-
ance of performances should be higher in the award than in the control treat-
ment, as high ability agents exert additional effort to win the award. Assum-
ing that the award signals that the task itself is of social value and that the
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effort of the subjects is much appreciated, the entire distribution of perfor-
mances should be shifted to the right, as the award motivates all subjects and
not merely those that expect to win.
Concerning the number of communities entered, we find that the standard
deviation is somewhat higher in the award (0.09) than in the control treatment
(0.06) due to higher performances at the top end of the performance spectrum.
Hence, part of the increase in performance is caused by the tournament char-
acter of the award. At the same time, the whole performance distribution is
shifted to the right (see figure 4.3 below). The two-sample Kolmogorov test
for equality of distributions is weakly significant. We can reject the hyoth-
esis that the two samples come from the same distribution on the 10% level
(p = 0.08). The picture is similar for the number of points. Again, the
standard deviation is somewhat higher in the award (1.38) than in the control
treatment (1.09) and the distribution is shifted to the right. However, the Kol-
mogorov test does not indicate a statistically significant difference between
the two distributions (p = 0.12).
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Figure 4.1: Performance Distributions
0
0
2
2
4
4
6
6
8
8
Density
De
ns
ity
0
.2
.2
4
.4
6
.6
8
.8
Number of Communitites Per Minute Worktime
Number of Communitites Per Minute Worktime
o Award
No Award
Award
Award
ker el = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0196
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0196
istributi  of P rfo mances -- K rnel Density Estimates
Distribution of Performances -- Kernel Density Estimates
0
0
.1
.1
2
.2
3
.3
4
.4
Density
De
ns
ity
0
2
2
4
4
6
6
8
8
Number of Points Per Minute Worktime
Number of Points Per Minute Worktime
o Award
No Award
Award
Award
ker el = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.4243
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.4243
Chapter 4 A Field Experiment on Awards as Incentives 105
4.4 Conclusion
The reported field experiment shows that awards without any material con-
sequence have a statistically and economically significant impact on work
performance. We isolated this performance enhancing effect under the most
stringent conditions possible: a one-time, two-hour student job for an un-
known employer, among anonymous fellow employees, without any prospect
of current or future material benefits due to the award, and in the presence of
the experimenters, which probably discouraged shirking. This points to the
large significance of these kinds of social incentives in the workplace, which
is more often characterized by repeated interaction among agents with their
peers and superiors as well as awards that have some material value, e.g., in
the form of a bonus or as a signal of talent and motivation for outsiders.
The results also add to the ongoing discussion about the different findings
on the impact of reciprocity in gift-exchange relations in the lab and in the
field. While lab studies find a large behavioral impact of wage increases on
effort; there is relatively little in the field. Dur (2008) argues that this diver-
gence is caused by the fact that employers in the field typically use types of
motivators other than wage, e.g., recognition, to signal kindness. Therefore,
employees do not reciprocate wage increases in the field to the same extent
as they do in the lab, where money is the only means available.
Hence, while the experiment provides clear cut evidence on the behavioral
impact of awards, there are also some limitations. For example, it is unclear
how far the findings from a one-time, student job should be generalized and
applied to ongoing work relationships. Also, one might wonder how much
of the effect is attributable to the employer being an NGO and hence, how
strong the effect would be in case a for-profit company was the employer.
The one-time nature of the employment excludes all effects associated with
repeated interactions like reputational concerns, and prevents an investigation
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on the sustainability of the incentive effect. Hence, the study does not allow
conclusions on how long the incentive effect lasts, on the effect of the awards
after their presentation and on the how the behavioral effect changes with the
number of awards in circulation. The next chapter addresses one of these
issues, namely the effect of awards on its recipients after they are presented.
Chapter 5
The Effect of Awards After They Have Been
Presented — An Econometric Assessment
“If an organization is going to function well, it should
not rely solely on monetary compensation schemes.”
Akerlof and Kranton (2005)
5.1 Introduction
This section estimates the causal effect of receiving an award on subsequent
employee performance in the call center of a large international bank. Specif-
ically, we measure the impact of an award for voluntary work behaviors like
filling in for colleagues or making improvement suggestions on a measure
of core performance, which includes the number of calls taken, the call han-
dling time. Because voluntary work behavior is shown to be uncorrelated
with core performance, receiving an awards can be considered to be an ex-
ogenous event. Hence, the causal effect of awards on performance can be
estimated. Section 2 presents the data and the estimation technique. In Sec-
tion 3, the empirical findings are discussed and Section 4 concludes.
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5.2 Data
The data set comprises information on awards as well as the employee per-
formance of the 155 call center agents of a credit card service company of a
large international bank and covers the period January 2004 to October 2007.
The call center is responsible for handling customer complaints and questions
and consists of six workgroups, each with one manager.
5.2.1 Dependent variable: Performance
The company records daily performance for a number of different perfor-
mance dimensions, starting in the second month of employment. On a monthly
and yearly basis, these measures are transformed into rankings and aggre-
gated into a single performance index. In particular, for each dimension,
the percentage deviation between individual performance and the average
monthly performance of all the call center agents is calculated and changed
into a rating between 5 (very good) and 1 (unsatisfactory), according to a ma-
trix set up by the department head. As an example, an agent that performs
120 percent of the average performance in a dimension receives a rating of
5 in that dimension, and an agent whose performance is 80 percent or lower
receives a rating of 1. The relative nature of the performance measurement
is an advantage for our study because it ensures that all time-varying factors
that affect the absolute performance of all call center agents are excluded.1
1 Theoretically, relative performance measures may have the downside that a change in rat-
ings may not always reflect corresponding changes in effort; hence, ratings may not be
comparable across months. This is the case when a variation in the average absolute per-
formance causes a given effort to translate into different ratings in different months. In our
setting, however, absolute performance does not exhibit a systematic trend and typically
changes only very little between two months in all dimensions. Moreover, the nature of
the task renders it highly unlikely that employee fluctuation causes changes in ability dis-
tributions dramatic enough to have a sizeable impact on absolute performance. Therefore,
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Specifically, the measurement is not affected by an increase in the number or
difficulty of calls or by improvements in the technical infrastructure. Both
of these factors render absolute performance incomparable over time. In line
with exerted effort, the relative rating further ensures that a certain number
of calls answered translates into a higher rating in slow rather than in busy
months because it is easier to handle a certain number of calls in a months, in
which many people call the call center. We use the same index as the com-
pany to ensure that our performance measure corresponds to the company’s
assessment. Because the company continually refines the exact calculation of
its performance index by adding and removing different performance dimen-
sions from it, a core performance measure was constructed in collaboration
with the call center manager. Our performance index comprises the follow-
ing six dimensions that have been part of the company’s index in all of the
periods covered:2
1. Calls Taken Per Hour: Average number of phone calls handled per
hour.
2. Call Handling Time: Average length of phone call.
3. After Call Worktime: Average amount of time needed to process the
request after the call has been ended.
any change in absolute performance that we observe likely reflects changes in working
conditions that should be filtered out.
2 The company’s changes in the index do not reflect systematic and sustained improvements
of performance evaluation, which would have suggested that we should use the changing
index too. Rather all dimensions that are not captured in our core rating were added and
removed at various instances. Examples are the two dimensions Training, which measures
an employee’s performance in in-house training courses, and Write off Policy, which mea-
sures the degree to which employees follow company guidelines on goodwill issues. Both
dimensions were in the company’s index only in 2006.
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4. Transfer Rate: The average ratio between calls handled by the em-
ployee and the number of phone calls that were transferred to col-
leagues or other service units.
5. Lates: Average number of days on which the employee showed up late
for work.
6. Quality: Quality of client handling as assessed by supervisors and
clients.3
Of these dimensions, only the dimension Lates is not evaluated relatively,
but according to an absolute scale (no absence corresponds to a rating of
4, one absence to a rating of 3, and more than one absence to a rating of
1). The resulting six ratings are then combined to a single overall rating
according to the same weighting scheme used by the company.4 Specifically,
Quality enters with a weight of 50 percent and the five other dimensions with
10 percent each. The weighting scheme suggests that the company places
equal emphasis on technical measures, such as the number and durations of
calls, and content measures, which capture the actual interaction between
employee and customer. The resulting index provides an overall assessment
of performance. The management confirmed that our core index captured
3 The rating has an internal and an external component, each of which accounts for 50 per-
cent of the quality rating. Internal quality is assessed by the group manager by periodically
monitoring the conversations of each agent. The assessment follows a clear set of rules
and guidelines that leaves virtually no room for subjectivity. Evaluation criteria are, for
example, whether the agent correctly introduces herself and asks the right set of questions
in the prescribed order. The external quality rating is generated by an outside company that
conducts surveys with the company’s customers.
4 The addition and deletion of performance dimensions in the company’s indices in different
years were accompanied by changes in the weights of the individual dimensions. However,
the relative weights of the six core performance dimensions remained basically identical
throughout the entire time period covered.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of Performance Ratings Against a Normal Distribu-
tion
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overall performance well and that no important performance dimension was
neglected. Figure 5.1 exhibits the density of performance ratings.
The performance ratings are approximately normally distributed with an
average of 3.02 and a standard deviation of 0.66 and do not exhibit a time
trend. The mean and variation corroborate the objective, quantitative nature
of our performance data, as subjectively determined evaluation data typically
cluster around high values (on the leniency bias see, e.g., Murphy and Cleve-
land, 1995; Yariv, 2006) and may cause endogeneity problems because man-
agers might assess award-receiving individuals more favorably. The resulting
index represents a weighted average of quantitative performance measures.
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Thus, we can treat the rating as cardinal because it takes on many different
values and does not have the quality of an ordinal grading scheme.
5.2.2 Independent variable: Awards
The company has a variety of awards. These are called the Thank You Re-
ward, the Gold Reward, the Platinum Reward, the President Reward, Em-
ployee of the Month, and Employee of the Year. The requirements for qual-
ifying for these awards increase from Thank You Reward to Employee of the
Year. While a Thank You Reward, an email notification of the recipient and
a letter sent to the employee’s home address, allows a spontaneous exchange
of thanks among colleagues, the President Reward remunerates activities that
have benefited the company as a whole; these require approval by the CEO
and come with a personal congratulation by the department head. The win-
ners of Employee of the Month and Employee of the Year are selected by
a reward committee and the CEO from among the winners of the Platinum
and President Rewards. For all awards, there is a close connection between
effort and likelihood of nomination, so that individuals can actively pursue
winning an award. Appendix B.1 contains a full description of the awards,
their requirements, approval procedures, and associated benefits. The award
program of the company has been in place since 2001. Therefore, we cannot
estimate how the presence of the award system per se changes performance
because there is no control group without awards. Rather, this ex-ante incen-
tive effect of awards is part of the baseline motivation of each employee and
constant throughout the period of our study.5
5 This incentive effect potentially changes with winning an award. One might argue that
the motivation to win decreases once an award has been won. However, such a potential
change in baseline motivation renders the detection of a positive change in performance
caused by the receipt of an award more difficult.
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While our dataset contains information on the winners of all awards other
than the Thank you Reward, only the Gold Reward lends itself to a statistical
examination because there are too few observations of call center agents win-
ning the other, more prestigious awards. The Gold Reward remunerates ex-
ceptional efforts that benefit the entire work group. Nominations can be made
by colleagues as well as supervisors.6 An award is presented by the call cen-
ter manager in front of the worker’s colleagues in the middle of the following
month. Award winners, as well as their colleagues, only learn about the award
at that ceremony. There is no additional announcement of the award winners;
however, the management tries to present the award when many colleagues
are on hand. The award is accompanied by a certificate for the wall, which
serves as a reminder and ensures that agents not present when the award is
presented learn about it, as well as a symbolic bonus of around Swiss Franc
(CHF) 150 (about 3 percent of monthly income). Examples of behaviors that
qualify for a Gold Reward are volunteering as a substitute during vacation
times, initiating and implementing team events, making improvement sug-
gestions, and helping others with good advice. Importantly, awards are not
presented for the performance used as the dependent variable in our analy-
sis. In fact, core performance is uncorrelated with the activities that lead to
an award. Awards are therefore exogenous, and their causal effect on core
performance can be identified by comparing the performance of winners and
nonrecipients subsequent to winning. If awards depended on performance,
they would always be — at least, in part — a reflection of good performance,
and a careful creation of control groups would be necessary to identify the
6 About half of the nominations come from group supervisors and the other half from col-
leagues. The reasons provided for the nominations do not differ systematically between
those by supervisors and colleagues. The Human Resources Department communicates
the criteria for nominations well, so almost all nominations result in an award. Interviews
with group managers and employees further suggest that employees deserving an award
are not ignored, especially as so many individuals can nominate.
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causal effect.
The data set comprises 46 awards (Gold Reward January 2004 to Gold
Reward October 2007). Overall, 158 Gold Rewards were presented to the
155 call center agents between 2004 and 2007. As expected, the distribution
is skewed to the right. Two agents received a total of eight Gold Rewards,
48 received one,and 76 got none. These numbers suggest that the award is
sufficiently scarce for it to be valuable to its recipients, and the sample is well
balanced between winners and nonrecipients because about half of the agents
never received an award. On average, 3.4 awards are presented per month
with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 11.
5.2.3 Further data information
The data set comprises a total of 1480 individual-month observations.7 Sixty-
three percent of the agents in the sample are female, and the agents remain in
the sample for 18 months on average.
The call center agents are paid a fixed monthly wage of CHF 4,500 (about
$4,500). The exact sum the individual receives depends on her level of expe-
rience, knowledge of languages, and length of employment at the call center.
The Gold Reward complements the company’s salary scheme because it in-
centivizes activities such as substituting for colleagues or organizing team
events that are not remunerated as part of the fixed wage. The management
asserted that receiving a Gold Reward had no effect on future promotion de-
cisions and award winners did not receive special attention, training, or other
advantages, for which we cannot control. Hence, although in-house training
may increase productivity, it is not correlated with winning awards; therefore,
7 The initial data set comprised some additional id-month observations that were lost be-
cause one or more performance dimensions were not recorded in a particular month due to
vacation, sick leave, or failure of the manager to assess the dimension Quality.
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it does not cause systematic biases because it is not correlated with winning
an award.
5.3 Awards and Performance
5.3.1 Empirical specification
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of awards on subsequent perfor-
mance, one needs a control group of individuals that is identical to those in
the treatment group (the group of award winners) in all relevant observable
and unobservable factors. Then, the performance of individuals in the control
group provides a valid counterfactual for the performance of award winners,
and the effect of an award can be estimated as the average difference in per-
formance between individuals in the two groups. Typically, control groups
are constructed ex post via matching procedures (see Angrist and Alan, 1999,
for an overview). In our particular case, a Gold Reward is directed towards
behaviors such as supporting colleagues and organizing team events that are
not captured in the core performance rating. This feature of the award system
suggests that there is no difference in the core performance of award winners
and nonrecipients prior to the award. Therefore, we can make the identifying
assumption that award winners and nonrecipients of the Gold Reward are ho-
mogeneous in all factors — other than a fixed effect that we estimate for each
individual — that drive core performance prior to winning an award. The
quality of this matching (i.e., the validity of our identifying assumption) will
be tested as part of the analysis below. As for the observable characteristics
(gender and mean length of tenure at the company), there is no statistically
significant difference between winners and nonrecipients (i.e., persons with
at least one Gold Reward and people that never receive one), which further
minimizes the concern that there is heterogeneity.
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To estimate the effect of receiving an award on subsequent performance,
we use an event study technique that allows us to estimate period-specific
effects both before and after a Gold Reward is won.8 Under the identification
strategy presented above, the causal effect of receiving an award on employee
performance is estimated by fitting the following equation to the data:
Yit = α+
T∑
τ=T
piτWiτ + µi + βXit + ξit (5.1)
The dependent variable Yit represents the performance rating of employee
i in period t. Because Yit is constructed as the weighted average of the rat-
ings in the individual performance dimensions discussed above, it takes on
many different values and can be treated as continuous (see, e.g., Wooldridge,
2003, 533). The index τ denotes the time period relative to t and is measured
in months. τ runs from -6 to +6 and is normalized so that τ = 0 refers
to the current month t; τ < 0 refers to months prior to t; τ > 0 refers to
months after t. The range of τ determines the size of the event window. The
indicator variable µi controls nonparametrically for employee fixed effects,
such as level of education and gender.9 Because the resulting panel is unbal-
anced, the use of dummy variables is preferable to fixed effects as controls
for individual-specific effects (see, e.g., Greene, 1997, 623). Xit is a vector
of time-varying observable characteristics of the individual. In our case these
are the length of employment in the call center and its square term. α rep-
8 A similar technique to study period-specific effects of events was used, for instance, by
Greenstone and Moretti (2004) and Peters and Wagner (2007). Event studies have a long
history in economics and are used in a variety of settings. An overview is presented in
MacKinlay (1997).
9 In principle, one could also control for time- and award-specific effects. However, the
relative nature of our performance measure already eliminates period-specific, exogenous
shocks to performance. In addition, the Gold Rewards in the individual months that we
cover are identical, so there is no reason to expect independent award-specific effects.
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resents a constant, and ξit is a stochastic error term. To calculate standard
errors, we cluster on the workgroup level per year.10 Alternative ways of
adjusting standard errors are discussed below.
The key variables in this regression are the Wiτ indicator variables. Wiτ
equals 1 for a person i who receives a Gold Reward τ from t, and zero other-
wise. As the Gold Reward is open to all employees in all periods, Wiτ cap-
tures all the relevant information because each employee is either a winner or
a nonrecipient in each month. The vector piτ are the parameters of interest in
this equation and capture the period-specific effects on performance of win-
ning a Gold Reward τ months from the current time period t as compared to
not winning an award, conditional on all covariates. By including an indicator
variable for each period, the effect of being a winner is allowed to vary with
τ . For example, a coefficient pi+2 = 0.5 means that the performance of em-
ployees who won a Gold Reward two periods ago is 0.5 points higher than the
one of nonrecipients. The time series of the coefficients piτ around the event
(τ = 0) allows us to detect the causal effect of an award on performance. If
the coefficients were significantly positive before the award was presented,
there would be concerns about reverse causality. In case the performance of
winners and nonrecipients is indistinguishable prior to an award for a large
number of periods, we can be confident that our identifying assumption about
the homogeneity of winners and nonrecipients holds.
As all individuals are winners or nonrecipients with respect to multiple
awards, every performance observation simultaneously helps to identify all
13 different piτ from pi+6, the performance of winners relative to nonrecipi-
10 We do not have obvious problems with grouped errors as the unit of observation corre-
sponds with the unit of variation, i.e. the award. However, clustering on workgroups
accounts for possible correlations of ratings within teams. As team composition varies
between years due to employee fluctuation, workgroup-per-year clusters are used. This
also increases the number of clusters, which improves inference due to the asymptotic
properties of the clustering procedure (Kiefer, 1980; White, 1980).
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ents six months prior to an award, to pi−6, the performance of winners relative
to nonrecipients six months after an award.
5.3.2 The Performance of winners and nonrecipients
Figure 5.2 shows the average performance of winners and nonrecipients around
the award. The performance was corrected for each individuals’ fixed effect
to ensure the comparability with the main regressions presented below.
Figure 5.2: Performance of Winners and Nonrecipients Prior to and After an
Award (With Standard Error Bands)
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The figure suggests that the performance of winners and nonrecipients
is indistinguishable prior to an award and that the performance of winners
increases relative to nonrecipients in the period following the award.
This first impression is confirmed in a regression analysis that controls
for individual fixed effects and length of tenure and accounts for potential
serial correlation. Table 5.1 presents the results when estimating equation
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Table 5.1: Impact of an Award on Performance (+/- 6 months)
Model 1 Model 2
pi−6 −0.055 −0.069
(−0.54) (−0.67)
pi−5 0.123 0.117
(1.37) (1.31)
pi−4 0.100 0.098
(1.40) (1.47)
pi−3 0.076 0.080
(0.76) (0.84)
pi−2 −0.013 −0.008
(−0.13) (−0.09)
pi−1 −0.028 −0.020
(−0.39) (−0.29)
pi0 −0.034 −0.022
(−0.51) (−0.33)
pi+1 0.234
∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(2.73) (2.96)
pi+2 0.015 0.035
(0.12) (0.29)
pi+3 0.172 0.192
(1.03) (1.19)
pi+4 −0.006 0.017
(−0.05) (0.17)
pi+5 −0.050 −0.022
(−0.85) (−0.40)
pi+6 0.005 0.033
(0.05) (0.28)
Tenure 0.017∗ 0.009
(2.05) (0.95)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000
(−1.59) (−0.81)
Constant 3.197∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗
(35.97) (34.91)
Observations 1130 667
R2 0.581 0.563
t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(1) for two different subsets of employees. The first model includes all id-
months observations with clean event windows. This means that those id-
month observations are included where at most one of the winner dummies,
Wiτ , equals one to eliminate confounding effects. Model 2 only includes
the id-month observations of those employees that have received at least one
Gold Reward. As the entire sample is now comprised only of individuals
that have received Gold Rewards at different points in time, we do not need
to assume that Gold Reward winners and employees who never receive an
award are homogeneous in their underlying unobservable characteristics. In
case the results of model 2 are identical to those of model 1, our identifying
assumption that winners and nonrecipients are homogeneous has received
additional support.
According to model 1, the performance of winners is 0.24 or 7.4 percent
higher than that of nonrecipients one month after the award. This increase
is substantial, especially when taking into account the large number of Gold
Reward winners at the call center and that we use performance in a job dimen-
sion that is not relevant for Gold Reward decisions as the dependent variable.
Two months after the award, the difference in performance becomes insignif-
icant. Consistent with our homogeneity assumption, we find that, in each
of the six months prior to an award, recipients and nonrecipients have very
similar performance ratings. Indeed, their performance ratings are statisti-
cally indistinguishable for this relatively large number of periods. Overall,
this finding lends credibility to the identifying assumption that the nonrecip-
ients form a valid counterfactual for the winners. We do find, however, that
the fixed effects of winners are, on average, higher than that of agents who
never receive an award. While this implies that winners and nonrecipients
are indeed not homogeneous with respect to their absolute core performance,
they are homogeneous with respect to their core performance once these level
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effects have been taken into account because of the long time line of insignif-
icant differences in performance prior to the award.11 Moreover, the results
for model 2 closely resemble those of model 1, which provides further evi-
dence against reverse causality. The control variable job tenure does not have
a robust statistically significant effect on performance. We also do not find a
gender effect.
Result 1: Awards increase the performance of recipients as compared to non-
recipients subsequent to winning.
The same is true when using change in performance as the dependent vari-
able. The winners’ performances increase significantly more than the nonre-
cipients’ performances between the month prior to the award and the month
after. A closer look at performance in the individual performance dimensions
shows that the overall result (i.e., the sizes of the coefficients and their signif-
icance levels) is reflected in the Quality dimension and, to a lesser extent, in
the dimension After Call Worktime. Performance also increases in all other
dimensions, but the effect size and the specific lags that exhibit significant
coefficients differ between dimensions and are not strong enough to have a
significant effect on the overall rating. However, these findings should be in-
11 In fact, this implies that employees that are productive in terms of the core performance
are also the ones that engage in voluntary work behaviors and hence, that there is no trade-
off between the two kinds of activities. One might counter that awards are given to the
productive types not because they actually engage in voluntary work behaviors, but because
they collude with supervisors to gain additional compensation for their high performance.
However, we can show that within the first five months at the company, employees who
receive an award exhibit a higher core performance than those who never receive an award
(Mann-Whitney test p-value: 0.07, one-sided). As employees at the beginning of their
careers lack the necessary familiarity with their supervisors and the unwritten rules of the
company, this supports the notion that it is in fact the high-performing individuals engaging
in voluntary work behaviors rather than low-performing types.
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terpreted with care because only the aggregate rating is a useful measure of
performance due to the trade-offs between the different dimensions.
5.3.3 Development of performance over time
So far, we studied whether the award causes a statistically significant diver-
gence between the performance of winners and nonrecipients after the award.
This section Analyzes the performance of winners and nonrecipients over
time, which serves as a check for whether winners increase their performance
not only relative to nonrecipients, but also relative to their own performance
prior to winning. For the following nonparametric analysis, we use perfor-
mance ratings that are corrected for individual-specific fixed effects and effect
of tenure to make the analysis comparable to the regressions above. Com-
paring the performance of winners between the month of the award and the
subsequent month (i.e., periods τ = 0 and τ = +1), the one-sided t-test for
paired samples suggests that performance is significantly higher (α = 0.05,
p-value: 0.03) in the month after the award than in the month of the award.
In contrast, the performance in the month prior to the award is not statisti-
cally different from that in the month of the award. The average increase in
performance between the month prior to the award and the month after the
award is 0.16. There is no statistically significant difference in performance
between any of these three months for nonrecipients (i.e., between the peri-
ods τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = +1). Performance is evaluated relatively in the
company. That is, an individual’s performance is compared with the average
performance in each month to derive the performance rating. Because there
is a large number of nonrecipients in each month, the latter drive the develop-
ment of the average performance. Hence, one should not expect significant
performance changes for nonrecipients. One may argue that the observed
increase in the relative performance measure for the winners may be driven
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by nonrecipients lowering their performance. If this were true, it would be
reflected in a deterioration of absolute performance over time. However, this
is not the case. Absolute performance stays relatively stable over the four
years covered. In particular, we do not detect a general time trend in abso-
lute performance or any individual performance dimension. In fact, there is a
slight increase in absolute performance because quality increases somewhat.
Hence, we can be sure that the observed increase in the ratings of the winners
represents higher winner effort.
Result 2: Receiving an award improves the performance of winners, whereas
the performance of nonrecipients remains unaffected.
5.3.4 Why do winners work harder?
The observed increase in performance subsequent to winning an award can
be attributed to induced feelings of organizational commitment. Akerlof and
Kranton (2005), for instance, state that employees who identify with their
company perform better and that employers can actively influence whether
employees identify with the company. Specifically, initiation rites, such as
award ceremonies, can be used to change self-perception.12 Our evidence,
however, suggests that a Gold Reward does not cause a sustainable change
in preferences (i.e., employee identity) because the effect is limited to the
month subsequent to winning. Endocrine studies suggest that hard-wired
mechanisms can raise the performance of award winners. Increases in sta-
12 According to Akerlof and Kranton (2005), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1954) is the
underlying psychological mechanism that drives this development of loyalty. Applying
cognitive dissonance theory to awards implies that individuals, who have publicly accepted
an award and thereby the rules and values of the organization, improve their views and
valuation of the organization.
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tus caused, for instance, by a victory in a competition have been shown to
be associated with a heightened level of testosterone. This in turn increases
competitive behavior (Booth et al., 1989; Mazur and Booth, 1998). Such
effects can be interpreted as preference changes, even though they affect be-
havior only for a short time after the occurrence of the change in status (i.e.,
after winning an award). Psychological evidence also suggests that a positive
event, which induces a good mood, increases subsequent voluntary behavior
when this is in line with the positive cognitions evoked by the event (Isen
and Simmonds, 1978). At the same time, receiving an award can also in-
duce reciprocal actions (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000 or Kube et al., 2008).
According to this theory, winners increase their efforts to reciprocate to the
monetary bonus associated with winning the Gold Reward . However, it is
highly unlikely that the entire effect we document is driven by the monetary
bonus. First, the amount is small — only 3 percent of the average monthly
salary. Second, field studies have shown that the wage elasticity of workers’
outputs ranges from roughly 0.15 to 0.44 (Fehr et al., 2008). Thus, the ob-
served increase in performance due to the award of 7.5 percent would require
a wage increase between 15 to 50 percent. This corresponds to a bonus of
between CHF 750 and 2,500, which is much higher than the actual amount
of CHF 150. Another explanation for the observed increase in performance
may be the increased visibility of the award winner in the month following
the award. Recipients may feel a need to live up to the honor of having re-
ceived an award for their voluntary work behaviors, and this may affect their
core performances. This effect should be stronger for award winners whose
core performance was below average prior to the award. The data allow us
to test this hypothesis by separating the winners into two groups: those in-
dividuals who performed below average in τ = 0 and those who performed
above average. Looking at how much performance increases between the
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month of the award and one month later, we find that, on average, the rat-
ing of low performers increases by 0.58, whereas the performance of high
performers decreases by 0.17. The one-sample t-test indicates that both co-
efficients are highly significantly different from zero.This differential impact
of winning an award supports the notion that the increase in performance is
caused by social pressure or the winners wanting to live up to the award with
respect to core performance. At the same time, the differentiated effect ren-
ders it highly unlikely that reciprocity or organizational commitment causes
the increase because this should apply to under- and over-performing win-
ners in the same manner. However, the differentiated effect could also be
caused by mean reversion. Individuals who achieve a very good performance
were lucky that month. Their next draws are unlikely to meet or exceed prior
realizations, causing their individual performance to revert to the population
mean. Therefore, we use a longer time horizon to classify individuals as high-
or low-performing. Specifically, we look at τ = +2, τ = +1, and τ = 0. In-
dividuals that perform worse than average in two or three of those periods are
classified as low performers. Low-performing winners increase their rating
by 0.29 (which is significantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level), while
the rating of high-performing winners changes by 0.03 (not significantly dif-
ferent from zero).13 Therefore, while there is some mean reversion going on,
the differential impact of awards on the rating of high-and low-performing
agents is robust.
Arguments explaining the observed effect without resorting to social mo-
tives are unlikely to play a role here. The award system is well-established
and the criteria clear to all employees. Therefore, handing out the award
should not change the relevant information of the agents on the type of behav-
13 The average rating of high performers in the month when they win an award is 3.52 (std.
dev. 0.32), which suggests that the performance of high performers is not bounded from
above, and they have the scope to increase their performance the same as low performers.
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ior and the required effort level to win. Further, the small bonus of CHF 150
is unlikely to cause an income effect that could explain the result. Moreover,
if there were any income effect, it would affect performance in the opposite
direction and only strengthen the result that winning the award triggers em-
ployees to work harder. A Gold Reward has no impact on future promotion
decisions, and employees know that. Strategic considerations about trying to
win the award again also cannot explain the finding because this would not
explain a further increase in performance above the level that was sufficient
for winning. Further, if strategic considerations were the motive, the increase
should last for more than one period. However, above all, any increase in
core performance is by definition of the award criteria not linked to a higher
chance of winning another Gold Reward because these reward activities are
not captured in the core rating.
We can also rule out that the effect is caused by award winners focusing
on those activities that lead to the award at the expense of core performance
prior to winning. If the argument were true, the performance after the award
would be the normal level of core performance, and winners and nonrecipi-
ents would not be homogeneous despite the similarity of their performance
prior to the award. While such an effect could be imagined if one only looked
at the three months prior to an award — the maximum time span that an ac-
tivity eligible for winning lasts — the long time series of insignificant per-
formance differences prior to an award, which casts doubt on this hypothesis.
In addition, the difference in performance after an award should then also be
sustained for more than one month.
Regarding the size of the effect, the sizes of the documented effects present
a lower bound due to three reasons specific to this study. First, the Gold Re-
ward is low in the hierarchy of awards at the company, and one would ex-
pect to find even larger effects for the other awards. Second, awards at the
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company are presented for beneficial behaviors that are not included in the
company’s core performance measure, which we use as the dependent vari-
able. Thus, the estimated effect of awards on core performance presents only
the spillover effect of the presumably larger effect on those behaviors that
are rewarded. One standard objection to awards is that their number will be
inefficiently high, as any award system induces unproductive efforts as indi-
viduals strive to increase their chances of winning. Our result, however, pro-
vides evidence to the contrary, as we observe an increase in productive effort.
Hence, even if there were some rent seeking going on, it does not come at
the expense of productivity. Third, we only measure the impact of the award
subsequent to being presented. However, the award system as such does have
an incentive effect that, while it cannot be captured in this study, probably
has a substantial impact on the performance of all employees as they work
towards the award. In a field experiment, Neckermann and Kosfeld (2008)
find that the introduction of an award system increases performance by about
10 percent.14
5.3.5 Robustness
This section addresses a variety of issues concerning the reliability of our re-
sults. As is the case with most, if not all, event studies, our results exhibit
serial correlation. However, this issue does not affect our results because we
estimate robust standard errors. Specifically, we report the robust (Huber-
White sandwich) estimates of variance that provide correct estimates for any
type of correlation within the observations of each panel/group. Moreover,
Bertrand et al. (2004) show that, if the intervention variable is not serially
14 Receiving an award may also have other beneficial side effects that cannot be measured
as part of this study. For example, one might conjecture that awards have an additional
positive affect on the retention rates of the award winners.
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correlated, OLS standard errors are consistent, despite the positive serial cor-
relation in the residuals. This holds in our study because the average correla-
tion of the award variable over time for each individual is close to zero. Serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity are more extensively addressed, and addi-
tional tests are reported in Appendix B.2. As a further robustness check we
used the two-way cluster approach (Cameron et al., 2006), which provides
cluster-robust inference when there is non-nested, two-way clustering. The
two dimensions that we checked were id and month because one could imag-
ine errors to be clustered for all observations of one individual and within
one month. However, our results are robust to this test as table B.1 in the
Appendix shows.
We already established above that the direction of causality runs from
award to performance by showing (1) that there is no significant difference
between the performance of winners and nonrecipients prior to an award and
(2) that the results of models 1 and 2 are basically identical. Nevertheless,
we additionally tested whether current or lagged performance determines if
a person receives a Gold Reward. As expected, there is no significant effect
of these variables on the likelihood of receiving an award. Only the length
of tenure has a significant impact, which provides an additional rationale for
including it in the regressions presented above.
Third, the results are robust with respect to the inclusion and exclusion
of employees depending on the number of Gold Rewards received. The re-
sults do not change with a variation in the event window size (we tested event
windows ranging from plus/minus 3 –12 months). In addition, the inclusion
of time fixed effects has no effect on the results because the relative rating
already eliminates any impact of time-varying changes in the business envi-
ronment. We can also confirm that our result is not driven by the large weight
of 50 percent of Quality in the index. Using a different index that weights all
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performance dimensions equally leads to the same pattern of performance,
both in terms of the size of coefficients as well as significance levels.
5.4 Conclusion
This study shows that winning an award for uncontractible, voluntary work
behaviors like organizing team events or filling in for sick colleagues has an
effect on subsequent performance. In the month after the award, the core
performance of winners is 7.5 percent higher than for nonrecipients. Core
performance refers to efforts that are more directly linked to business suc-
cess than the voluntary work behavior rewarded with the award. Specifically,
core performance comprises job dimensions like the number of calls han-
dled, the transfer rate of calls, and the quality of the phone calls. This study
adds to the economic literature by providing field evidence on the effect of
social rewards. Further, it adds to the field experiment presented in the previ-
ous chapter by showing that awards not only motivate ex ante, before people
have received them, but also ex post, after they have been presented. It is
highly likely that awards as well as other reward instruments exhibit such
effects. This suggests that the focus of economic theory on ex ante incen-
tive effects has been too narrow. Indeed the present study demonstrates that
ex post effects are sizeable, albeit transitory. The ex post effect also refutes
the argument that awards only influence behavior via to their effect on future
monetary income and the argument that awards only reflect high ability and
performance but do not cause it.
Further, this study demonstrates that awards have positive spillovers from
one performance dimension to other performance dimensions. Such spillover
effects have so far been neglected in the literature. An exception is the liter-
ature on motivational crowding out (see 2.2.4) that has investigated the neg-
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ative effect of monetary payments on activities not subject to compensation.
One would expect that such positive spillovers likely occur when incentives
influence the work environment or identity and loyalty of employees (see
2.2.3). However, further research is certainly necessary to identify the con-
ditions under which such spillovers occur and the conditions that allow man-
agers to utilize them deliberately.
This study adds to the economic literature in general by providing evi-
dence on performance in a complex work environment. The job of the call
center agents is characterized by many different performance dimensions, in-
cluding friendliness. As was pointed out earlier, many economists lament the
focus of empirical research on incentives on simple and clearly identifiable
tasks (Prendergast, 1999).
Unfortunately, the data do not allow one to evaluate absolute performance
over time. Hence, it cannot be clearly identified by how much recipients
get better when compared to their own previous performance because the
performance of nonrecipients may deteriorate at the same time. However,
a substantial negative effect on nonrecipients is unlikely because the overall
performance in the call center remains stable in the period covered. Hence,
the general critique that the positive impact of awards on the recipient should
be outweighed by the frustration of the many nonrecipients does not hold.
Still, the Gold Rewards may frustrate nonrecipients who expected to receive
one. Management asserted that they do not expect that extraordinary, volun-
tary work behaviors that qualify for an award go unnoticed because the award
criteria are clearly communicated and because employees are repeatedly re-
minded of them and encouraged to nominate colleagues for awards. Further,
because all employees can nominate potential recipients, it is highly unlikely
that no colleague notices award-worthy behavior. However, we cannot show
this empirically because we cannot identify the employees who expect to re-
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ceive a Gold Reward but in fact do not.
A number of issues remain open for future research. First, we cannot
identify whether performance increases after winning an award because ei-
ther employees feel proud or because they feel they are closely observed and
under peer-pressure. Hence, further research should aim at gaining a better
understanding of the psychological mechanisms that drive the behavioral ef-
fect. Such knowledge is important for predicting the motivational power of
rewards according to reward characteristics like publicity because different
specifications of individual reward characteristics have different implications
for the reward’s value in terms of self-esteem or prestige. Second, the per-
formance index used in this study provides an adequate picture of overall
performance because there are trade-offs between the individual performance
dimensions. Therefore, an increase of performance in an individual perfor-
mance dimension like number of calls taken or call handling time cannot be
judged as an improvement without knowledge on how the agent performed
in the other dimensions. Nevertheless, further research that looks at whether
there are specific job dimensions that increase disproportionately due to the
award would be insightful. Third, the data set only allowed an investigation
of the Gold Rewards, which are low in the award hierarchy of the company.
Future research should capture the impact of higher-ranked awards so that
the effects can be compared. One might, for example, hypothesize that more
important awards have a more persistent influence on performance subse-
quent to winning. Further, different psychological mechanisms like sustained
changes in identity might play a role for more important awards. The two
empirical projects presented so far have provided evidence on the ex ante and
ex post motivational influence of awards. The next chapter presents a project
that investigates which features of the award — like publicity, number of
winners, or any monetary bonus — drive these motivational effects.
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Chapter 6
The Effect of Individual Award
Characteristics on the Motivational Effect
of Awards — A Vignette Study
6.1 Introduction
The preceding two empirical studies have shown that awards have a statisti-
cally significant and sizeable effect on employee performance both after they
are announced and after they have been presented. This section also focuses
on the quantitative effect of introducing and handing out an award. Addition-
ally, it analyzes what award characteristics determine the size of the effect.
To answer these questions, a survey experiment was conducted online with
the employees of the IBM research lab in Rüschlikon, Switzerland.
6.2 The Vignette Technique
We use the vignette study technique, in which subjects are presented with
short descriptions of hypothetical situations called vignettes and asked to in-
dicate their behavior if they were in the described situation. Each vignette
consists of randomly selected values for each vignette dimension. The vi-
gnette dimensions are the factors that define the situation and represent those
variables whose impact on behavior the researcher wants to study. The sys-
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tematic variation of the values in the different dimensions allows the re-
searcher to estimate the effects of changes in combinations of variables as
well as changes in individual variables. Further methodological information
is provided in Rossi and Anderson (1982), McFadden (2001), and Hensher
et al. (1999).1
Traditional survey approaches tend to elicit unreliable and biased self-
reports, as the questions are too abstract (see Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001; Alexander and Becker, 1978). The vignette technique is preferable,
because vignettes closely resemble real-life decision-making situations and
are precisely specified, so that the information subjects have at their disposal
when making their decisions is standardized. In particular, respondents eval-
uate a complete situation description (bundle of different factors), rather than
having to state how isolated factors influence their behavior. The researcher
only later connects the answers of the different individuals with the variables
in the description to isolate the impact of particular factors. This is cogni-
tively less challenging and more natural for the respondents and decreases
the risk that respondents consciously bias their answers towards socially de-
sirable responses. It also alleviates the problem that most people are not very
insightful about the factors that enter their own decision making process, par-
ticularly when factors are highly correlated in the real world. Hence vignette
studies are more likely than other survey approaches to elicit stable and true
preferences. Among many others, Telser and Zweifel (2007), demonstrate
the ability of vignette experiments to predict choice behavior. Moreover, re-
sults from vignette studies have been shown to be reliable over time, attribute
sets, and data collection methods (Bateson and Boulding, 1987).
1 Vignettes studies are a common research tool in health economics, sociology, and market-
ing, and there exists a large literature on the method and its reliability and external validity.
In behavioral economics, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) use this technique to complement their
set of experiments assessing the impact of control on effort in the workplace.
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This approach was chosen because the vignette technique has several ad-
vantages over laboratory experiments. First, awards present non-monetary,
social incentives. Their value — or at least a great part of it — depends on
a meaningful relationship of the recipients with both the award giver and the
co-workers. Hence, we would expect that actually giving awards would not
function well in an anonymous lab setting with an abstract effort task and the
experimenter as the award-giver. Second, the investigation of the relative im-
pact of certain award characteristics requires a random variation in the award
characteristics over employees of the same company to hold all other factors
constant. However, offering different rewards to employees in similar posi-
tions at the same company is typically not possible in the field. Third, a great
advantage of vignette studies is that they provide more control than qualita-
tive or observational studies but, at the same time, put respondents in natural
situations and involve decisions about bundles of factors. Subjects may con-
sider it easier and more natural to make decision under such circumstances
than under laboratory conditions. At the same time, vignette studies exhibit
a high degree of uniformity and control over the stimulus situation approx-
imating that achieved by researchers using laboratory experimental designs.
Confounding factors are not a problem, because vignettes are randomly as-
signed to a large number of subjects. This ensures that the causal factors are
uncorrelated on average, which allows the econometric estimation of effects.
Vignette studies are typically not incentivized and one might doubt the accu-
racy of the stated answers and their capacity to predict actual work behavior.
In our particular case, however, there are no strategic reasons that could in-
fluence the answers. Importantly, any potential upward biases in the stated
contributions to the public good does not matter for the analysis, as we only
look at differences in stated contributions for awards with different charac-
teristics. Moreover, we control for individual fixed effects, which filters out
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some — if not all — of the potential upward bias in the level of contributions.
6.3 Operationalization of Reward Treatments and Study
Design
Each vignette describes the introduction of a new incentive for all employees
at the IBM research lab in Rüschlikon. All vignettes have identical textual
descriptions; they only differ in terms of the realized factor levels in each of
the five different vignette dimensions. Each subject is randomly assigned an
award with a particular set of factor levels, and the assignment procedure is
precisely analogous to assigning experimental subjects to different treatment
combinations in an experimental study. In a pre-study we surveyed awards
at different companies and conducted interviews with a number of human
resource managers. For the present study, we chose those four, orthogonal
factors that that were considered to be important by all managers and that
varied most between the different awards surveyed.2
Factor 1, type of accompanying reward.
According to standard economic theory compensation should always be in
cash, as it is the most efficient means of compensation due to its fungibility
and option value (e.g., Waldfogel, 1993, 1996). A gift of the same monetary
value does not lead to a higher utility than the equivalent payment in cash
making gifts inferior incentives. However, motivational crowding and sig-
naling theory argue that gifts can lead to a higher motivation because gifts
are less likely to be perceived as controlling or as destroying the signaling
value of certain actions (e.g., Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Bénabou and
2 Appendix C.3 contains the wording of the four factors as well as information on how the
factors were operationalized in the statistical analysis.
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Tirole, 2006b). Social and cognitive psychology describe further advantages
of gifts, so far neglected in economics, that may be sufficient to reduce or
eliminate any inherent advantage of cash as an incentive (Jeffrey and Shaffer,
2007). To shed light into this theoretical discord about whether cash or gifts
of equal monetary value are better motivators, we used cash as well as gifts
as prizes associated with receiving the reward.
Factor 2, degree of publicity.
In addition to the motivational power of the prospect of winning the incentive
per se, rewards can function as signals to outsiders of the recipient’s ability
and motivation and bring social recognition by an extended set of colleagues.
This requires a degree of publicity; other persons need to know about the
award.
To measure the behavioral impact of visibility, each vignette contained one
of the following three types of publicity. The list of recipients could: remain
undisclosed, be published on the intranet, or be published on the intranet and
presented at a ceremony. As with all vignette dimensions, the type of public-
ity was randomly selected for each vignette.
Factor 3, amount of cash/value of gift.
The accompanying cash payment or gift of the rewards described in the vi-
gnettes varied in value between CHF 0 and CHF 10,000.3
We expect that motivation increases with the value of the reward.
3 The set of possible values was CHF 0, CHF 50, CHF 150, CHF 300, CHF 1,000, CHF
2,000, CHF 4,000, CHF 6,000, CHF 8,000, and CHF 10,000. The equivalent Dollar
amounts are approximately equal to $ 0, $ 43, $ 128, $ 257, $ 857, $ 1,713, $ 3,427, $
5,140, $ 6,854, $ 8,567.
In the statistical analysis, monetary value was treated as a continuous variable. Hence, the
number of observations necessary to reliably estimate the effect can be substantially lower
than when the variable is categorical.
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Factor 4, the maximum number of recipients.
Awards only work as incentives if the prospective recipients value them. The
perceived (positional) value of an award depends critically on the award be-
ing scarce (e.g., Hirsch, 1976). This is a major difference between awards
and money. The value of money per se is not decreased by the fact that other
employees also receive a salary.4 Hence, the effect of awards should be lower
when there are more recipients. However, there is a countervailing effect.
An increase in the number of reward recipients, ceteris paribus, increases the
chances an individual employee will be a winner. Hence, we hypothesize an
inverted u-shaped relationship between the number of recipients and motiva-
tion in the overall population. The same prediction follows from the tourna-
ment literature, which shows that maximal incentives occur for intermediate
promotion rates, and lower incentives occur for lower and higher promotion
rate (Gibbs, 2001).
To study the impact of additional recipients on motivation, the maximum
number of award recipients per year varied between 1, 2, 6, 10, 16, and 20 in
the reward descriptions.5
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the factors and their levels. Further details
are provided in the supplementary material at the end of this paper. The num-
ber of factors and their levels appears to be rather large. However, by asking
people to answer to many situation descriptions, a large number of obser-
vations can be generated, which can be evaluated with multiple-regression
analysis (rather than mean-comparison). Therefore, fewer observations per
4 For both awards and salaries it is true that recipients might gain utility from having more
awards/ a higher salary than their colleagues. However, this social comparison effect (rel-
ative income effect) is different from the inflation effect discussed above.
5 Like the monetary value of the reward, the number of recipients is treated as a continuous
variable in the statistical analysis.
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factor combination are necessary to reliably estimate the impact of a certain
factor.
Table 6.1: The factors and their levels
Factor Factor Levels
Type of accompanying reward: gift, cash payment(categorical)
Degree of publicity: anonymous, intranet announce-
(categorical) ment, intranet with ceremony
Monetary value of cash payment or gift: zeroa, smallb, mediumc, highd(continuous)
Maximum number of recipients: 1, 2, 6, 10, 16, 20(continuous)
a {CHF 0} b {CHF 50, 150, 300} c {CHF 1,000, 2,000, 4,000}
d {CHF 6,000, 8,000, 10,000}
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6.3.1 An illustration of a vignette
Individual vignettes, i.e. award descriptions, are constructed by randomly
choosing one factor level from each of the independent factors.6 The total
pool of vignettes comprises all possible factor combinations. The four vi-
gnettes for each subject were sampled without replacement from this pool.
Not all possible vignettes have to be answered as long as the levels of the
different factors in the set of vignettes are uncorrelated, i.e. as long as there
is little multi-collinearity, and as long as there is sufficient variation in the
vignettes. In the sample of vignettes drawn in our study both of these con-
ditions are met. We also have no endogeneity problems as the respondents
answered to all the vignettes presented to them.7
Below a specific vignette is exhibited with realized factor levels in bold. The
factors and their levels are shown in parentheses; subjects did not see this in-
formation. The introductory text that was displayed in front of each vignette
is presented in the appendix C.2.
6 While the assignment of vignettes to individual respondents was random, we ensured that
the four award descriptions each subject was confronted with differed in terms of factor
levels (e.g., we ensured that each person received one award with zero, small, medium,
and high monetary value). Further, each person received at least one award with a cash
payment, and one award with a gift. This was necessary to ensure that subjects were not
confused by the potential close similarity of award realizations caused by a purely random
assignment. Further, we randomized the order in which the different factors appeared in
the award description to control for order effects.
7 Of the 220 observations for the willingness to contribute only nine present instances in
which “no answer” was marked. These “no answers” do not appear to correlate with any
specific award features, but rather stem from three researchers who answered to zero, one
and two vignettes respectively, because some researchers indiscriminately chose not to
answer the question.
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IBM introduces a new ‘Cooperation Award’. Nominations must originate
within the team and be supported by the project leader/manager. One level
of management in the home office needs to approve the award for the nom-
inated person.
In recognition of the recipients’ contribution, the award comes with a ball-
point pen labeled “Thank you for your exceptional contribution!” (fac-
tor: type of accompanying reward; level: gift; factor: value of gift; factor
level: CHF 0).
There will be up to 16 recipients (about 6% of researchers and non-
technical staff) per year in the Rüschlikon lab (factor: maximum number
of recipients; factor level: 16).
The lab director congratulates the winner(s) in the presence of the other
members of the lab at the kick-off meeting in January 2008. Award re-
cipients are published on the intranet (factor: degree of publicity; factor
level: ceremony and publication on the intranet).
6.3.2 Operationalization of the dependent variable
The subjects were asked to indicate their willingness to share an important
finding with their team before publishing it under their own name. Individ-
uals were told that sharing the finding now would increase the quality and
speed of the team project, but expose them to the personal risk that the find-
ing could be used and published without giving them the appropriate personal
credit for the discovery. Alternatively, they could wait and publish the finding
in a scientific journal under their own name before sharing it with team col-
leagues. Respondents marked their willingness on a 10-point scale ranging
from 1=“I definitely would not share now” to 10=“I would certainly share
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now.” Employees were familiar with this type of public good situation in
their everyday work life, as was confirmed in interviews preceding the study.
In the survey, about 84 percent of the respondents rated the situation descrip-
tion as realistic or very realistic. Appendix C.2 contains the wording of the
situation description and the questions asked.
6.3.3 Study design
First, we asked the respondents to state their willingness to share the finding
assuming they were working in their current work environment (status quo).
Then, subjects were sequentially confronted with four vignettes, i.e. the sce-
narios describing the introduction of a reward, and asked to indicate their
willingness to share the finding in each of them. As each subject answers
to four different vignettes, we have multiple observations per person and can
control for effects specific to the individual. Due to time constraints, it was
not possible to ask about more than four vignettes per subject. These four
reward descriptions per individual present a random set out of the total pool
of over 100 different reward descriptions, i.e. combinations of values in the
four dimensions that characterize each reward. After the fourth vignette, sub-
jects were asked to imagine that they either did or did not receive the reward
that was described to them in the final award introduction scenario (vignette
4) and asked again how willing they would be to share the finding now that
they know whether they received reward 4 or not.8 Because this question
8 Reasons for inquiring about motivation after revealing the recipients only once and after
the last vignette are the following: 1) Answers to the different incentive descriptions may
otherwise have been biased by whether the person had or had not received the previous
reward; 2) Studying the effect of receiving versus not receiving an award is a delicate
issue in surveys since it heavily relies on subjects’ willingness to imagine their emotional
reaction. In general, people are not willing to do this often; 3) Subjects had to state their
willingness to share the finding 5 times prior to this question (with respect to their current
work environment and after each of the four incentive introduction scenarios). Adding the
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was asked only once, we have only one observation of the motivation after
revealing the recipients per respondent (rather than four in the case of mo-
tivation after incentive announcement). However, we can still draw general
conclusions, as the fourth and final reward descriptions represent a random
draw from the set of all possible vignettes. The survey ended with a section
in which respondents were asked questions about personal characteristics,9
their perception of the role of awards in organizations, and the determinants
of award effectiveness in motivating employees. The questions in the survey
section were the same for all participants and placed at the end of the ex-
periment to ensure that subjects are primed as little as possible. Participants
were informed about this entire sequence of questions at the beginning of the
survey. The respondents progressed through the questionnaire as is shown
below.10 Vignettes 1 to 4 were different for each subject.
1. Each subject is asked about her behavior in the public good situation
given their current work environment, i.e. no additional new incentive.
2. Each subject is presented with her particular realization of vignette 1
and then asked about her behavior in the public good situation.
3. Each subject is presented with her particular realization of vignette 2
scenario on winning or not winning the award as well as the associated questions after each
reward introduction scenario would have made the questionnaire overly long and repetitive.
9 Specifically, we inquired age, gender, income range, and award history at IBM. A question
about the respondents’ level of education was not included in the survey as all researchers
have a university degree and most also have a PhD.
10 To ensure that subjects did not use the first award description as their baseline/reference
point and evaluated awards 2 Ð 4 in comparison to the first award scenario, we informed
the subjects in advance what kinds of different incentives they could expect; for instance,
that the rewards would come with or without a monetary bonus ranging in value from CHF
50 to CHF 10,000. This was necessary to make the answers comparable across subjects,
since the realized values and therefore the description of reward 1 was different for each
subject.
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and then asked about her behavior in the public good situation.
4. Each subject is presented with her particular realization of vignette 3
and then asked about her behavior in the public good situation.
5. Each subject is presented with her particular realization of vignette 4
and then asked about her behavior in the public good situation.
6. Each subject learns whether she receives the reward described in vi-
gnette 4 and then asked about her behavior in the public good situation.
7. Each subject is asked a number of survey questions regarding her per-
sonal characteristics, her thoughts on the determinants of award suc-
cess, and her ideas about how awards function in organizations.
6.4 Implementation
The vignette study was conducted in a two-week period in January/ Febru-
ary, 2007, with the 177 researchers of the IBM research lab in Rüschlikon,
Switzerland. The lab is one of eight research labs that IBM maintains world-
wide. In collaboration with clients and universities, researchers at these labs
conduct basic as well as applied research in chemistry, information technol-
ogy, physics, electrical engineering, and materials science among others. To
date, four researchers have been awarded Nobel prizes in physics for research
conducted during their time as employees at the IBM lab in Rüschlikon. The
management in Rüschlikon hands out the approximately 20 different awards
that are available in all IBM research labs. The awards can be broadly sepa-
rated into formal and informal awards. Formal awards recognize outstanding
scientific contributions and innovations, are associated with substantial mon-
etary compensations, and recipients are announced on the worldwide intranet
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of IBM research. Informal awards honor exceptional motivation in general;
examples are contributions to teams, knowledge sharing, passion for work,
and customer service. Informal awards are typically associated with smaller
monetary bonuses or gifts such as dinners or weekend trips. Only the more
important informal awards are publicized on the local intranet of the Rüsch-
likon lab. Given the large number of established awards, respondents can be
assumed to be familiar with their own behavior and feelings with respect to
striving for and receiving awards. This is an advantage for the study, since it
increases reliability and the predictive power of our findings.
The participants were invited to the study via an e-mail of the HR Man-
ager and were reminded with a second e-mail at the end of the first week. The
questionnaire could be accessed via a link provided in the e-mail. Anonymity
was guaranteed. Participation in the study was voluntary and there were
no monetary incentives associated with it. During the survey period, 54 re-
searchers (response rate 31 percent) completed the questionnaire, resulting in
211 observations. The respondents are representative of the workforce (and
therefore also to the non-respondents) with respect to all objective criteria
available from the company.11
6.5 Results
6.5.1 Awards as incentives
The data are analyzed with random effects OLS models (see Greene, 1997,
p. 623ff). Unlike fixed effects models, these allow the inclusion of time-
invariant independent variables. The random effect for each individual cap-
11 Among the workforce of the IBM lab in Rüschlikon average age, proportion of females,
and length of employment are 41 years, 13.2 percent, and 12 years. The respective numbers
are 42 years, 10 percent, and 12 years among our sample of respondents.
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tures the individual specific propensity to respond to incentive introductions
irrespective of the realized award factor levels. This propensity is potentially
independent of the initial motivation that we control for separately. Random
effect models require that the unobserved individual effect is uncorrelated
with all explanatory variables for all observations of that individual. Since the
explanatory variables, i.e. the treatments, were randomly assigned to the in-
dividual there should be no such correlation. However, our results are robust
with respect to other estimation techniques like ordered probit, fixed-effect
models, and OLS-regressions that do not include random effects.12 Table 6.1
in the C.1 presents the results of the different models. We present the random
effects OLS rather than the ordered probit results in this section for ease of
interpretation. The main regression includes four predictor variables associ-
ated with the four factors that were varied to produce specific vignettes. All
observations are pooled because subjects receive no feedback in between the
different vignettes and there should be no dynamic adjustment of the stated
contributions to the public good over time. We also included a predictor vari-
able to control for variation in initial motivation among subjects. Model 1 in
table 6.2 shows the results.
The monetary value of the reward has a robust and statistically signifi-
cantly positive impact on contributions, i.e. the willingness to share the sen-
12 As respondents indicated their answer on a 10-point scale (1:“I definitely would not share
now.” to 10=“I would certainly share now.”), one could argue for the use of ordered pro-
bit models. However, studies have shown that 10-point scales can be interpreted as (e.g.,
Van Praag, 1991; Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Moffitt et al., 1999). Further, one
might advocate the use of fixed effects models and only study within person variation. This
is preferable when the unobserved individual effect ai is correlated with any explanatory
variable. However, there should be no such correlation in our design. An OLS-model with
neither fixed nor random effects, controlling for baseline motivation only, might be suit-
able when the individuals are not heterogeneous in their reaction to the introduction of an
incentive per se (irrespective of reward characteristics). However, a priori this assumption
is not necessarily fulfilled.
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Table 6.2: Effect of Award Factors on Public Good Contributions
Model 1 Model 2
Ln(Value) 0.071∗∗∗
(0.021)
ValueLow: CHF 50, 150, 300 0.032
(0.198)
ValueMedium: CHF 1,000, 2,000, 4,000 0.561∗∗∗
(0.198)
ValueHigh: CHF 6,000, 8,000, 10,000 0.587∗∗∗
(0.203)
Intranet 0.307∗ 0.334∗
(0.185) (0.186)
Ceremony 0.486∗∗ 0.501∗∗
(0.206) (0.207)
Gift −0.404∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.150)
# Recipients 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.010)
Initial Motivation 0.881∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.054)
Constant 0.274 0.344
(0.475) (0.463)
Observations 211 211
R2 within 0.130 0.148
R2 between 0.811 0.813
R2 overall 0.753 0.756
Random Effects OLS Regressions; Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
148 A Vignette Study on Award Characteristics Chapter 6
sitive finding with colleagues. We use the log of monetary value to account
for diminishing marginal utility with respect to the monetary value of the re-
ward.13 The coefficient of 0.07 implies that an increase in the value of the
award from CHF 0 to CHF 150 increases the stated contributions by 0.34 on
a 10-point scale. An increase from CHF 0 to CHF 2000 increases it by 0.52;
an increase from CHF 0 to CHF 8000 increases the stated willingness by 0.62
points. Model 2 of table 2 presents the regression results when dummies are
used to represent reward value categories. It turns out that zero and small
monetary values do not have a statistically significantly different impact on
contributions. Also, contributions for medium and high reward values are not
statistically different. Compared to the latter, zero or small monetary values
lead to a motivation that is half a point lower on a 10-point scale. This dif-
ference is statistically significant. In the qualitative survey conducted after
the vignette study, the responding employees confirmed the importance of
the monetary character of rewards. Almost all indicated that they considered
it to be essential for an award to be accompanied by a substantial monetary
bonus. This can be interpreted in two ways: First, the money that comes with
the award and not the award per se motivates employees. Or second, it is
the award per se that motivates employees, but the appreciation of an award
depends on whether the award is costly for the employer. Only awards that
involve real costs for the employer ensure that the award is meant seriously
and is not merely used as a cheap incentive device.
Both forms of publicity, announcements of the winners on the intranet and
ceremonies, have a statistically significantly positive effect on stated contri-
butions to the public good. Compared to a situation with no publicity, contri-
13 To construct the variable ln(Value), (Value+1) is used, since Value can be equal to CHF
0. We assume that observed behavior for CHF 0 is not markedly different from what one
would observe for CHF 1. Including a dummy for every possible monetary value, which is
the most flexible functional form, confirms that the logarithmic specification is appropriate.
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butions are on average 0.48 points higher when there is a ceremony, which is
substantial. Naming the recipients and having a ceremony increases contri-
butions by as much as increasing the value of the award from CHF 0 to about
CHF 1,000. The finding that publicity is important is in line with answers
from the survey part of the study. Almost all respondents agreed that awards
are important as signals of one’s qualities to other employees and outsiders.
The coefficient of having a ceremony and announcing the winners on the in-
tranet is substantially larger than the coefficient of an announcement on the
intranet alone. For the rewards to serve as signals only the announcement is
necessary. Hence, the larger coefficient on the combination of intranet and
ceremony indicates that employees value the ceremony per se.
For a given monetary value, gifts works less well than payments in cash.
Holding the value of the reward constant, a gift leads to a willingness to
share that is 0.40 points lower than the willingness induced by an equivalent
payment in cash. The size of this effect is substantial. For a gift to induce
the same willingness to share as a payment in cash of CHF 50, it needs to
increase in value from CHF 50 to CHF 2,000. Again, this is in line with
remarks by the respondents. In the comment section, a substantial number
stated that they preferred money or paid vacation to other kinds of prizes.
The number of recipients does not have a statistically significant effect.
The two hypothesized countervailing effects might cause this insignificance:
an increase in the number of recipients reduces the scarcity value of the award
but raises the perceived chances of winning. We also check for the hypothe-
sized inverted u-shaped relationship by including the square term of number
of recipients. While the coefficients of number of recipients and its square
term are statistically insignificant, they have opposing signs, indicating that
two countervailing effects might be at work.
Initial motivation has a highly statistically significant positive effect on
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the willingness to share the finding. The respective coefficient implies that
a person with a 1-point higher willingness to share the finding in the current
work environment is about 0.9 points more willing to share the finding after
incentives have been introduced. Hence, subjects that differ in their initial
motivation do not markedly differ in their reaction to the introduction of an
incentive.
Demographic variables such as age, gender, and experience with interna-
tional teams do not play a role. We also checked whether the award history of
the participants, i.e. the number and value of the IBM awards received in the
past, was an important determinant for stated sharing behavior. All of these
variables are statistically insignificant and the Akaike information criterion
indicates that adding them to the models discussed above does not increase
the informational content enough to justify their inclusion. The same is true
for interaction effects. While there may be order effects, they only introduce
noise, and do not bias our results. Further, potential order effects average
out over all participants, as each subject receives a different vignette at each
stage.
Our data show that rewards have significant and systematic effects on
stated contributions of employees in a public good situation that they were
well familiar with in their work experience: (1) contributions strictly increase
with the monetary value of the reward and a value of zero leads to no increase
in contribution; (2) Gifts are valued less than the cash equivalent; (3) Public-
ity matters. That ceremonies have a larger impact than a publication on the
intranet suggests that recipients value direct personal recognition.
6.5.2 The effect of receiving and not receiving the award
Our design also allows us to study how people react when they receive or
do not receive the reward. While economic status models (e.g., Auriol and
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Renault, 2008) and some psychological literature (e.g., Ambrose and Kulik,
1999) posit a positive effect on effort of receiving and a negative effect of not
receiving the award on effort, incentive considerations suggest that winners
should be less motivated by the prospect of winning the award a second or
third time. Additionally, observing the recipients and their behavior can in-
fluence nonrecipients by providing new information on the type and level of
effort required to win the reward.
After having stated their contribution to the public good when vignette
four was presented, we then told each respondent whether she received the
presented reward. Then we asked each respondent again to indicate how will-
ing she was to share the finding now that she knew whether she was a winner
or a nonrecipient of reward 4. Model 1 in table 6.3 presents the results of
the basic regression in which the willingness to share the finding after reveal-
ing the winners is the dependent variable and whether the person receives the
reward is the main independent variable. In addition to the reward factors,
we control for initial motivation and the incentive effect of the award, i.e. the
motivation stated after incentive 4 was announced but not yet handed out (this
variable is called Sharing4 in table 6.3).
The motivation of winners is statistically significantly higher than the mo-
tivation of losers. The difference in contribution is 0.70 on a 10-point scale.
Persons with a higher initial motivation and those with a higher willingness
to share the finding after reward 4 was introduced are more willing to share
the finding after announcing the winners independently of whether they re-
ceive the reward. The award factors do not have a robust statistically sig-
nificant effect on the motivation after announcing the winners other than via
the contribution stated after the introduction, but prior to conferral of reward
4, marked as Sharing4 in the table 6.3. The previous analysis showed that
Sharing4 is influenced by the award factors. Ceremony exhibits a weakly sig-
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Table 6.3: The Effect of Receiving or Not Receiving an Award
Model 1 Model 2
Received/Not Received 0.701∗∗ 1.778
(0.295) (1.496)
Ln(Value) −0.001 0.039
(0.057) (0.093)
Intranet −0.069 0.530
(0.319) (0.480)
Ceremony −0.732∗ −0.245
(0.427) (0.791)
Gift 0.373 0.324
(0.314) (0.519)
# Recipients −0.018 −0.018
(0.024) (0.037)
Sharing4 0.629∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.152)
Initial Motivation 0.352∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗
(0.102) (0.148)
Ln(Value)*Received −0.059
(0.126)
Intranet*Received −1.224∗
(0.687)
Ceremony*Received −0.809
(0.968)
Gift*Received 0.213
(0.678)
# Recipients*Received 0.014
(0.051)
Sharing4*Received 0.063
(0.202)
Initital motivation*Received −0.101
(0.214)
Constant −0.054 −0.786
(0.672) (1.197)
Observations 52 52
Adj. R2 0.860 0.847
Random Effects OLS Regressions; Standard errors in parentheses
Sharing4 is the willingness to share the finding that the subjects indicated after
vignette 4, i.e. after the announcement of reward 4, but before learning whether
they received reward 4 or not.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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nificant, negative impact in model 1. This effect is, however, not robust. To
check whether award factors or the size of motivation prior to revealing the
recipients have different effects on winners and losers, we include interaction
effects of all award factors and whether the reward was received. The results,
which are displayed in model 2 of table 6.3, indicate that the award factors do
not have statistically significantly different effects on winners and losers. The
only exception is the weakly significant negative interaction effect between
winning and intranet. 14
In a separate calculation we subtracted the motivation after revealing the
winners from the motivation upon announcement but before conferral of re-
ward 4 for each respondent. This shows that losers on average decrease
their motivation by 0.4, while winners increase it by approximately the same
amount. The effect on the nonrecipients is negative at the 90 percent con-
fidence level, while the effect on the recipients is positive at the 95 percent
confidence level. Hence, winners do indeed increase their motivation upon
receipt. In contrast, losers experience a decrease in motivation, which could
be due to disappointment or information updating. The magnitude of the ef-
fects of winning and losing are substantial. Hence, at the aggregate level it
is not enough to assess the effects of awards upon announcement in order to
determine the profitability of an award.
6.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter addresses the relative importance of individual award character-
istics in term of the overall effect of an award on performance. Further, how
of winners and nonrecipients react to the presentation of an award is inves-
14 This finding seems plausible in light of the fact that intranet has a substantial positive
impact on contributions when the award is announced. Hence, there is less room for further
increases subsequent to winning.
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tigated. We find that respondents react systematically to the announcement
of the award; namely, the willingness to contribute increases monotonically
with the value of the monetary payment or gift that comes with the award, and
it is lower for gifts than payments of equal value. Contributions are signif-
icantly higher for awards whose winners are publicized within the company
and for awards whose winners are celebrated in a public ceremony. We find
that nonrecipients decrease and recipients increase their stated contributions
relative to the motivation they indicated before the award was announced. In-
vestigating the influence of the individual award characteristics suggests that
it is necessary to design awards carefully. In general, good award systems
should minimize the negative impact of awards on nonrecipients and incor-
porate those award characteristics that the employees value, such as publicity.
This is necessary because the establishment of awards, as is the case for all
incentive schemes, has risks; poorly designed awards may backfire.
The presented evidence does not allow a final assessment of the over-
all profitability of introducing an award. Predicting the overall quantitative
change in behavior due to the introduction of an award is difficult because
aggregating the effects over all employees requires one to estimate the time
until the disappointment among losers subsides and the ex ante incentive ef-
fect returns. Moreover, it is unclear how the incentive effect changes over
time as heterogeneous employees both win and lose multiple awards. The
profitability of awards for the company also depends on the impact of the
induced changes in behavior on company profit and on the costs of award
administration, information that is often hard to determine.
This section also makes a methodological point by employing the vignette
technique, which is a powerful empirical tool that permits the researcher to
isolate the effects of individual factors without artificially restricting the num-
ber of factors present. Vignette studies should be taken seriously as a valuable
Chapter 6 A Vignette Study on Award Characteristics 155
method in behavioral economics.
Overall, this study adds to the previous two studies by providing a third
piece of evidence that shows that awards have a significant impact on moti-
vation and induce systematic changes in behavior. This points to the robust-
ness of the behavioral impact of awards. It extends the findings of the other
empirical projects presented in four specific dimensions. First, as compared
to the call center study, the direct impact of the award on the rewarded ac-
tivity is assessed. The call center study looked at the spillover effect of an
award for voluntary work behaviors on core performance. Taken together
the two studies demonstrate that awards have a significant positive influence
on both rewarded and unrewarded tasks. Second, as compared to the field
experiment, the agents in this study are in a long-term employment relation-
ship. As compared to the two other studies the task investigated is highly
complex and requires a high level of education and skill. Hence, the demon-
strated effect of awards is not restricted to one-time jobs involving simple
tasks. Third, as compared to the field experiments, agents in this study work
in a for-profit setting and they constitute a different sample of people from
the population. This implies that awards work well for researchers, students,
and call center agents. Awards do not just work well for NGOs. Fourth, the
study differs from the other two studies in the method used. The data for
this study were generated with a survey experiment. The other projects used
either field experiment or company data. In contrast to the other two studies,
not all company employees actually participated in the present study. Further,
performance is assessed by stated choices rather than by observed behavior,
and the answers are not directly incentivized. As was discussed above, these
factors do not compromise the validity of our findings.
While highlighting the robustness of the effect of awards on employee per-
formance, the differences between the three studies make it hard to compare
156 A Vignette Study on Award Characteristics Chapter 6
findings among them. In contrast to the experiment at IBM, the call center
study, suggests that awards do not have a negative effect on nonrecipients.
In principle, a number of factors could cause this divergence. It could, for
instance, be induced by the difference in methodology employed, by the dif-
ference in the sample composition of employees, or by the smaller salience
of the Gold Reward at the call center than the newly introduced award at
IBM. The differences mentioned also make it difficult to integrate the find-
ings from the three studies. The vignette study demonstrated, for example,
that cash is preferable to gifts in-kind as rewards associated with winning an
award. It is unclear whether cash would also work better than gifts in the
call center. Further, the size of the incentive effect of awards is not directly
comparable between the field experiment and the vignette study because the
survey method employed at IBM prohibits an interpretation of the absolute
change in performance. Thus, in order to increase the predictive power of
the established findings, further research is necessary to examine how me-
diating factors like the nature of task or the type of employee influence the
effectiveness of awards.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
“No appetite in human nature is more universal than
that for honor.”
(Adams, 1973/1790, p. 51)
This thesis has argued that awards are a unique kind of incentive that differ
from monetary incentives and from other forms of social recognition like
praise. A theoretical analysis as well as findings from manager interviews
highlighted a number of differences. Awards are more formal than most other
social incentives and differ from tournaments for promotion in terms of the
rewarded activities and the number of potential winners. Further, awards are
more durable than rewards in the form of gifts in-kind, which are consumed.
Unique features of awards are the publication of the recipients via a ceremony
or notification and an associated trophy or certificate. These give awards a
higher value as signals of unobservable employee characteristics than other
incentives do. Awards can also be used more flexibly than monetary forms
of compensation and require a less strict system for measuring performance.
Therefore, awards can be used to reward vaguely defined tasks and are less
likely to exhibit the detrimental effects on intrinsic motivation that have been
demonstrated for performance pay. In contrast to monetary compensation,
the value of awards can be influenced by the giver because it depends on
the scarcity of the award, the fairness of the procedures, and the prestige of
the organization. Further, awards induce loyalty so that employees are more
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likely to act in the interest of the company even in the absence of explicit
monetary incentives.
It was empirically demonstrated that awards influence employee behavior
and a number of theoretical accounts have been discussed that explain such
an effect. Specifically, it was shown that awards have a sizeable ex ante in-
centive effect on employee effort. A vignette study investigating which award
features are most important revealed the importance of publicity as well as the
size of the associated material reward. Finally, an empirical analysis of the
performance of call-center agents demonstrated that awards influence per-
formance ex post after they are presented and in unrewarded performance
dimensions.
These theoretical and empirical findings have implications for economic
theory as well as for practitioners. General implications for economic theory
concern how it can be enriched to account for non-monetary, social incentives
are included in the section on open issues below.
7.1 Implications for Economic Theory
So far, economic theory has mainly focused on material incentives to induce
effort and to align the interests of principal and agents. While this approach
has been very successful in explaining a wide variety of behaviors both in
economic settings and elsewhere, a number of relevant phenomena could not
be explained. To reconcile economic theory with empirical facts, the last
decade has seen an increasing attempt to incorporate non-standard prefer-
ences in the form of altruism, fairness, and self-image. However, the literature
has been largely silent about how these concerns can be instrumentalized as
incentives in principal-agent relationships. This thesis has provided empiri-
cal evidence that awards have a significant and systematic effect on behavior.
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Hence, awards should be considered an additional instrument in principal-
agent theory. By incorporating awards and other non-monetary rewards into
economic theory, further insights can be gained into how incentive systems
can take account of agents’ desire for (self-) esteem.
The econometric study at the call center demonstrated that awards have
positive spillover effects on performance dimensions that are not pertinent to
the award. At the same time, the literature on motivational crowding out has
shown that monetary payments may have negative spillovers on other perfor-
mance dimensions. So far, such spillover effects have rarely been addressed
in economic theory. An explicit account of spillovers may be valuable to bet-
ter understand if such spillovers can be exploited to induce agents to engage
in tasks for which direct incentives might not work.
This thesis further showed that the overall impact of an award depends on
individual award features like the type of publicity associated with winning.
This suggests that it might be worthwhile for economic theory to explicitly
model the different features of rewards rather than just their monetary value.
One would, for example, also expect that the impact of a monetary payment
differs depending on whether the payment is private or public knowledge.
The comparison of awards with other incentive instruments revealed im-
portant differences. It was shown that the nature of the task affects how well
awards work and if awards or monetary rewards are preferable. Specifically, it
was shown that awards are less likely than monetary compensation to crowd-
out the intrinsic motivation to engage in a task and to cause multi-tasking
problems in situations in which performance can only be partially measured.
Moreover, the effectiveness of awards depends on employee-, company-,
and country-specific variables such as hierarchical position, organizational
norms, and culture. Awards have, for example, a large incentive effect for
employees low in the company hierarchy. So far, economic theory has mostly
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abstracted from such environmental and situational factors. Hence, while it
could explain the basic mechanisms via which incentives work, it sometimes
had little predictive power with respect to the strength of the effect and the
types of situations suitable for a particular incentive.
Awards typically only have a small material value. Therefore some other
mechanism is needed to establish their value. One way to make awards valu-
able is by keeping them scarce. The value of awards also depends on the
sincerity with which they are presented because they are only esteemed if the
recipients perceive them to express genuine recognition. Therefore, the ways
the award is announced, its criteria are communicated, and it is presented to
the winner are important determinants of the incentive effect of awards. Thus,
the value of awards is can partly determined by the award-giving institution.
Economic theory has so far abstracted from issues like the communication
of the incentive system assuming that the value of the material awards that
were considered is exogenous. When extending the analysis beyond purely
material rewards, however, such features need to be incorporated.
The evidence presented also has implications for empirical work. Overall,
much more empirical research is needed on social incentives in general and
awards in particular. While economic theory has, at least, started to incorpo-
rate non-material motivators, systematic and clear empirical accounts of their
impact in the workplace are still rare. Exceptions include the literature on al-
truism and reciprocity that has been partly extended to the corporate setting.
As was pointed out earlier, there is basically no empirical evidence regard-
ing the effects of formal recognition programs like awards on work behavior
beyond what has been presented in this book. Further research is required to
illuminate the contextual factors that determine the effects of such programs
and how they interact with other incentives.
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7.2 Implications for Practitioners
As was discussed in the introduction of this thesis, recognition drives em-
ployee motivation, which is essential for business effectiveness and competi-
tiveness. Despite the substantial management literature on recognition,1 man-
agement has mostly ignored the power of recognition. Awards may be one
instrument that allows to tap this source of motivation.
The studies presented in this thesis clearly demonstrate the substantial im-
pact of awards on employee performance. This suggests that managers may
do well to systematically employ such non-monetary, social motivators in ad-
dition to or even in lieu of financial incentives. Further, the vignette study
pointed to the large role of publicity. Thus, managers should pay attention
to the design of an award ceremony or intranet publication when installing a
formal recognition program.
The main aim of this thesis was not to provide practitioners with detailed
suggestions about how and when to apply awards. Rather it was to demon-
strate empirically the relevance of social motivators like awards in a corporate
setting. Nevertheless, the conceptual analysis allows drawing some conclu-
sions on when human resources managers should use awards. Awards rather
than performance pay should be used when there are norms against monetary
compensation for a particular kind of activity or when performance evalu-
ation criteria cannot be clearly specified. Further, awards are preferable to
monetary incentives in situations in which agents care about signaling their
performance to outsiders and in situations in which social- and self-esteem
are important. Moreover, awards are preferable when management needs to
rely on a high degree of intrinsic motivation. Awards should be used in addi-
1 See the large number of practitioner guides on motivating employees with recognition like
Townsend and Gebhardt (1997); Glassock and Gram (1999); Ventrice (2003); Podmoroff
(2005); Nelson (2005).
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tion to appropriate monetary compensation when employees lack recognition
because, for example, they occupy the low ranks of the company hierarchy.
Awards serve as incentives along many dimensions because they entail
a number of different benefits for the recipient such as status, recognition,
current and future material benefits. Thus, awards are preferable to other
motivators when the needs of the employees are heterogeneous. Of course,
monetary compensation also has implications for an agent’s social standing.
But, awards provide a broader array of incentives. Awards may complement
feedback and praise, which play an important role for motivating agents on
a day-to-day basis. Awards are more formal than praise and feedback and
therefore bring a different kind of recognition. Specifically, awards serve as
a reward for outstanding performances above what can be considered to be
a “normal” part of an employee’s job. The formal nomination and selec-
tion procedure as well as the public presentation of the award and the public
recognition of company managers confer special value on awards.
For more detailed policy implications further research is needed to explore
the channels via which awards motivate and the contextual factors that influ-
ence the effectiveness of awards. These and other issues are examined in the
next section.
7.3 Limitations and Further Open Issues
As a first approach to awards, this thesis has treated awards as one uniform
kind of incentive instrument. However, there is a great variety of awards in
the corporate sector and beyond. These awards differ along a number of di-
mensions such as the degree of publicity, the type of activity rewarded, the
size of the monetary component, and whether award winners are determined
on an absolute or a relative scale. These differences likely have an impact on
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the attractiveness of awards to different kinds of employees. Thus, it might
be worthwhile to abandon the simplifying assumption that awards are un-
differentiated and instead ask how differences among awards influence their
motivational impact.
The empirical studies presented rely on experiments, field data, and the
vignette technique. I exploit the advantages of each method (such as the ex-
ogeneity of the award in the field experiment or the real-world employment
situation in the call center study). Taken together the findings from the differ-
ent studies present a comprehensive assessment of awards. That all studies
report a significant influence of awards points to the robustness of awards
effects. However, the differences in methodology used, the awards imple-
mented and the employment situation studied preclude a direct comparison
of the results.
Additional empirical research is needed on what determines the desirabil-
ity of social versus monetary incentives. Important variables include the
nature of the task, culture, the institutional environment, and the business
environment. Knowledge on these factors will help to augment economic
theory and allow more specific policy implications for human resources man-
agers. Moreover, the relative importance of the different channels via which
awards affect behavior deserves further inquiry. The large impact of public-
ity demonstrated in the vignette study suggests that social recognition plays a
substantial role with respect to the motivating power of awards. Nevertheless,
it might be valuable to know how much of the effect remains when only the
recipient herself knows about the award. If such private awards still motivate
significantly, they may be suitable incentive instruments in situations where
managers fear a large negative impact on nonrecipients.
Another open issue is the interdependency of incentives. An interesting
question in this regard is whether and when awards should be used in combi-
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nation with other incentives and when they can even substitute for them. As
is demonstrated in the organizational behavior literature, there are synergistic
effects between praise, money and feedback as incentives. Awards comprise
all three elements, and they may represent a combination that best exploits
the synergies present. At the same time, there may also be synergies when
combining awards with yet other incentive instruments. An important open
question is when and why monetary compensation leads to social recogni-
tion. In situations in which money is an accepted basis for granting prestige,
money may be less likely to crowd out the signaling value of pro-social activ-
ities, and awards may in fact be less effective than money in promoting such
activities.
Further, this study, just as much of the economics literature in general,
has focused on employee effort as the dependent variable. While effort is, of
course, important, practitioners consider other outcome variables, such as job
satisfaction, job retention and health. Future research should investigate the
comparative effect of different incentives on these outcome variables.
Additionally, economic theory should take into account that agents typ-
ically face more than one kind of incentive. The multi-dimensionality of
incentive provision has so far been neglected,2 and an explicit incorporation
may help explain phenomena like the fact that agents sometimes accept re-
ductions in their monetary payoffs if this increases social recognition or fu-
ture career options.
Different incentives may also interact with each other in a non-linear way.
A number of accounts have shown that the effect of monetary incentives for a
task that yields a positive image effect is smaller in public than in private set-
tings (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009). Further, the reduction of all incentives to their
2 Exceptions are a few theoretical accounts that study, for example, how status incentives or
promotions can complement variable monetary compensation (Auriol and Renault, 2008).
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material value has prohibited an inquiry into when and to what extent differ-
ent incentives may serve as complements or substitutes depending, for exam-
ple, on the nature of the task at hand. A mix of incentives can simultaneously
address a variety of needs and potentially overcome the negative side effects
associated with one-dimensional incentive schemes. The exploitation of a
social norm can mitigate effort distortions induced by pay-for-performance
schemes in settings that are susceptible to multi-tasking problems (Bruggen
and Moers, 2007).
7.4 Broadening the Scope of the Analysis:
Awards Outside the Corporate Sector
This thesis has studied awards as incentives in principal-agent relationships
where the employer gives awards to her employee. However, awards are
present in many other areas of social and economic life. In fact, awards are
present just about everywhere we look. Awards are present on the national
level in the form of state orders and decorations. In the arts, culture and
the media, awards are also of central importance. Prominent examples are
the Academy Awards (Oscars), the prizes handed out by the film festivals at
Cannes, the Grammy award for artistic significance in the field of recording,
or the Brooker and Pulitzer Prizes in literature. In sports, athletes may re-
ceive the honor of being chosen Sports Personality of the Year, and of being
admitted into one of the many Halls of Fame. Academia also has an elaborate
and extensive system of awards, such as honorary doctorates, prizes such as
the Fields Medal in mathematics or the Nobel Prizes, as well as a multitude of
prestigious fellowships. The media support this by creating their own awards
and by regularly choosing a Best Manager (Business Week) or a CEO of the
Year (Financial World).
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Awards in these areas may serve different goals and functions, and they
may also differ in terms of the mechanisms via which they work. On the
national level, for example, award ceremonies are used by heads of state to
demonstrate proximity to the “common man”. Also, awards are often given
to prominent persons to associate the government with popular individuals.
Thus, national awards differ from corporate awards in that the presentation of
the award brings a direct benefit to the award giver. Another interesting differ-
ence is that state awards are typically not associated with monetary bonuses.
This is consistent with the argument made above that a monetary payment is
necessary in the corporate sector to credibly signal the recognition provided
with the award in an environment characterized by monetary exchange and
profit seeking. Outside this realm, awards are less likely to be mistaken as
a cheap incentive device, especially because the publicity of these awards is
much greater,3 and the procedures for nominating and selecting the winners
are more elaborate, and hence costly, due to greater anonymity and a larger
pool of potential recipients.
The function and value of awards also differs between the sectors men-
tioned above. In the cultural sector, for example, many awards serve the
explicit purpose of being signals of ability and talent. As quality is hard to
assess even for informed parties, and as the supply of cultural products is
huge, prizes bring attention and serve as quality signals. Hence, basically all
awards in this sector have obvious material consequences. In fact, awards are
often the sole criterion people use when deciding which movie to go to or
which author’s book to buy. State orders are at the other extreme, having ba-
3 This ensures that the recipient receives substantial social recognition irrespective of the
recognition by the award giver. At the same time, the greater publicity establishes a well-
remembered association of the award giver with the recipient. This makes a careful and
serious selection of the winners necessary, especially because it is likely that the media
would expose the sham if the award went to an undeserving individual.
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sically no signaling value for the recipient but bringing immense recognition
in the form of public attention and recognition by heads of state.
Despite their prevalence, economics has produced little knowledge on
awards outside the corporate sector. One way to approach the subject would
be to study awards across countries by investigating the determinants that
render awards important in a country. Alternatively, studying the history of
certain kinds of awards like state orders, or comparing the prevalence and
kinds of awards in different sectors may be insightful.
The economic literature on awards is still in its infancy and many issues
remain open for future research. If the reader is now convinced that non-
material motivators in the form of awards have unique properties and signifi-
cantly influence behavior, this thesis has achieved its aim.
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Figure A.1: The Award Certificate
The text translates to “The Hunger Project Switzerland congratulates ... to
his/her dedicated and motivated work in creating the community address
database. This new database enables us to systematically approach
communities with appeals for donations.”
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Material to Chapter 5
B.1 Awards at the Company
B.1.1 The Thank You Reward
The Thank You reward is exchanged between colleagues. Whenever an em-
ployee chooses a colleague for a Thank You reward, the recipient immediately
receives a notification per email and a letter is sent to her home address. Once
a month, the three employees with the highest number of Thank You rewards
receive gifts (if two employees have the same number of awards, a lottery
decides). The first prize is dinner for two (value CHF 200); the second prize
is traveler’s checks (value CHF 100); the third prize is two cinema tickets
(value CHF 40).
B.1.2 The Gold Reward
The Gold Reward is presented for extraordinary, non-contractual performance
with an impact on the output of the whole work group. Each employee can
nominate a colleague for a Gold Reward. Approval is required by the group
manager of the nominated employee. Each Gold Reward is accompanied by
a certificate for the wall as well as a bonus between CHF 100 and CHF 250
($100 and $250). The reward is presented by the call center manager in front
of the other team members. Additionally, the names of the winners are pub-
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lished on the intranet and listed in the monthly company newsletter, and the
winners receive a trophy, which has their names engraved on it.
B.1.3 The Platinum Reward
The Platinum Reward is handed out (1) for exceptional efforts benefiting the
whole department or (2) for extraordinary performance over an extended pe-
riod of time. As a general rule, the behavior of the winner must clearly rep-
resent the values of the organization. Special attention is given to actions
that further cooperation and collaboration across departments. As is the case
with a Gold Reward, colleagues nominate individuals for a Platinum Reward.
Both the department head as well as the supra-departmental reward commit-
tee have to approve the nomination. The Platinum Reward is presented by
the human resources manager and comes with a bonus of between CHF 300
and CHF 750 ($300 and $750) and a trophy. The names of the winners are
published on the intranet, listed in the monthly company newsletter, and addi-
tionally mentioned at the yearly Christmas ceremony. The Platinum Reward
is presented much less frequently than the Gold Reward. Between 2004 and
2007, it was awarded to only seven employees in the call center. In general,
call center employees have little scope to affect the performance of the whole
department or to establish and foster cooperation between the departments.
Hence, they have only limited opportunities to qualify for a Platinum Reward.
B.1.4 The President Reward
The nomination and approval procedure for the President Reward is identical
to the one described for the Platinum Reward. However, this award requires
the CEO’s approval. The President Reward requites efforts that have bene-
fited the company as a whole. As only a few activities meet this requirement,
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there are only a few President Rewards each month. Examples of actions that
qualify for the President Reward are process innovations that save costs or
discoveries of major credit card frauds. The President Reward comes with
a trophy and an amount between CHF 1,000 and CHF 2,000 (the amount is
about the same in US$). The names of the winners are published on the in-
tranet, listed in the monthly company newsletter, and additionally announced
at the yearly Christmas ceremony.
B.1.5 The Employee of the Month
Each month, a committee chooses one of the Platinum and President Reward
winners of the previous month as the Employee of the Month (Gold Reward
winners are also considered when there are too few Platinum and President
Reward winners). The title is awarded to that Platinum or President Reward
winner who made the most significant contribution, in particular, a contribu-
tion that affects the success of the organization as a whole. The nomination
requires approval by the CEO, and the award is presented by the human re-
sources manager, often together with the CEO. The award comes with the
privilege of using a company mini Cooper (including gasoline) in the respec-
tive month and a trophy. Between 2004 and 2007, five call center agents were
awarded this title. An email containing a picture of the winner notifies all em-
ployees of the new Employee of the Month. In addition, the CEO mentions
all Employees of the Month winners and shows their pictures at the yearly
Christmas celebration.
Gold, Platinum, and President Rewards can be won multiple times by
each call center agent and can be awarded to multiple employees in the same
month. There is only one Employee of the Month per month, and this title can
be awarded to the same individual only once per calendar year.
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B.1.6 The Employee of the Year
At the end of each year, the reward committee and the CEO choose an Em-
ployee of the Year from among the Employee of the Month winners. The title
is awarded to that Employee of the Month whose contribution benefited the
company the most. The title is awarded at the yearly Christmas ceremony and
comes with a trophy as well as a week of paid vacation in a summer cottage
for up to six people including a generous allowance.
B.2 Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
With event studies two concerns are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
of the disturbances. These would render the least squares estimator ineffi-
cient and even inconsistent if some regressors are lagged dependent variables.
Standard test statistics, such as the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of
the residual (coefficient 0.125, significant at 1 percent level), obtained from
regressing performance on individual characteristics (tenure and tenure2)
and individual fixed effects, as well as the DW-statistic for panel data, do in-
deed suggest that disturbances are positively correlated.1 Serial correlation is
also detected when using the Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
(Wooldridge, 2002, 282–283) (p-value: 0.05 forH0: no first-order autocorre-
lation). We also ran the modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity
on the fixed effect model and found a highly significant test statistic. There-
fore, we reject the null hypothesis that the panels in our model have common
disturbance variances and that those disturbances are not correlated with the
regressors. Hence, adjustments need to be made. If the goal were to estimate
a model with complete dynamics, we needed to re-specify the model because
1 Second- and third-order autocorrelation coefficients are small (0.028 and 0.004) and in-
significant.
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strong serial correlation is often an indication of omitting important explana-
tory variables or functional form misspecification. However, as this was not
our goal, we had to find a way to carry out statistical inference in light of
this positive correlation and potential heteroskedasticity (Wooldridge, 2003,
p. 402 and Li and Hsiao, 1998).
Bertrand et al. (2004) discuss serial correlation as a frequent problem,
typically caused by the use of a fairly long time series, the positive serial cor-
relation in the dependent variable, and the high degree of persistence of the
intervention variable. They used Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how
several estimation techniques helped to solve this serial correlation problem.
They found that allowing for an unrestricted covariance structure over time
within groups, with or without making the assumption that the error terms in
all states follow the same process, worked well when the number of groups
(i.e., units to which the intervention is applied, here: individuals) was greater
than 50. This is satisfied in our sample. In addition, we allow for an ar-
bitrary variance-covariance matrix as we cluster on the team level. These
variance estimates are robust in the sense of providing correct coverage rates
to much more than panel-level heteroskedasticity. In particular, they are ro-
bust to any type of correlation within the observations of each panel/group.
Moreover, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that, if the intervention variable is not
serially correlated, OLS standard errors are consistent, despite the positive
serial correlation in the residuals. This is true in this study where the average
correlation of the award variable over time for each individual is -0.05 (cor-
relation coefficients vary between -0.31 and 0.47 with a mode and median of
-0.05).
To further check the robustness of the reported standard errors, we applied
OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) assuming heteroskedastic
and contemporaneously correlated disturbances across panels (a method ini-
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tially suggested by Beck and Katz, 1995)). The estimates calculated with the
Prais-Winsten FGLS (Prais and Winsten, 1954) assuming an AR(1) process
in the disturbances, do not differ in any meaningful way from the ones pre-
sented above. The same holds, when we apply the Driscoll and Kraay stan-
dard errors for fixed effect models (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). These standard
errors are robust to general forms of cross-sectional (spatial) and temporal
dependence when the time dimension becomes large. Because this nonpara-
metric technique of estimating standard errors places no restrictions on the
limiting behavior of the number of panels, the size of the cross-sectional di-
mension in finite samples does not constitute a constraint on feasibility —
even if the number of panels is much larger than T . Hence, we are confident
that the standard errors reported in the table are roughly accurate.
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Table B.1: Models with one-way and two-way Clustering
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
one-way two-way one-way two-way
pi−6 −0.041 −0.041 −0.069 −0.069
(−0.38) (−0.38) (−0.67) (−0.62)
pi−5 0.124 0.124 0.117 0.117
(1.30) (0.85) (1.31) (0.77)
pi−4 0.096 0.096 0.098 0.098
(1.16) (1.06) (1.47) (1.18)
pi−3 0.101 0.101 0.080 0.080
(0.89) (0.89) (0.84) (0.72)
pi−2 0.018 0.018 −0.008 −0.008
(0.16) (0.16) (−0.09) (−0.07)
pi−1 −0.041 −0.041 −0.020 −0.020
(−0.50) (−0.43) (−0.29) (−0.21)
pi0 −0.055 −0.055 −0.022 −0.022
(−0.70) (−0.54) (−0.33) (−0.22)
pi+1 0.236∗∗ 0.236∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(2.67) (1.94) (2.96) (2.00)
pi+2 0.027 0.027 0.035 0.035
(0.21) (0.19) (0.29) (0.25)
pi+3 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
(0.93) (1.25) (1.19) (1.31)
pi+4 0.049 0.049 0.017 0.017
(0.41) (0.48) (0.17) (0.16)
pi+5 −0.043 −0.043 −0.022 −0.022
(−0.56) (−0.51) (−0.40) (−0.25)
pi+6 0.073 0.073 0.033 0.033
(0.64) (0.57) (0.28) (0.29)
Tenure 0.017∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.009 0.009
(2.05) (2.01) (0.95) (0.82)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−1.59) (−1.35) (−0.81) (−0.62)
Constant 3.197∗∗∗ 3.197∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗
(35.97) (21.87) (34.91) (21.45)
Observations 1130 667
R2 0.581 0.563
Note: t statistics in parentheses∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.2 Instructions for the Participants
C.2.1 Explanation of the procedure to respondents
We will now present you with four different scenarios:
• Introduction of Incentive 1
• Introduction of Incentive 2
• Introduction of Incentive 3
• Introduction of Incentive 4.
In each scenario, a hypothetical incentive for international cooperation is in-
troduced at IBM Rüschlikon. Every respondent receives a different set of
4 incentives. The 4 incentives are randomly assigned. Here is an overview
over the range of possible incentives: The incentives are either cash incen-
tives or awards. They are worth between CHF 50 and CHF 10,000. Some
of the described awards come with a cash bonus, some with nothing, oth-
ers with a material gift such as a pen, a voucher for gourmet dinner, or a
4-day vacation (including additional days of paid vacation).
In the scenarios, the maximum number of recipients per year varies be-
tween 1 and 20. In some scenarios, a list of recipients will be published on
the intranet. In some instances there will be a ceremony for the winners.
For each scenario we will ask you the same question:
• What is your willingness to share the finding now?
Please look at these questions as a thought experiment and try to answer
them by putting yourself into each scenario.
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C.2.2 How the vignettes were introduced to respondents
Please imagine the following.
(This description is valid for all 4 incentive descriptions. We will repeat it
each time so that you can look at it again if you want to.)
In addition to the existing bonuses and awards, IBM Research announces
a new incentive for individuals who have made great efforts to promote co-
operation between labs.
Recipients will be selected annually, starting in December 2007.
The incentive is for individuals demonstrating exceptional efforts to pro-
mote cooperation on projects involving employees from different research
labs and IBM units.
All employees on the IBM payroll are eligible.
Criteria for selection are:
• Initiation and maintenance of successful collaborations among research
labs.
• Exceptional dedication to making teamwork succeed across national
boundaries.
• The sharing of ideas and knowledge among labs.
C.2.3 How the willingness to share the finding was elicited from
the respondents
Situation Description: Please imagine the following:
• You are assigned to an international project that involves several re-
search laboratories.
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• Apart from you, there are two employees from Beijing and two from
New York on the team.
• You have never worked with the employees from the other labs on a
team before. On this team, management does not intervene much in
the project.
• You have made an important finding on this team.
• This finding can be used to greatly enhance the international project
you are working on at the moment.
• However, the finding is fundamental in the sense that it is very relevant
to a variety of other projects as well.
Now you have two options.
• First, you can share this finding now with your team colleagues
before publishing it under your own name.
This would solve some important problems on the project and greatly
enhance the quality and speed of the project.
• Second, you can wait and share the finding later, after it has been
published.
This would eliminate the risk that it could be used by your Chinese
or U.S. colleagues in their own work without giving you the appropri-
ate credit for your work, both within the company and when writing
papers. You don’t think that this is very likely, but the risk exists.
Please indicate how realistic you consider the described situation.
6: very realistic . . . 1: very unrealistic; no answer
On a scale between 1 and 10, what is your willingness to share the finding
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now?
(Sharing the finding now means choosing the first option.)
10: I would certainly share now. . . . 1: I definitely would not share now; no
answer.
C.3 Wording of the Levels of the Reward Character-
istics
A particular vignette is constructed by randomly selecting one factor level
for each of the four factors. In the following, we present the four different
factors, their levels, the corresponding texts in the vignettes, and the opera-
tionalization of the factors in the statistical analysis.
Factor 1, the type of accompanying reward.
The wording of this factor depended on the monetary value of the reward
(factor 3) and will be presented in the description of factor 3 below.
Factor 1, level a, gift.
Factor 1, level b, cash payment.
In the regression models factor 1 was treated as a dummy variable, Gift, that
took the value 1 if the reward was accompanied by a gift and the value 0 if
the reward was accompanied by a payment in cash.
Factor 2, the degree of publicity.
The three factor levels had the following texts.
Factor 2, level a, anonymous.
“The lab director congratulates the winner(s) privately. Award recipients are
not published on the intranet.”
Factor 2, level b, announcement on the intranet.
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“The lab director congratulates the winner(s) privately. Award recipients are
published on the intranet.”
Factor 2, level c, announcement on the intranet and ceremony.
“The lab director congratulates the winner(s) in the presence of the other
members of the lab at the kick-off meeting in January 2008. Award recipients
are published on the intranet.”
In the regression models the factor levels were represented with 2 dummy
variables. The variable Intranet was a dummy that took on the value 1 if
the list of recipients was published on the intranet without a ceremony. The
variable Ceremony was a dummy that took the value 1 if the recipients were
announced on the intranet and the award was handed out in a ceremony. Fac-
tor level a was represented by both dummies taking the value 0, factor b was
represented as Intranet = 1 and Ceremony = 0, and factor level c was rep-
resented as Intranet = 0 and Ceremony = 1.
Factor 3, monetary value of cash payment or gift associated with
the reward.
To determine the monetary value of the reward we used a two-step sampling
procedure. We did this to ensure that we sampled the space of monetary
values adequately. Specifically, we first randomly determined whether the
reward would have no monetary value, a small monetary value, a medium
monetary value, or a high monetary value. Second, if the award came with a
cash payment (Factor 2, level b), one of three numerical values was selected
from the category selected in step one.
Factor 3, level a: Zero monetary value
Factor 3, level b: Small monetary value (CHF 50, 150, or 300)
Factor 3, level c: Medium monetary value (CHF 1,000, 2,000,
or 4,000)
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Factor 3, level d: High monetary value (CHF 6,000, 8,000, or
10,000)
In the regression models the variable V alue was treated as quantitative and
took one of the following values: 0, 50, 150, 300, 1,000, 2,000, 4,000, 6,000,
8,000, 10,000.
The wording of factor 3 depended on the type of accompanying reward (fac-
tor 1). Because the values of gifts are typically vague, our set of possible gifts
had four elements, namely one gift for every category described above. Im-
portantly, the set of possible gifts did not include one gift for each of the pos-
sible monetary values listed above. Depending on the category of monetary
value drawn, a gift of corresponding value was described to the participants.
The associated monetary value used in the statistical analysis was equal to the
intermediate amount in the category. For example, if the gift was of medium
value, the value used in the statistical analysis was CHF 2,000. In case the
reward came with a payment in cash, a random draw decided which of the
values in each category was displayed to the participant.
The texts associated with the different levels of factor 3 are displayed below.
Factor 3, level a: Zero monetary value
Factor 1, level a, award with gift:
“In recognition of the recipients’ contribution, the award comes with a ball-
point pen labeled ‘Thank you for your exceptional contribution!’.”
Factor 1, level b, award with cash payment:
“The award is not accompanied by a payment in cash.”
Factor 3, level b: Small monetary value (CHF 50, 150, or 300)
Factor 1, level a, award with gift:
“In recognition of the recipients’ contribution, the award comes with a gift
basket including a good bottle of champagne, two bottles of wine, and vari-
ous specialty food items.”
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Factor 1, level b, award with cash payment:
“The award comes with CHF Y in cash.”, where Y is randomly chosen from
{50, 150, 300}.
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Factor 3, level c: Medium monetary value (CHF 1,000, 2,000,
or 4,000)
Factor 1, level a, award with gift:
“In recognition of the recipients’ contribution, the award comes with an addi-
tional day of paid vacation and a voucher for a gourmet menu for four people
at the Restaurant Petermann’s Kunststuben in Küsnacht, where the star cook
Horst Petermann will personally cater the party.”
The value of this gift used in the regression was CHF 2,000.
Factor 1, level b, award with cash payment:
“The award comes with CHF Y in cash.”, where Y is randomly chosen from
{1,000, 2,000, 4,000}.
Factor 3, level d: High monetary value (CHF 6,000, 8,000, or
10,000)
Factor 1, level a, award with gift:
“As a symbol of recognition, the award comes with a voucher for a trip
of 4 days for two adults and children to a destination of their choice, all-
inclusive. This trip will not be deducted from your normal paid vacation and
thus presents additional paid vacation days.”
The value of this gift used in the regression was CHF 8,000. The value of
the gift is based on the fact that IBM estimates that one workday for one em-
ployee is worth about CHF 1,000.
Factor 1, level b, award with cash payment:
“The award comes with CHF Y in cash.”, where Y is randomly chosen from
{6,000, 8,000, 10,000}.
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Factor 4, the maximum number of recipients per year.
“There will be up toX recipients (Z% of researchers and non-technical staff)
per year in the Rüschlikon office.”, where X and Z are chosen from the set
{(1, 0.4%), (2, 1%), (6, 2%), (10, 4%), (16, 6%), (20, 8%)}.
In the regression models, factor 5 was treated as a quantitative variable,
#Recipients, with values 1, 2, 6, 10, 16, and 20.
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